This is backwards.
1. Putting Ukraine in NATO makes it far harder for the war to end.
2. For the US, guaranteeing Ukraine's security entails pointless risk.
3. Having refused to fight for Ukraine now, how can it be credible we'd do so later? This might erode other commitments.

https://twitter.com/ProfPaulPoast/status/1667146274385084416

It's true Article 5 doesn't require directly going to war. But what states expect by joining NATO is that the US (and less important others) will fight for them. US nuclear weapons are crucial. Putting Ukraine in and not fighting for them is like admitting that's all fraud.

How could it be that the Biden admin thinks Ukraine can't win a total battlefield victory but won't encourage a negotiated settlement? I consider the explanations. responsiblestatecraft.org/2022/10/14/the… If the Post is right and U.S. officials think "neither Russia nor Ukraine is capable of winning the war outright, but they have ruled out the idea of...nudging Ukraine" to negotiate, they share the view of their dovish critics who say US policy on the war serves to prolong it.

Nearly every US security strategy asserts we're in a time of unprecedented change. The new Biden one does so in the first line of the president's forward, which is hardly its worst problem but still annoying.
whitehouse.gov/wp-content/upl… Also in the predictably annoying but basically harmless category is the pretension they have discovered that domestic well-being and achieving security abroad, are (would you believe it?) connected.

No war for semiconductors.
defensepriorities.org/explainers/sem… Semiconductor production security is better reason for the US to not fight for Taiwan than to do so. The war is what might disrupt production. China can't shut down semiconductor sales to us without losing key component suppliers.