@benrileysmith UK government is looking for evidence of foreign involvement b/c of belief that DPRK couldn't have made progress without outside help. (2/n)
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Ukraine has reportedly attacked the Russian early-warning radar at Armavir. This strike was a bad idea. It provided only limited military benefit to Ukraine and exacerbates nuclear risks.
The Armavir radar is part of Russia's "strategic" early warning system. It is designed to detect an incoming nuclear strike and enable Russia to launch its nuclear forces before they are destroyed.
However, such radars can also contribute to nonnuclear warfighting--not least by detecting nonnuclear ballistic missiles and enabling defenses. I assume that Ukraine hit this radar to help U.S.-supplied ATACMS penetrate Russian defenses. (3/n)
At @CSIS @csisponi yesterday, Frank Miller engaged with my recent essay on targeting. In a collegial spirit, I'd like to respond to him here--he has mispresented me--and accept his offer to a public debate.
I believe the United States should adopt CMI targeting (Conventional Military forces and war-supporting Industry) because it would make us and our allies more secure, whether or not China or Russia changed their targeting policies (which, again, I don't think they would). (3/n)
<THREAD>There's been evidence-free speculation that Prigozhin may try to seize a nuclear weapon or two. I think this fear is misplaced. That said, there is a nuclear risk associated with this insurrection--one that isn't yet being discussed. (1/n)
CAVEAT: The situation on the ground in Russia is clearly very fluid and unpredictable, and I'm certainly not going to try to predict what's going to happen. Here I aim to assess what we should worry about NOT how worried we should be. (2/n)
An armed insurrection in a nuclear-armed state is clearly disquieting (even if its current leader goes around invading his neighbors). But, for two reasons, I don't see Prigozhin (who probably isn't much better BTW) seeking a nuclear weapon. (3/n)
<THREAD>China now appears to have a comprehensive early-warning system against a U.S. first strike, allowing it to operationalize launch-under-attack options.
Stay tuned a new discovery: a new-ish Chinese radar that rotates (no, not Korla).
(1/n)
As Chinese sources and the Pentagon have reported, China has been developing an early-warning (EW) system for a decade-ish so it could launch its nuclear forces before being destroyed by a US first strike (launch under attack). (2/n)
Recent analyses have suggested China’s EW system is not yet complete. According to one news story, the geostationary TJS-2, -5, and -6 satellites are for EW. If so, they'd detect US Trident-D5 launches from the pacific, BUT… (3/n)
<THREAD>As @POTUS, @RishiSunak, and @AlboMP announce AUKUS submarine plan, here’s my assessment of the technical and proliferation risks.
BLUF: They’ve made serious efforts to mitigate those risks, but those that remain are real and significant.
(1/n)
Here’s the plan (in brief): 1. 🇬🇧 & 🇺🇸 deploy SSNs* in🇦🇺(from 2027) 2. 🇦🇺deploys Virginia-class SSNs purchased from 🇺🇸 (from ~2032) 3. 🇦🇺deploys AUKUS SSNs, designed and produced with UK (starting in early 2040s)
If these reports are correct, this program is a goat rodeo in the making. 🇦🇺, which has never operated an SSN before, now plans to operate two different classes. Plus modifying 🇬🇧-built Astute SSNs and introducing 🇺🇸 technology will add significantly to the technical risk.
Prior to today, I gave a ~50% chance of 🇦🇺 fielding SSNs by 2040, on the basis of reporting that it would go for an unmodified design. I think the odds of deploying Ozstute are now ~30% (though maybe still 50% of fielding Virginia).
Not fielding SSNs would significantly mitigate the negative nonproliferation consequences of AUKUS though!