Integral $5842.T is a long @ ¥2,720 per share. Integral is publicly traded private equity firm that offers one of the most compelling ways to invest in Japan’s undervalued equity market & ongoing wave of corp. governance reforms. Worth 2x current share price. 1/n At current price, Integral’s market cap is ¥93B. For that, investors get >¥85B of investments that have CAGR’d at 20%+, along w/ an asset management franchise worth ¥85B. In total ¥170B, or ¥5,000 per share (+85%) of value, which should continue compounding at a high rate.

Howard Hughes $HHH is a long @ $63.50—existing business priced near depths of COVID lows, yet risk/reward profile of company has never been more attractive. 1/n With a market cap of ~$3.8B, the market is effectively pricing the legacy Master Planned Community (MPC) biz at less than $2.4B after accounting for the $1.2B deployed to acquire Vantage Group.

$NOMD Nomad Foods is a long @ $12.50. Currently trading at its lowest valuation since going public following a couple Qs of weak organic growth. Think growth resets in 2026 and the stock moves much higher. Worth $20+ one year out. 1/n NOMD can plausibly generate more than half of its current market cap in cash over the next few yrs & is run by a value-maximizing mgmt team that has plainly stated that the co will aggressively shrink the share count at these ridiculously low prices.

Centene $CNC is a long @ $28 w/ a ~$13.7B mkt cap. Largest player in both Medicaid & ACA marketplace —sitting at a historic valuation low. Several short-term headwinds but earnings should reset over next 2yrs. Well under 5x normalized EPS 1/N Withdrew $7.25 2025 EPS guide on a $1.8B reduction in risk adjustment revenue related to its ACA business ($2.75 EPS hit). Rising medical loss ratios from mispriced 2025 ACA plans & Medicaid cost trends hurt. But these issues are transitory.

$BFF.MI €7, €1.35B. Sized up recently. Quick pitch: leader in Italian non-recourse factoring market w/30% market share. The company runs a sustainable 30%+ROE & trades at 6x EPS. Baby thrown out w/bath due to classification as a ‘bank’, leading to misplaced neg. sentiment. 1/n Market indiscriminately selling financials, but impact of potential recession mostly neutral for BFF, if not positive. Economic instability increases demand for BFF’s factoring services, as businesses offload invoices to improve cash flow.

$HYUD $57.60 (Hyundai 1st preferred) is still one of the cheapest stocks in developed markets when you peel back the layers. Trades at 3.3x trailing earnings and closer to 2x earnings when adjusting for JVs— ~9% TTM dividend on a 30% payout ratio. Hyundai prefs have no voting rights, but are legally entitled to divvys equal to common plus a premium. Unlike US preferreds, Korean preference shares have no fixed divvy or maturity--they fully participate in divvy growth of issuer, making them comparable to non-voting common.

$NEWT is a compelling long at $13. Newtek Bank is the largest player in the SBA lending market. At today’s price, it trades at a market cap of $340M & <7x what the company has guided to earn this year ($1.95). 1/n The SBA lending market, especially 7(a), is an attractive niche. The rough model: Given the higher default rate, the govt guarantees 75% of the value of a 7(a) loan. This piece is typically sold by originating bank for an 11% gain-on-sale. This leaves unsecured portion (25%) for bank to hold on its balance sheet.

Porsche SE $PAH3 (m. cap: €16b), Holdco that owns controlling interests in Volkswagen (VW) & Porsche AG (AG), is a long. At €53, you get $1 worth of undervalued securities for 52 cents. The holdings are also significantly undervalued, principally VW at less than 4x EBIT 1/n Diving in (follow closely): PAH3 directly owns 53.3% of the ordinary shares of VW and 1.3% of its prefs, which equates to control position w/a 31.9% economic interest. VW, in turn, owns 75% of the ordinary shares of Porsche AG and 75.8% of its prefs.

Long Northeast Bank $NBN. $300m market cap specialty bank w/mgmt that plays way above their pay grade. Tangible book value is $38. Price is roughly the same. 3-year avg ROE is 24%. 1/n NBN has carved a profitable niche as a buyer of commercial loans in the secondary market, capturing a market segment too small for larger institutions to focus on and too complex for community and regional banks to underwrite.

$CASH starting to look pretty juicy here at $40—now under 7x management’s mid-point guidance. One of the three major players in the prepaid debit card space (w/ $GDOT & $TBBK)—a bank with a 30%+ ROTE and no deposit flight risk. Baby thrown out with the bathwater stuff. Operates a banking-as-a-service business that generates fee income w/ high levels of noninterest bearing deposits (96% of total). Partners w/ companies that want to instantly disburse funds—think corp disbursements, insurance claim payouts, tax rebates, early wage access, etc.

$GRBK 4Q call: “we are not seeing margin degradation at all” related to infill locations that represent 75-80% of book. Further, “we are seeing (4Q) type of margin sustainable…. We look at it every week.” Co also noted it had actually reduced incentives during Jan. and Feb. Compare to last housing crisis: peak prices in May 2006 vs peak prices in May 2022. Most builders had already suffered 1,200 bps of gross margin compression by final quarter of 2022. Today GMs continue to exceed those registered prior year.

Pitch for 2023: Bank of Georgia. $BGEO.L running at 32% ROE with stock at 1x TBV vs 5-year pre-covid avg 1.4x. Sustainable ROE well above 20%. 800lb gorilla in developing economy that is decidedly pro-business/pro-market w/ low corruption. Easily accessible London listed shares 36% dom. market share on total assets, 39% loans, and 40% deposits. Given relatively small size of addressable market (pop. of 4mil with unique language), company has won the penetration game and now operates in a disciplined duopoly w/TBC.

$GRBK released its 2Q results yesterday and, as expected, the company proceeded to murder analysts' expectations for the quarter ($2.08 vs $1.24).  Likely at peak margins here, but echoing the recent @davidein letter--yea, these cyclicals are obviously overearning, but if runrate is 4x cash earnings and they drop by half, might they still be bargains at 8x normalized? Add to this, a company that is on pace to buy back 20% of its float annually (all of the homebuilders are repurchasing shares but, to my knowledge, no others have