What seems to be happening (I could be wrong) is that the U.S. is slow walking Israel away from a full Gaza invasion, because they don't feel it will work, its objectives are unclear, civilian deaths will turn opinion against the U.S. and Israel, and it may spur a regional war. First, the Americans asked for a delay to negotiate hostage releases. That's still on, but Netanyahu yesterday added a second U.S. request: time to allow the U.S. to reinforce its positions in the Middle East in the event of a regional war.

I think the Biden adm. behaved brilliantly in the latest round of fighting in Gaza. While it was blamed in the Arab world for embracing Israel and arming it, something else was afoot. The tight embrace was a way of containing the Israeli response and avoiding a regional war. It appears that from the start an indirect channel was opened to Iran, as per Jake Sullivan’s remarks, via the Omanis. The Iranians set entry into Gaza as a red line, which the U.S. likely used as leverage over Israel.

The Saudi-Iran deal was a blow for Hezbollah, as it meant the party's role as an instrument in regional rivalries with the Arab world would be curbed. So, Hezbollah had to reinvent itself and refocus on another role, and this was, of course, Israel. The first sign of this, though it was preceded by many months of contacts with Hamas and Islamic Jihad, was the rocket attack against Israel a few weeks ago, amid talk of a unification of the fronts between the Golan, Lebanon, and Gaza.

Gebran Bassil is in Qatar in what appears to be another step in reaching a presidential compromise over the army commander, Joseph Aoun. There are still things that must fall into place for a consensus to emerge, but if Bassil is in Qatar, negotiations have effectively started. This leads me to think of an important outcome of the Michel Aoun-Bassil tandem, though both men have been disasters. Franjieh's prospects appear to be diminishing by the day, largely because he has little support in his community, a condition the tandem made possible.

Some preliminary thoughts on the election results in Lebanon. First, I think it’s useful to look at what happened in a regional context. The importance of the local results notwithstanding, what matters is how the elections might affect Hezbollah’s agenda in Lebanon. Since 2006, the party had managed to impose a consensus around its priorities thanks to its alliance with Aoun and its ability to shoehorn Hariri into that consensus. Today, that has broken down. Yes, Lebanon is deeply divided, but that division is also an obstacle to Hezbollah.

We are at a major new juncture in the Middle East, as the revival of the nuclear deal with Iran appears imminent. It’s in this context that we need to understand the UAE’s invitation to Bashar al-Assad and the Gulf states’ decision to send their ambassadors back to Beirut. By embracing Assad, major Arab states—Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Jordan—appear to believe that Syria’s reintegration into the Arab fold is necessary to enhance Arab stakes in Syria and Lebanon, where Iran now dominates.

3 things noticed in Italy's Berezina moment against North Macedonia. First, their tendency to pass laterally and back allows them to dominate matches, but the tendency to pass around the defense means there is less effort to penetrate it, meaning sterility. Second, by circumventing defenses, the preference is to cross balls into the middle. Because Italy is not particularly good, or bad, at the head game, however, they can be effectively neutralized by a well organized defense. This was clear in the North Macedonia game.

The Cordahi saga shows, once again, that Hezbollah's maximalist game is pushing us in very dangerous directions. By holding strongly to the information minister (if that is indeed what it is doing, which remains to be seen), the party is creating the following situation: Mikati will probably resign, since he will not preside over a cabinet responsible for the rift with the predominantly Sunni Gulf states. In this he will be backed (or pushed) by the trio of former prime ministers and the mufti—in other words by the Sunni establishment.

The events in Beirut were likely a sending of messages, not unlike what happened in Khaldeh. The armed Amal and Hezbollah members were fired upon when they were about to enter "Christian" areas in Tayyouneh, as a way of saying these areas are off limits to hostile militias. They are all the more off limits in that the so-called Shia duo was trying to use intimidation to undermine an investigation, a majority of whose victims were Christians. While Hezbollah has not yet reacted, the party has to take into consideration its alliance with Michel Aoun.

@ChoucairWalid provides a very realistic reading of Bassil's reasons for blocking a government he doesn't control. What is unknown, however is whether Hezbollah will go along with this: beirutobserver.com/2021/09/252422… There are several unanswered questions in his analysis. First, is Hezbollah willing to face the generalized economic and social breakdown that will follow if no government is formed, just for Bassil's sake? The repercussions in the Shia community are already significant.

There is a growing view in Lebanon that the cabinet formation process is really a sideshow for something much more sinister, namely an effort to accelerate the collapse of the second Lebanese Republic and replace it with a new system. In this context, Hezbollah and Aoun share a desire to get rid of the post-Taif system and replace it with one more to their liking—in Hezbollah's case a system that gives the Shia community, and by extension Iran, a much larger say in the destiny of the country.

Lee seeks to delegitimize the Palestinians' claim to their land by writing they are "an ad hoc collection of Arabic-speaking people who came from all corners of the Levant, mostly from Greater Syria but some perhaps from as far away as the Gulf." bit.ly/38jbJ6w But in the very next sentence, he has no trouble legitimizing the arrival of Jewish immigrants from Poland, Russia, and Yemen "because they thought of themselves as members of a pre-existing nation returning to their homeland."

There are interesting possibilities for Syria if there is competition between Iran and Arab states over supplying Lebanon with energy. The Iranian fuel vessel headed for Lebanon may unload in Syria, from where the fuel will be transported across the border. Similarly, Egyptian gas and Jordanian surplus power may come to Lebanon through Syrian territory. That makes Damascus happy for 2 reasons: It can benefit from the gas and electricity, and politically it signals an Arab effort to reintegrate Syria into the Arab fold.

It’s apparent that Aoun’s decision to play hardball on a new cabinet is having damaging consequences for him and Bassil. Without a government, all the blame for the catastrophic situation today is being directed against him, impacting his legacy and Bassil’s future. Aoun thought he could play the populist card by refusing to lift subsidies. But all he did was fall into the trap of the major fuel importers and their political sponsors who kept their products off the market, raising public resentment against Aoun.

Yesterday I posted a thread arguing that unless a government is formed that can improve Lebanon’s situation, Gebran Bassil would be unable to prepare for his presidency. No Mikati, no Bassil, I argued. Here is a more pessimistic scenario to consider. Bassil feels that unless he can impose his conditions on Mikati, it is preferable to force him out and support a nonentity like Faisal Karami. Assuming Karami will accept Bassil’s and Aoun’s conditions—no certainty—what will happen?

While the “atmosphere is positive” in the cabinet-formation process, the reality is that the obstacles remain the same in negotiations today. That said, one important factor will weigh heavily on Aoun’s attitude and possible flexibility. Aoun’s and Bassil’s strategy in the past year, which is aimed at securing Bassil’s presidency, is built on three pillars: First, affirming in the minds of people that the Aounists are outside the pre-2005 political class, and even pose a threat to it.

Reading the apocalyptic headlines in Lebanese newspapers today, one can reach certain clear conclusions. First, that the political class, starting with Hezbollah, has no clue about how to resolve Lebanon's escalating economic and financial problems. The mode of operation in the past 31 years has been to resolve all problems by dividing the spoils among the political-financial-sectarian cartel and otherwise leaving all problems as they were, bringing in governments to keep this unsustainable system alive.

Reports are that Hariri will return tomorrow to Beirut. Given all the false starts, one hesitates to predict a cabinet soon, but Nasrallah’s speech yesterday and the fact that Bassil’s efforts to undermine the Berri initiative have floundered suggest this may be different. Indeed, Bassil’s theatrics last Sunday were most likely designed to torpedo Berri’s efforts, precisely because they were nearing a positive conclusion and Bassil saw he could not get a blocking third. Hezbollah didn’t fall for it and in recent days shot down his protests.

I'm wondering if the protests today across Lebanon are not only a natural reaction of people in distress, but also a concerted effort by the political leadership opposed to Aoun and Bassil to raise the pressure on them both to greenlight a new government: bit.ly/3dWfaEa The sudden proliferation of protests across different geographical and sectarian areas makes me think that there is a political dimension as well here: Is this a new May 7, which brought down Rashid al-Solh's government in 1992? But this time directed against Aoun and Bassil?

Saad Hariri, in his interview with Marcel Ghanem last October, signaled a radical change in his political approach, composed of two parts: First, a decision to base his domestic political strategy on a partnership with the main Shia parties, Hezbollah and Amal. This he showed by denouncing his erstwhile allies Samir Geagea and Walid Joumblatt, who had spent months criticizing Hariri. He effectively told them that if he and the Shia parties agreed, Geagea and Joumblatt could follow if they wanted, but if they did not, tough luck.

The deadlock in the Lebanese government-formation process may not be as permanent as it seems. The dilemma of Gebran Bassil shows why. Aoun's refusal to sign off on Hariri's cabinet is based on one aim and one desire: The aim is for Aoun and Bassil not to be weakened in any new government; and this is tied to their desire for Bassil to succeed Aoun as president. The two feel the first can only come by having a blocking third. The second is more problematical.