@benrileysmith UK government is looking for evidence of foreign involvement b/c of belief that DPRK couldn't have made progress without outside help. (2/n)
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At @CSIS @csisponi yesterday, Frank Miller engaged with my recent essay on targeting. In a collegial spirit, I'd like to respond to him here--he has mispresented me--and accept his offer to a public debate.
I believe the United States should adopt CMI targeting (Conventional Military forces and war-supporting Industry) because it would make us and our allies more secure, whether or not China or Russia changed their targeting policies (which, again, I don't think they would). (3/n)
<THREAD>There's been evidence-free speculation that Prigozhin may try to seize a nuclear weapon or two. I think this fear is misplaced. That said, there is a nuclear risk associated with this insurrection--one that isn't yet being discussed. (1/n)
CAVEAT: The situation on the ground in Russia is clearly very fluid and unpredictable, and I'm certainly not going to try to predict what's going to happen. Here I aim to assess what we should worry about NOT how worried we should be. (2/n)
An armed insurrection in a nuclear-armed state is clearly disquieting (even if its current leader goes around invading his neighbors). But, for two reasons, I don't see Prigozhin (who probably isn't much better BTW) seeking a nuclear weapon. (3/n)
<THREAD>China now appears to have a comprehensive early-warning system against a U.S. first strike, allowing it to operationalize launch-under-attack options.
Stay tuned a new discovery: a new-ish Chinese radar that rotates (no, not Korla).
(1/n)
As Chinese sources and the Pentagon have reported, China has been developing an early-warning (EW) system for a decade-ish so it could launch its nuclear forces before being destroyed by a US first strike (launch under attack). (2/n)
Recent analyses have suggested China’s EW system is not yet complete. According to one news story, the geostationary TJS-2, -5, and -6 satellites are for EW. If so, they'd detect US Trident-D5 launches from the pacific, BUT… (3/n)
<THREAD>As @POTUS, @RishiSunak, and @AlboMP announce AUKUS submarine plan, here’s my assessment of the technical and proliferation risks.
BLUF: They’ve made serious efforts to mitigate those risks, but those that remain are real and significant.
(1/n)
Here’s the plan (in brief): 1. 🇬🇧 & 🇺🇸 deploy SSNs* in🇦🇺(from 2027) 2. 🇦🇺deploys Virginia-class SSNs purchased from 🇺🇸 (from ~2032) 3. 🇦🇺deploys AUKUS SSNs, designed and produced with UK (starting in early 2040s)
If these reports are correct, this program is a goat rodeo in the making. 🇦🇺, which has never operated an SSN before, now plans to operate two different classes. Plus modifying 🇬🇧-built Astute SSNs and introducing 🇺🇸 technology will add significantly to the technical risk.
Prior to today, I gave a ~50% chance of 🇦🇺 fielding SSNs by 2040, on the basis of reporting that it would go for an unmodified design. I think the odds of deploying Ozstute are now ~30% (though maybe still 50% of fielding Virginia).
Not fielding SSNs would significantly mitigate the negative nonproliferation consequences of AUKUS though!
Some history. Back in the 1960s, the U.S. did keep aircraft--B-52s actually--loaded with nuclear weapons on airborne alert. This posture had obvious disadvantages as became apparent when... you know... aircraft crashed. (2/n)
Following the Thule crash, airborne alerts were abruptly ended. Instead, strategic bombers were kept on strip alert, loaded with nuclear weapons and ready to take off promptly. (3/n)