Senior Advisor @Heritage. Former NSA @HawleyMO. Views my own.
Jul 10, 2024 • 9 tweets • 2 min read
The @NATO summit has begun, but officials aren't talking about the single most important problem facing the Alliance today:
The US military can only win a single major war at a time. So long as China is the priority, that means we can't also lead in Europe's defense. 1/
That's because many of the US forces required to deter or defeat China are also expected by NATO allies to be available to defend the Baltics, Poland, etc., including submarines, bombers, fighters, certain ground-based fires, air & missile defense, critical munitions... 2/
Nov 17, 2023 • 11 tweets • 3 min read
"Until now, the U.S. has borne much of the burden of helping Ukraine militarily, with tens of billions of dollars in assistance. Now, Europeans are planning to take a growing role."
This is a victory for realism. It's also the only viable path to a durable peace in Ukraine. 1/11
The USA was always going to struggle to meet all of Ukraine's military requirements given the difficulties facing Ukrainian forces in the field, Russia's structural advantages (e.g., manpower, regeneration), and competing priorities for the US (e.g., Taiwan, Israel). 2/11
Oct 26, 2023 • 8 tweets • 2 min read
Outstanding letter from @RepGallagher & @RepYoungKim to @SECNAV Del Toro on his service's failure to prioritize arming Taiwan as quickly as possible given looming threat of war in the Pacific.
Here are the key quotes:
1/8
static.politico.com/f4/02/771fc788…
"At this hour of danger, however, when we should be arming Taiwan to the maximum to strengthen its defenses and deter China, bureaucratic delays within the Navy are impeding the timely production and delivery of key weapons to Taiwan – including critical anti-ship missiles" 2/8
Sep 16, 2023 • 8 tweets • 2 min read
Taiwanese officials continue to show a lack of good judgment by dragging themselves into the US debate over aid to Ukraine.
This can only raise serious questions about Taiwan's understanding of US politics & commitment to its own defense. 1/8
First of all, Ukraine is one of the most polarizing issues in US politics today. In what world does it make sense for Taipei to make itself part of that debate? Do Taiwanese officials really think it's a good idea for Americans to think of Taiwan & Ukraine in the same bucket? 2/8
Aug 8, 2023 • 7 tweets • 2 min read
Taiwan has shown a lack of seriousness about defending itself.
As @RANDCorporation reports, this is evident in Taiwan's defense spending, acquisitions, & readiness.
Hsiao's remarks are another data point to this effect.
Trust is vital in any partnership. But it has to be earned.
That's harder when a partner regularly ignores a threat or fails to take appropriate steps to deal w/ it.
In this case, we should keep trying to build trust. But we can't just take what they say at face value.
2/7
Jul 27, 2023 • 18 tweets • 3 min read
Devastating assessment of Taiwan's defense preparations by @RANDCorporation.
Bottom line, the USA should do everything possible to deter China. But Taiwan has to do its part—and it is not.
Full report at link.
Key quotes:
1/18
rand.org/pubs/research_…
"Taiwan faces an existential threat but is not responding in a way that suggests that it recognizes and accepts this." 2/
Jul 25, 2023 • 7 tweets • 2 min read
We've spent decades enabling China's rise, incl. by offshoring US industry & turning a blind eye to PRC industrial espionage, unfair trade practices, etc.
If that didn't show we weren't trying to prevent PRC development, I don't know what will.
Instead, China took advantage of US policy to grow more powerful, even as it grew more belligerent. So the idea we can ease China's concerns & defuse tensions by showing we don't want to hurt its economic development just isn't borne out by history. 2/7
Jul 19, 2023 • 11 tweets • 2 min read
Allen & Pfeiffer make a serious effort to show how to deter China while aiding Ukraine. But their proposal would have us withhold weapons from Taiwan that it needs to defend itself. That necessarily weakens deterrence in Asia, which is a risk we should not accept. 1/11
The authors at first say, “Ukraine & Taiwan don’t need the same things.” They later acknowledge the reality of tradeoffs & rightly so. Ukraine & Taiwan do need many of the same things: Patriots, NASAMS, HIMARS, ATACMS, GMLRS, Harpoons, Stingers, & Javelins are examples. 2/11
Apr 25, 2023 • 15 tweets • 6 min read
This report by @RLHeinrichs makes important progress by recognizing some of the tradeoffs between Ukraine & Taiwan.
But we should be clear on *all* of the tradeoffs. We should also recognize that reindustrialization won't spare us hard choices. We must still prioritize.
To its credit, the report acknowledges Ukraine & Taiwan need some of the same weapons. Its main recommendation to resolve these tradeoffs is to strengthen US defense industry. The good news is we’ve started to do so – but it’ll take years to pay off. 2/15
I understand ADM Aquilino’s desire to avoid showing weakness. Things are so bad China might attack Taiwan pre-2027 if it sees an opening. There’s also pressure to stick to Admin talking points.
But some of his remarks seem to contradict facts we already know to be true. 1/16
For example, when @RepGallagher asked re- munitions in the Pacific, ADM Aquilino said, “I’m not too worried.” Gallagher was rightly surprised by this response b/c everyone knows we’re short on munitions for the Pacific. 2/16
There's a lot of hype about how the next offensive will bring an end to this conflict if only we send more weapons to Ukraine. But that's probably not the case. 1/9
War in Ukraine will most likely end when neither side thinks it can do better for itself by continuing to fight.
A UKR offensive won't yield peace unless Russia believes it can't reverse UKR's gains – but there's plenty of reason for Moscow to think it'll be able to do so. 2/9
Apr 20, 2023 • 5 tweets • 2 min read
I'm not the only one who isn't sure Ukraine can seize Crimea. GEN Milley expressed similar concerns in recent months & he's Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. If we're appealing to authority, shouldn't we defer to him over LTG(R) Hodges?
Predicting the future is hard. It's very difficult to fully anticipate what's going to happen, especially in such a dynamic situation as an ongoing war. That's why a little humility goes a long way. It's also why a clear sense of priorities is so important. 2/5
Apr 19, 2023 • 4 tweets • 1 min read
This is dishonest at best. Nobody knows how a Crimea offensive would unfold. To say you do with any certainty is absurd.
What we do know is any Crimea offensive will require a lot more US military aid. We also know such an offensive carries real risk of nuclear escalation. 1/4
The question before us then is whether it's important enough for American interests to provide that aid & accept that risk.
Is a Crimea offensive so important for American interests that we should do it even at the cost of strengthening deterrence in Asia? 2/4
Apr 19, 2023 • 8 tweets • 3 min read
@LukeDCoffey says Ukraine has the ability to take Crimea. But it’s not clear why he’s so confident. Faith and optimism aren’t enough. The US military itself is skeptical of Ukraine’s ability to seize Crimea. We should be too. 1/8
Even if Ukraine can do it, the USA still faces tradeoffs. Ukraine & Taiwan share requirements for systems like HIMARS, Javelins, Stingers, NASAMS, Patriots, Harpoons & drones. Advocates say UKR needs ATACMS & GLSDB for Crimea – but TWN could use ATACMS & arguably GLSDB too. 2/8
Feb 20, 2023 • 20 tweets • 4 min read
US officials talk constantly about how allies & partners are our competitive advantage.
But America's track record when it comes to alliance management isn't great.
It's not even very good, whether we're talking about Europe or Asia. 1/20
In Europe, rampant freeriding has terribly weakened NATO's ability to deter or respond to Russian aggression without massive contributions from the USA. This dynamic is on display in Ukraine now, with the USA providing the vast majority of military aid to Ukrainian forces. 2/20
Jan 5, 2023 • 10 tweets • 4 min read
I've argued that risk of a 3rd World War is growing.
@CherylRofer & others disagree. They say Russia no longer poses a real threat to NATO, so we shouldn't worry about it.
I disagree. Russia may be down. But that doesn't mean it's out, or that it'll stay that way.
Russia bit off more than it could chew in Ukraine. Its campaign has been plagued by missteps & serious losses.
As a result, Russia poses less of a threat to NATO now than it did a year ago. But that doesn't mean it no longer poses a threat, or that it won't again.
2/10
Jan 4, 2023 • 5 tweets • 1 min read
The USA may well be forced to lean more on our nuclear deterrent to avoid or end conflict as our conventional military advantage erodes, especially in Asia.
A US threat to go nuclear over Taiwan or the Baltics, for example, is almost certainly less credible than a threat to go nuclear over Cuba, an island so close to our homeland. That'd likely limit such a threat's deterrent value.
Then there's a question of implementation.
2/5
Jan 3, 2023 • 4 tweets • 2 min read
That's not correct. As Secretary Hicks said last March:
"The 2018 NDS framed...a force planning construct that we essentially continue, which is the ability to defeat aggression by a major power while deterring opportunistic aggression elsewhere."
To be clear, "deterring opportunistic aggression" is a far lower threshold than "defeating" such aggression.
It's our waning ability to do this—deter opportunistic aggression by Russia or China, in particular—that's driving increased risk of global war.
2/4
Jan 3, 2023 • 7 tweets • 2 min read
.@gregmgrant, it's like math. To the degree we can enforce security equilibria in multiple places at once, then those equilibria are more likely to hold. To the degree we can't in any place, or only in one place at a time, the more the likelihood of failure in one or more places.
My argument, which is validated, by the way, by analysis behind multiple NDSs among other things, is fundamentally about scarcity. It's about heightened risk of opportunistic aggression by a major rival in a second theater if USFOR are drawn away, as the FPC implies they will be.
Jan 3, 2023 • 7 tweets • 2 min read
@gregmgrant, it's like math. To the degree we can enforce security equilibria in multiple places at once, then those equilibria are more likely to hold. To the degree we can't in any place, or only in one place at a time, the more the likelihood of failure in one or more places.
My argument, which is validated, by the way, by analysis behind multiple NDSs among other things, is fundamentally about scarcity. It's about heightened risk of opportunistic aggression a major rival in a secondary theater if USFOR are drawn away, as the FPC implies they will be.
Jan 3, 2023 • 6 tweets • 2 min read
Risk of a Third World War is growing.
This is due primarily to the overextension of American military power.
If the USA goes to war against China in the Indo-Pacific (e.g., to defend Taiwan), then we will be very limited in our ability to defend NATO.
1/6
The balance of forces in Europe will then shift toward Russia, w/ new incentivizes for Moscow to attack NATO.
One scenario is a Baltic fait accompli but others are plausible. Russia's intent might be revealing NATO to be hollow, territorial expansion, or something else.
2/6
