I would really like, as an Artillery American, to chat with whomever is advising the NSC on DPICM. I have some questions. If your moral code privileges hypothetical casualties which can be eliminated by post-war mine clearing (which is already necessary) over the actual losses Ukrainians are suffering every day, you need to have a seat and reexamine your entire outlook.

Just one comment from me on the current discussion on why no one, including the admin, is interested in a naval buildup despite the very real threat from PRC sea power. It's not just the NSA of 1947 fundamentally broke the ability of the USG to coordinate a maritime strategy (although this is true), it's not just that the Navy has been remarkably bad the basics of force planning and design forever (although this is also true), it's about trust.

I'm going to respectfully (because he is an absolute essential source on this) disagree with @KofmanMichael here. This isn't a good army executing a bad plan. It isn't a good army executing outdated or out-of-context tactics. It's a bad army! Here's why.

https://twitter.com/KofmanMichael/status/1498043667403186187

@KofmanMichael First, this isn't something analysts or intel folks could know before now. You just can't know how an army will perform in war until it tries. War, and only war, is the acid test of an army. And Russia's armed forces are failing that test.