Personal interest in defence, risk & military history. Views strictly my own: likes & RT ≠ endorsement. I occasionally write blogs on defence issues.
Apr 10, 2022 • 12 tweets • 2 min read
Some very initial thoughts on lessons learned so far from Ukraine.
1. You can’t divorce a military and its campaign opening from the political context it existed in pre war. Analysis has to include this aspect, it’s not a nice-to-have. This means multidisciplinary approach…
2. The sign of a good Army is one that accepts encirclement is inevitable, prepares for it, and when the time comes fights hard whilst surrounded. This leads me to point 3…
Jul 5, 2020 • 5 tweets • 1 min read
Phil’s Army Laws:
1. In an unstable world the Army needs significant Tier 1 SF capability against non-state and focussed state activity.
2. If you don’t have a credible conventional deterrent on land then your hi-speed “grey zone” capability is by passable.
3. ...
... 3. If you have a credible land deterrent then expect the enemy to contest the “grey zone”.
4. The regional land threat is firmly population based. Populations, & by extension place, will be contested if combat starts. Ground combat will therefore require slugging it out...
Jun 17, 2019 • 21 tweets • 4 min read
Basket: 1 US Army WW2 Infantry Division.
Estimate Delivery Time: 457 days.
A thread on activating and raising US Army infantry divisions in WW2. (Niche I know...). It all takes longer than you probably think to raise a division in a war at maximum national effort. 1/20
In Dec 1941 there were 10 Regular US Army infantry divisions, 18 National Guard and 1 Army of the US for 29 in total. By 1945 67 infantry divisions would be activated, trained and deployed overseas. 2/20
