.@JordanMBecker and I are very pleased to share a new article of ours. Published in Post-Soviet Affairs, it is titled ‘The Art of Partial Commitment: The Politics of Military Assistance to Ukraine’ (tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.10…)

This thread below summarizes its main points. 1/19 This piece began in 2020/21, inspired by a simple question: how much military assistance Ukraine was at all receiving from NATO members? At the time, there was little public information available: only scattered news reports and incomplete data efforts like SIPRI.

2/19

I read a lot of terrific books this year. Below are a selection of those that stood out for me, whether because they were really impactful or simply very well done.

A thread of books in no particular order. Olesya Khromeychuk's (@OKhromeychuk) A Loss is a short book that packs much emotional heft and insight on a war that was, at the time of its writing, largely localized in eastern Ukraine. One of the most essential reads from the war.
cup.columbia.edu/book/a-loss/97…

Macron: "We must not humiliate Russia so that the day when the fighting stops we can build an exit ramp through diplomatic means ... I am convinced that it is France's role to be a mediating power."

Ooh boy, where to begin? reuters.com/world/europe/r… Macron is a thoroughly mediocre statesman with an exagerrated sense of his historic destiny. Books will be written about how he missed a massive opportunity to use the Russian offensive to frame and to push his vision of European strategic autonomy around containment of Russia.

This is a decent essay by Stephen Walt that applies balance-of-threat theory to illuminate why Finland and Sweden are now formally applying for NATO membership. At the same time, it reveals the problems of balance-of-threat theory.

A 🧵. foreignpolicy.com/2022/05/18/nat… 1) It is unclear what the theory is trying to explain. Purportedly, it is alliance formation, but we do not know whether it is the formation of any security partnership or the signing of a security treaty. There is a measurement problem here: when does alignment become alliance?

In mid-March, @Lauren_Sukin and I conducted a survey experiment to gauge popular attitudes in Poland, Romania, and the three Baltic countries with regards to their security guarantees and the nuclear dimensions of Russia's war against Ukraine.

A thread. thebulletin.org/2022/04/poll-r… At the outset, we must admit we could not get nationally representative samples in the Baltic countries. Too hard. We did get them in Poland and Romania, however. Our findings from the Baltic countries are generally in line with our priors and what we find elsewhere, though.

NATO has bent itself backwards to be compliant with the NATO-Russia Founding Act by not positioning substantial combat forces east of Germany on a permanent basis. The Founding Act was already dead, but Belarus' announcement today about Russian troops is its epitaph.

Quick 🧵.

https://twitter.com/GLandsbergis/status/1495363217740156932

NATO deployed Battlegroups to Poland and the Baltic countries on a rotational basis to abide by the NRFA. There are supposedly signaling benefits. Yet practical drawbacks exist: such forces don't stay long enough to develop familiarity, and strains on personnel are significant.

So, Washington plans to discuss missile deployments to Europe with Russia as a potential issue-area where there might be some bargain.

Quick thoughts in the thread below.
washingtonpost.com/national-secur… 1) Of course, many would be upset that the US is willing to bargain away any aspect of its force posture in Europe with Russia. I am sympathetic to this view, because it rewards Russia's military build-up on Ukraine's border and threats of war with little to no return.

The title of this article is misleading.

Some very, very quick reactions below.
nbcnews.com/politics/natio… 1) The article indicates that the Biden admin may pull out some US forces in Poland (and the Baltics) *provided* that Russia takes "reciprocal, equivalent steps to scale back forces" in Ukraine. "Pulling back forces from Ukraine" not "sufficient here". Some messy language here.

I am uncomfortable with the suggestion sometimes made here that Belarusian protestors would have succeeded in dislodging Lukashenka and his government if they resorted to violence at the outset. For one, it is a difficult counterfactual to assess because Belarusian authorities have had little compunction in using lots of brutal violence. Such a strategy would bear massive risks. Civilian losses could have been far higher for possibly little gain.

Larry Wolff's new book on Woodrow Wilson and his approach towards Eastern Europe is excellent and full of insightful nuggets.

Here are some passages that I found particularly interesting. Wilson apparently contemplated very briefly that the United States should take administrative control of Constantinople. He really did not like the Ottomans, but he understood quickly that this idea was a non-starter.

I think Mearsheimer was more wrong than right in his 1990 piece. That is because of several predictions that Paul does not mention here in his otherwise compelling thread.

So here we go. 1/x

https://twitter.com/ProfPaulPoast/status/1412739908565884928

One is with respect to ethnic conflict in Eastern Europe. JJM clearly argues that the Soviet Union "tightly controlled" its satellites. Absent that control, ethnic tensions might resurge and Eastern Europe may be awash with violence. 2/

Talking with colleagues and reading threads, I gave some more thought to the White House's stated intention to withdraw up to 9,500 troops to Germany.

I am not as reflexively against the withdrawals as before, but I have very strong reservations. A thread. 1/n To begin with, there is a sound strategic logic for Washington to bringing down the number of troops in the region. Not only is Europe wealthy, but East Asia is of greater geopolitical importance. Having 70k troops in Europe may not be sustainable given these priorities. 2/n

Much int'l discussion about non-aggression pacts in the 1930s since Putin sought to label Poland a Nazi collaborator.

Many misconceptions, half-truths, and falsities abound, of which M. Merchet's tweet is just one example.

And so a long thread.

https://twitter.com/jdomerchet/status/1210878964836847616?s=20

Yes, Poland signed a non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany. No one serious disputes this. Key is the context in which Warsaw made this decision.

THREAD:

It's finally here ... on Friday evening no less: the Department of Defence's long-awaited Indo-Pacific Strategic Report (#IPSR: link: media.defense.gov/2019/May/31/20…).

Here are a few things noteworthy to me as someone interested in alliance politics and Europe. 1. Much here about the general value of alliances. It emphasises joint preparedness; notes how allies and partners are helpful for
achieving peace, deterrence, and interoperable warfighting capability; and argues for a networked approach to grasp local security relations.