🧵on recent jihadism trends in the Sahel

- Al-Qaeda’s Sahel branch (JNIM) continues to be dominant regional jihadist force, both more active and widespread than IS

- This year, JNIM attack claims have risen sharply in #BurkinaFaso: heatmap below compares H1 23, H2 23, H1 24 - Overall JNIM attack claims have more than doubled since this time last year

- IS attacks are harder to quantify, but al-Naba rhetorical focus and individual attack claims point to no significant rise across the board

🧵on Islamic State in #Africa
- IS-claimed attacks are falling, but share of attacks in sub-Saharan Africa is growing
- Africa attacks now dwarf Iraq+Syria (former heartlands) and ROTW (once 600+ per year)
- 80% of frontpages from IS's newspaper al-Naba focused on Africa in 2024 2/ - IS's main African branches (⭕️) have generally co-opted existing insurgencies and militant Islamist groups
- The #Somalia branch has been unable assert itself vs AQ-linked al-Shabab
- Youth bulges, climate change, & troop drawdowns are common themes

1/ What can we learn from the 2006 #Lebanon war to help humanitarian and development actors plan their responses in Lebanon?

We can start by looking at a map of the destruction in 2006 alongside a map of Israeli strikes so far (2006 | 2023)

2/ Strikes have been limited to south of the Litani River, and they may remain focused on the South depending on events in #Gaza. But, in a worst case humanitarian scenario, Israeli bombardments could target key infrastructure as they did in 2006. Some *possible* targets include: