Last week's Devolution AG Reference seems problematic to me.

Here's a quick THREAD connecting the outcome to what the court says about interpretation of the devolution statutes.

supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uks… The case is the latest in a long line of authority rejecting an approach to interpreting the devolution statutes proposed in Robinson, where Lord Bingham (quite famously) said this:

A quick thread on parliamentary scrutiny and the sunset clause in the Coronavirus Bill.

Summary: It's inadequate even as sunset clauses go, and they are never very good. And the problems might matter here even more than usual. (This is derived from my research, in particular my published work on parliamentary scrutiny of delegated legislation, where i used sunset clauses - in that instance in terrorism legislation - as a case study).

Clause 3(3) of the Benn Bill is surprisingly drafted (in the circumstances).

I'm sure there are good reasons for this (I can think of some). But it might need tightening up somehow.

Here's a thread which explains why: A central aim of the Bill (and of the onerous procedures it is now going through) is to take away the PM's power to avoid or refuse an extension. That is the sense in which it avoids no-deal

If the Bill preserves a way for the PM to refuse an extension, it will have failed

2/n

A thread on "exit day"

In summary - there will be a big mess if the SI changing exit day isn't made; but it isn't the mess people seem widely to be expecting The legal position is this:

Brexit day is, for now, 12 April (it might be extended further)
Exit day is, for now, still 29 March (the gvt has the power to align it with Brexit day)

There are some pretty serious things happening around the meaningful vote provisions and s13 of the Withdrawal Act, which sets out the House of Commons' powers to intervene in the end stages of Brexit negotiations. For example... 1. The indefinite suspension of the s13(1)(b) meaningful vote
By law, the deadline is "before the European Parliament decides whether it consents", conceivably too late for the meaningful vote to be, well, meaningful.
Until it happens, no "plan B" vote under s13(6) is required

So the CJEU has confirmed that the UK can unilaterally revoke under Article 50. This has important ramifications for domestic law

A thread about 2 of them:

1. It renders Miller dead letter.
2. It undermines the argument that legislation is needed prior to revocation.

https://twitter.com/EUCourtPress/status/1072039706123210752

FIRST, Miller. It is now clear that Miller was essentially decided per incuriam. It depended on the hypothesis (accepted by both sides) that once triggered Art 50 was irrevocable. That hypothesis (about EU law) has now been shown to be false.

A thread with some thoughts on Article 4 of the Draft Withdrawal Agreement.
Art 4 is (amongst other things) a Supremacy Clause.
It has implications for parliamentary sovereignty. And parliamentary sovereignty has implications for it. (1/) Art 4 requires Parliament to pass a provision binding future Parliaments. This new provision will be in some ways narrower and in others broader than s2(4) of the EC Act 1972. Some of this leads to constitutional novelty. It'll likely be OK, but is unlikely to be plain sailing.

Almost the last thing I taught my public law students before this infuriating hiatus was the topic of consultation.
And then, over the weekend, UUK proposed a consultation as their way of ending the #USSstrike.
Here's a thread inspired by that coincidence. Part of what I taught in those lectures was the (so-called) Sedley principles, which lawyers use to evaluate the adequacy of consultation processes. I rather enjoy teaching the Sedley principles. And I encourage my students to enjoy learning them too.