Some thoughts on the UK-EU “reset” deal announced today at Lancaster House (focusing on what was actually agreed, not the politics): This is a helpful first step towards more constructive post-Brexit relations between the UK and EU. But most of the agreed package captures low-hanging fruit; politically difficult areas remain unresolved; and the fundamentals haven’t changed. /1

What is happening in Slovakia is alarming. In just the past 48 hours:

1. Fico's government announced plans to disband the National Crime Agency (NAKA), the very agency investigating high-profile corruption cases, including those involving Fico's own associates. /1 This follows a crackdown on a number of NAKA investigators who have been probing corruption linked to Fico and his Smer party. These investigators are now being investigated for "abuse of power," while others are being shuffled to lower-tier police depts across the country. /2

Big news from Slovakia where Robert Fico is about to form a new government after the third largest party, Hlas, has decided to accept his coalition offer, along with the ultranationalists from the Slovak Nationalist Party. /1 The three-party coalition seemed like the most probable outcome after the election 10 days ago. But the surprise came after the Progressives, the second largest party, offered the top job to the leader of Hlas, Peter Pellegrini, to prevent Fico’s return. /2

An update to this: the last poll before Saturday’s election suggests that the centrist, pro-EU Progressive Slovakia would come first, overtaking Fico’s Smer by a small margin. What would this mean? /1

https://twitter.com/antonspisak/status/1706220915510395213

The good news of this would be that the worst-case scenario might be avoided: Fico would be short of two seats (!) to form a coalition with the nationalist SNS, the far-right Republika and his one-time protégé Pellegrini, now heading up Hlas. /2

Slovakia, a small central European country and EU member, is facing a parliamentary election this week. It might be one of the most consequential elections in the country’s 30-year history, with ramifications for the EU, Ukraine and the West. A thread: The “snap election” was called after the centre-right coalition of @eduardheger collapsed earlier this year. Heger’s govt was pro-EU and one of the staunchest supporters of Ukraine, but also marked by deep internal conflicts that led to its collapse. /2

reuters.com/world/europe/s…

A new piece on what the Windsor Framework means for the Retained EU Law bill.

TLDR: As it stands, the REUL bill is incompatible with the Windsor deal, and this creates some tricky decisions for Rishi Sunak. A short thread:

cer.eu/insights/will-… At the heart of problem here is this question:

What happens to EU-inherited rules that are at risk of being automatically removed under the REUL bill at the end of this year, but continue to apply in Northern Ireland due to the Windsor deal/amended Protocol?

Reading through the published SI on the Stormont brake, it’s actually fairly favourable to Unionists. It suggests that, for every decision that UK Govt makes at the Joint Cttee regarding adoption of new EU laws (i.e. 13(4) for the nerds), UK Govt… /1 legislation.gov.uk/ukdsi/2023/978… will agree to a new rule only after there’s been an “applicability motion” – a vote in the Assembly – that is passed on a cross-community basis. This gives Unionists a de facto veto not only over replacement EU laws, but also new legislation flowing into the treaty. /2

A fascinating microcosm of how the Windsor framework will work, how the Stormont brake could be used, and how regulatory divergence between GB and EU might affect N Ireland. Some thoughts:

on.ft.com/3yqPWqp In question here is the EU’s updated legislation that would lower the level of arsenic in some food products, like baby foods. NI producers will have to produce to updated EU rules. But GB producers will have to comply with a UK regulation, which is different.

Having now digested most of the legal and non-legal texts published as part of the Windsor Framework, here are some thoughts on the deal.

My @InstituteGC piece below – and a thread:

institute.global/policy/windsor… This is a good deal and most probably the best deal that was, and ever will be, on offer from the EU.

Sunak has secured a number of concessions that neither Johnson nor May were able to do in 2019 and 2018. He did so because he showed pragmatism, for which he deserves credit. /1

Not a comment on "the Stormont break", but thought it's worth reminding people that, even under the current Protocol, the UK could refuse to adopt new EU laws under the Protocol at the Joint Cttee – at the cost of being taken to arbitration by the EU and potentially fined. The difference here is that Johnson's government refused to give the NI Assembly any formal role in this process. (I proposed a more consultative role in my NIP paper last July, the response from senior UK figures was: why should Westminster give up any leverage to the Stormont?)

A few important things to look out for in the NI Protocol deal as it is announced today. A thread: 1. Behind the border stuff: What difference does the 'green lane' make not only to border checks but also the regulatory and customs requirements that GB businesses will have to deal with? Do they have to fill out customs declarations in any case?

This is a major issue with the current NI Protocol, IMHO. But it is not unresolvable. The two sides could easily commit to:

1. Giving the NI Assembly a consultative say in the pre-legislative stages of adopting new EU laws into the NIP (i.e. before the Joint Cttee decides on it)

https://twitter.com/AndyBounds/status/1627775827562713121

2. Giving an opportunity for the NI Executive to be formally consulted (i.e. via a preliminary exchange of views) on new EU laws that would fall under the Protocol and devolved competence and the UK Govt for all non-devolved areas.

A new Friday afternoon post in which @ChristosTsoukal and I look at what Brexit has meant for the UK economy over the last three years.

Here is the story in six striking charts:

institute.global/policy/three-y… 1. The Brexit hit to trade has been significant, especially on the import side, and may have occurred more quickly than previously assumed.

The figures below show the latest estimates following a revision of the trade data in January by the ONS.

A nerdy post for Thursday: I've found interesting UK customs data for 2021, giving us an insight into the first year of trading outside the single market.

1) The number of total export declarations submitted by UK businesses nearly *tripled* in 2021 relative to previous two yrs 2) What's driving this enormous rise in customs paperwork? The answer is Brexit. Over half of all export certificates were specifically for GB-EU trade.

Interestingly, customs export declarations for GB-NI movements accounted for just under 5% of all.

An important development which shows a real push by the Biden administration to see a “deal” before April. I understand Biden’s visit to the island of Ireland is contingent on getting NI institutions up and running. But the time is short and the gap between UK and EU still large.

https://twitter.com/alexwickham/status/1600231146775728128

I still think there’s a clear landing zone for a sensible deal. But it would require significant movement on the UK part (away from wishing to do away with ‘EU law’ in the NIP), as well as on the EU side (towards a risk-based approach). A large gap to be crossed in a short time.

Great to see a full write-up of our Fixing Brexit paper covered by @matt_hfoster in the @POLITICOEurope London Influence newsletter today. The first two parts of our proposals – fix the 'trust deficit' in the current UK-EU relationship and commit not to go on a deregulatory spree.

A new @InstituteGC report out today, arguing that we need a new debate about the post-Brexit relationship with the EU and setting out how the current UK-EU deal could be improved with a bit less ideology and more pragmatism.

A couple of key messages:

institute.global/policy/fixing-… The starting point here are two inescapable facts:

1) The public views of Brexit are shifting. As shown in our recent poll w/ @JLPartnersPoll, a significant majority of the public think Brexit has damaged UK economy and had negative impacts on their lives. /2

Many people dismiss this too quickly, but the point of a Swiss-style relationship is that it comes about by decisions of the other party to align voluntarily with parts of EU single market. Ultimately, it is in the EU’s interest to make the end-outcome more stable & governable.

https://twitter.com/thetimes/status/1594035405703225345

The Swiss-style relationship doesn’t come about by UK negotiators going to the Commission and asking for one.

It comes about by taking a sovereign decision to re-align parts of the UK regulatory system with the EU’s.

The simplest reason for this is, minimise business costs.

Despite all that Heaton-Harris says publicly, a fresh election in NI isn’t in the interest of UKG: it is unlikely to lead to an outcome on the NI Protocol or to restoration of power-sharing. So, what’s the alternative? /1

https://twitter.com/markerjparker/status/1587789977437585408

The best thing, at this point, might be for UKG to delay the election by extending the statutory 24-week period through secondary legislation *and* to set up an interim process that would bring NI parties together to identify some commonalities in their positions on the NIP. /2

How does the British public view Brexit and what does it want from a future relationship with the EU?

In a new @InstituteGC paper out today, we publish findings of a very comprehensive recent poll of voters by @JLPartnersPolls.

A thread on what we found:
institute.global/policy/moving-… 1. Most Britons think Brexit is not “done”, including over a third of Leavers and almost a third of 2019 Conservative voters, which is fairly large.

Unexpectedly, there’s a deep split between Remainers and Leavers on this question.

In case anyone here is up for a challenge: Good that they are going external, IMO. Hard to find this unique skillset within the civil service.