Are you actually on meth?

African-Americans had their own Zionism, and we did the same stuff that the state of Israel is doing now (that’s a large part of why I can plainly state that it’s not the sensible pathway).

That ended in General Butt Naked (yes I cropped out his dick) and a disastrous 15+ years of constant civil war. Look, I know African-American is considered niche as shit, but almost half century before Theodore Herzl was even born, there was this well meaning pastor named Robert Finley.

Because the early United States was absolutely schizophrenic with how its treated its African-American population (who weren’t all slaves — there were hundreds of thousands of “free-people” scattered around the country, including in the South), there was a mixture of panic from southern slave-owners (virtually all of whom were infected with ringworm by the way — if you’re wondering why the American south made so many dumbfuck calls for so long, that’s the main reason), and indignation from abolitionists.

The solution Finley and a few of his arrived at was the “American Colonization Society”, established in 1816. By 1822, they’d sent over their first colonists.

A quick Israel-Gaza War thread on why dismantling Hamas as a military organization is quite hard, if not impossible, inspired by questions from @Charlie533080

This is an overly simplified illustration of the force structure of a Hamas battalion derived from reports as well as videos/imagery produced by the IDF, Hamas and others. Each green dot is a individual fighter, the blue boxes denote "tangible combat assets/kit", hypothetically located in fixed locations. Yellow rings around green circles denote individuals in leadership roles (who are presumably institutionally promotable).

Caveat emptor, the only organizations that actually have access to Hamas' Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOEs) are Hamas and the IRGC (maybe). The IDF and US IC can see fragments of it, but not the whole picture, so this thread is speaking purely in broad brushstrokes. First and foremost, unlike in most highly bureaucratized militaries, Hamas (and it appears most of Gaza's other militant orgs) devolve a massively outsized share of both their organizational logistical responsibilities and their combat power down to the "cell" level.

Think of their cells as being akin to Western-style fireteams with a handful of guys (a quick aside, Hamas 'does' have a formal rank/structure hierarchy - i.e. cells → to squads → to platoons → companies → brigades). There are multiple cells in a squad (so the above graphic really should have 2 or 3 of the blue blocks per squad).

Every cell is supposed to maintain/have a semi-standardized allotment of kit. The most shoddily equipped units have a mixture of RPGs and AKs, but some (well... most apparently) cells have better/more niche equipment, e.g. EFPs and ballistic protection. There are also specialized anti-tank and sniper teams, but I haven't seen any footage of their caches being pinched.

Simple answer, they haven’t really.

Daesh was never big on foreign terror attacks (they hyper-focused on securing al-Sham — i.e. Iraq and Syria), so their non-MENA campaign wasn’t really designed to be extensive. Even their invocations to lone-wolves were largely one-offs.

With Al-Qaeda, it’s a different, vaguely embarrassing story. The only two ‘extensions’ of AQ capable of conducting sophisticated “foreign” attacks have historically been AQAP and Al-Shabaab.

In AQAP’s case, they got their shit rocked pretty badly by SOCOM in Yemen (which is a campaign you’ll never hear anyone talk about), and after Uncle Sam’s boot stopped stomping on their face, they found themselves combatants in Yemen’s Civil War. The YCW forced the US to pull out its guys, but AQAP promptly found itself in a land war with the Houthis and getting bombed to shit by the Saudis. They’re still clinging on to territory, but they’re obviously a lil busy right now.

That brings us to Al-Shabaab, arguably the cleverest of the major jihadist groups. They have the financial capacity and institutional wherewithal to conduct strikes against the West, and their continuous success against the Somali government (despite American and AU assistance) has given them enough latitude to conduct foreign strikes — but uhhh, they just don’t seem to be interested in doing that. You could argue that they’re hyper-focused on conquering Somalia first before they get into a fist-fight with the entire West, but that argument’s not very persuasive to me, seeing as we’ve been bombing and droning them for over a decade now. It’s more likely that their ambitions are narrowly focused on the horn of Africa. That brings us to the odd men out — Al-Qaeda central, based out of AfPak.

The general perception (even in the US government) is that our drone strike campaign has attrited AQ-C to the point where it’s incapable of conducting sophisticated foreign strikes.