Alexander Gabuev 陳寒士 Profile picture
Mar 6, 2018 9 tweets 3 min read Read on X
Who is Ye Jianming, the mysterious potential buyer for 14% stake in @RosneftEN? @LeonidKovachich, a @CarnegieRu regular contributor, connects the dots between CEFC and the Chinese military intelligence (in RUS) 1/ rbc.ru/opinions/polit…
In 2003-2005, Ye has worked as deputy secretary-general of China Association for International Friendly Contacts, according to CEFC annual report of 2013 de-tenants.org/PageContent/Qa…
CAIFC is one of the public faces of Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission 中央军事委员会政治工作部, part of China's military intelligence
These dots in public records, confirmed by some of my recent interviews on CEFC in China and around the world, may help to explain Ye's sudden rise and demise. CEFC problems coincide with grand purge in PLA, including downfall of Fang Fenghui
If Ye Jianming and his company are indeed tied to Chinese military intelligence, bromance between him and Igor Sechin won't be surprising. Before becoming Putin's secretary and then Russia's oil tzar, Sechin started his career in the USSR intel as military "translator" in Angola
The talks started in June 2017, and led to swift agreement by It September 8. Worth noting that Putin wasn't present at the signing ceremony of the MOU, and the only contact between Putin and CEFC executive was at VTB's investor conference in October en.cefc.co/detail/news/77…
Yet another dot: Ye Yanming was business partner with Ye Jingzi 叶静子, eldest daughter of general Ye Xuanning 叶选宁 (longtime head of PLA intel) and granddaughter of one of PLA founders Ye Jianying 叶剑英: acnnewswire.com/press-release/…美亚娱乐公布配售280,000,000股予凯利资本(香港)
Mysterious CEFC and CAIFC, public facade of Chinese military intel, share very similar logos. #coincidence Image
These logos could also work well for CEFC and CAIFC Image

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More from @AlexGabuev

Jul 24
🇨🇳🇷🇺🧵
Is China distancing itself from Russia economically, as the West urges Beijing to do amid war in Ukraine? Not really, if you look at this week's travel of Ding Xuexiang, one of Xi's top economic lieutenants. 1/15 Image
2/ This year 🇺🇸 has invested a lot of effort to choke off Chinese support for the Russian war machine, including threats of sanctions against 🇨🇳 banks involved in trade, and tightening the screws against landmark projects like Arctic LNG-2. Is it working?
3/ 🇨🇳customs statistics shows that breakneck pace (+26.3%) of 🇨🇳🇷🇺 trade growth in 2023 has slowed down to just 1.8% in Jan-June 2024. Key here is a visible drop in 🇨🇳 exports to 🇷🇺 by 0.8% (imports have grown by 3.9%). customs.gov.cn/customs/302249…
Read 15 tweets
Jun 14
Why is China not attending 🇺🇦 Peace Summit in🇨🇭? What may be 🇨🇳 plan for diplomacy around the war started by Xi's partner Vladimir Putin? Some thoughts in a new @ForeignAffairs piece, and more details in this🧵
foreignaffairs.com/china/why-chin…
2/ Roots of 🇨🇳 decision to skip 🇨🇭 summit can be traced back to last August, when Xi's special envoy Li Hui 李辉 appeared in Jeddah, which sparked expectations that Beijing is ready to engage in multilateral diplomacy based on @ZelenskyyUa peace formula. wsj.com/articles/with-…
3/ However, after Li sat through the discussion and had brief conversation with @JakeSullivan46 & Toria Nuland, China's conclusion was that it shouldn't engage in next rounds. The agenda is set by @AndriyYermak, the peace formula doesn't change to include 🇨🇳 suggestions, and... Image
Read 16 tweets
May 13
What does a cabinet reshuffle in Russia mean for 🇨🇳🇷🇺 government-to-government ties? It's about continuity, deepening, and long-term. Also, as Beijing and Moscow expand their defense industrial cooperation, Putin has elevated high-caliber professionals with China experience. 🧵 Image
2/ Putin's government set to be appointed by Duma today is an old-new cabinet, with very few changes. This is a quite competent team that has worked together for 3+ years. They have weathered COVID, war, and sanctions - much better than Russian generals perform on the battlefield
3/ For 🇨🇳🇷🇺 government-to-government ties, this continuity is very important. Since Xi's state visit to Moscow in March 2023, the Kremlin and Zhongnanhai have invested serious effort in order to get senior officials on both sides to know each other well.
Read 19 tweets
May 10
Is 🇺🇸 recent push to choke off 🇨🇳 supplies of dual-use goods to 🇷🇺 having an effect? It looks like it, according to the newest Chinese customs data. But I'm not holding my breath: over the last 2+ years Beijing and Moscow have found ways to adapt to U.S. sanctions. Short 🧵 Image
2/ Newest customs statistics is out, and it shows that Beijing's exports to Russia continue to decline for a second month. April shipments to 🇷🇺 are $8.3b, down 13.7% compared to April 2023. This is bigger than yoy exports drop to 🇺🇸 (-2.8%) or 🇪🇺 (-3.6%). customs.gov.cn/customs/302249…
3/ Russian exports to China are growing ($11.5b in April), but the drop of imports is significant and it builds on nearly 16% drop in March - the first such decline of 🇨🇳 exports to 🇷🇺 since summer 2022. bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
Read 10 tweets
May 9
🇷🇺⚔️🇺🇦🔭🇨🇳
What lessons are Chinese leaders learning from Russia’s war on Ukraine? They may be the opposite of those the @WhiteHouse wants them to learn. Some thoughts from a @WSJopinion piece, in a short🧵
wsj.com/articles/xi-ji…
2/ The demonstrative effect of Western reaction to Putin's aggression was very much on U.S. policymakers' mind very early on. Here is how @SecBlinken is talking about it last year in Helsinki. ru.usembassy.gov/secretary-blin…
Image
3/ And here is @CIA director William Burns discussing it in his recent essay for @ForeignAffairs: foreignaffairs.com/united-states/…
Image
Read 17 tweets
Apr 25
The fact that 🇷🇺 will receive 28% less for its gas in 🇨🇳 than in Europe, but still seeks to expand gas sales to China, illustrates a dilemma Moscow faces in economic relations with Beijing. Simply put: amid war in 🇺🇦, there is no alternative to dependency on China. 🧵1/14 Image
2/ According to this excellent story in @business, 🇷🇺 government expects to earn 28% less in 🇨🇳 market for same amounts of gas than in EU & Turkey. For example, in 2024 it's $257 vs $320 for 1,000 m2. bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
3/ This reality shouldn't come as a surprise. As my @CarnegieEndow colleague @SergeyVakulenk0 has established in the best to date study on 🇨🇳🇷🇺 piped gas pricing formula, a discount benefiting Beijing is nearly pre-programmed in the devil's bargain. carnegieendowment.org/politika/89552
Read 14 tweets

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