I think most people who supported the JCPOA (myself included) were keenly aware of its limitations. But let’s take these criticisms point by point. These arguments seem historical, but they have relevance for the present and the future. 1/

https://twitter.com/doranimated/status/2040197381484945848

1. The JCPOA did separate nuclear issue from Iran’s ballistic missiles and drones, but that was for two reasons: 1) The nuclear program presented the greatest threat to U.S. national security and 2) Iran wasn’t going to negotiate limits on those other issues—a fact that remains true today despite the killing of Iran’s top leaders and the decimation of its conventional and asymmetric capabilities. That should tell us something. The deal also went beyond enrichment and inspections, and dealt with plutonium and weaponization (fair debate to be had on how well it did the latter). 2/

There are many things one could say about this proposal. I’ll offer three observations.

1. Iran is highly unlikely to agree to these conditions (and if it did, that should give us pause). The reasons are many, but a big one is that the points laid out here are essentially trying to force terms of surrender on a country that does not believe it’s been defeated. 1/

https://x.com/BrewerEricM/status/2036556934065590312

2. Other than a vague reference to the IAEA getting access, these points say nothing about verification. How will the United States know Iran is meeting these commitments? Without adequate verification, the agreements are basically worthless. One could argue there’s at least a legal and historical basis on the nuclear issue, but several of these points contain no precedent, and would require the development of novel measures (which, by the way, Iran has to agree to). Say what you will about the JCPOA, but monitoring and verification were thought though in great detail as part of the development of that agreement and were specified at length in the document. 2/

Concerns are mounting that events in the Middle East could lead Iran to build nuclear weapons.

Iran is not the first country to possess nuclear latency & potential weapons ambitions and find itself in a major crisis. What can we learn from history?

The news isn’t great…1/ In 1967, fearing an attack from its Arab neighbors (including an Egyptian attack on the reactor used to produce material for weapons), Israel likely took the final steps to assemble a nuclear device on the eve of the Six-Day War. 2/

Some preliminary thoughts on the relationship between Iran’s nuclear program (the “nuclear crisis”) and the Israel-Hamas war and related dynamics (the “regional crisis”). 🧵

It would be too much of a stretch to say the current war is unfolding under the “nuclear shadow”…1/ That is, the presence of at least two nuclear-armed states and the risk of a conventional crisis going nuclear. But nor would it be accurate to say the nuclear dimension is irrelevant or absent from the crisis and the calculations of the various parties. 2/

Lots of breathless reporting, denials, and tweeting about a possible deal where Iran stops enriching to 60%.

But it’s also worth asking what that stoppage, alone, would get us.

1/ It would:
- Prevent Iran from accumulating material that could be most quickly enriched to weapons grade
- Likely slow the rate Iran could build up its stockpile of material for “more bombs, faster” in a breakout scenario.

2/

Both the NYT and WSJ now reporting that Saudi is seeking US assistance with its nuclear program and security guarantees in exchange for normalizing ties with Israel.

But there’s some important missing info and context on the nuclear issue.1/

nytimes.com/2023/03/09/us/… First, the US has been trying to help Saudi develop its nuclear energy program for a *long time.* It’s spent well over a decade trying to ink the deal (know as a “123 agreement”) that is legally required for the US to sell Saudi (and any country) nuclear technology. 2/

What stands out to me here:

1) The comment that Iran hasn’t made a decision “to resume the weaponization program” it stopped in 2003 is consistent with what US officials have said to date, but more explicit (usually they say no evidence of decision to produce/weaponize). 1/

https://twitter.com/facethenation/status/1629602699950936072

This is obviously good news and, quite frankly, one of the only things we have going for us at the moment. Most estimate that weaponization would take a year or two. Burns says “they're still a ways off.” 2/

I’m not sure I’d say it’s likely at this point, but I also don’t think a “sheltered pursuit” strategy for Iran—where it uses Russian protection to advance further toward nuclear weapons and/or produce them—is out of the question.

https://twitter.com/shashj/status/1629174696347414528

In the past that would have been laughable, but by all accounts the relationship is evolving in important ways. @HannaNotte has an excellent piece out on how Russian interests on the nuclear issue have shifted. library.fes.de/pdf-files/inte…

I often get asked whether Iran will build nuclear weapons.

My answer is the same every time: I don’t know.

Here are a few data points that I think about when trying to answer that question. 🧵 1/

apnews.com/article/russia… First, if you allowed nuclear proliferation experts to create a hypothetical state that *should* build nuclear weapons, you’d be hard pressed to come up with a better example than Iran. 2/

DNI Haines made several unsurprising, yet noteworthy comments on Iran at the Reagan National Defense Forum yesterday…. "We're not seeing the regime perceive this as an imminent threat to their stability”

“[protests are] not something we see right now as being an imminent threat to the regime"

"We don't have information that suggests that they've made a decision to move toward nuclear weapons"

In response to the latest IAEA resolution, Iran begins enriching uranium to 60% at the deeply buried Fordow site, and announces plans to phase out old IR-1 centrifuges with more powerful IR-6 machines.

reuters.com/world/middle-e… Why this matters: 1) Until now, Iran was producing 60% only at its above ground (and therefore much more vulnerable) facility. Fordow is deeply buried and therefore harder to target in a military strike.

Respectfully disagree. As I wrote earlier this week with colleagues, a proliferation “spiral” resulting from Ukraine is unlikely. And it’s Washington’s allies and partners—not Moscow’s—that pose the greater proliferation risk. foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/ukrain…

https://twitter.com/JackDetsch/status/1594005249995333638

The only Russian “ally” that poses a serious proliferation risk is Iran. But that is for reasons that have nothing to do with Russia.

Explanations about *why* Iran decided to provide drones & training to Russia and what Tehran received in exchange have ranged from highly plausible ($, coordination on sanx evasion) to wildly absurd (nukes). But there are three potential motives I haven’t seen mentioned. 1/ First, Iran could very well see the use of its drones against Ukraine—backed by the U.S. and NATO—as a way to strike at the West in its own backyard. This would likely be viewed as an attractive opportunity after the U.S. spent almost the last two decades in Iran’s backyard. 2/

That Iran would up the nuclear ante in response to U.S. sanctions (or at least blame sanctions for its latest nuclear advances) was predicted. A few things to keep in mind if this tit-for-tat exchange continues in the coming months. Bottom line: Buckle up for the long haul. 1/

https://twitter.com/AbasAslani/status/1554440959156518912

As @hrome2 and I wrote last December, things "have changed significantly since the period from roughly 2010 to 2012, the last time Iran and the West were engaged in an escalatory cycle of sanctions and nuclear advances." 2/
warontherocks.com/2021/12/gettin…

As many have noted today, the decision by Trump 4 years ago to leave the Iran nuclear deal was a massive strategic (and avoidable) error that lit the fuse for the current nuclear crisis. But the damage is actually much deeper. 1/ The JCPOA withdrawal and “maximum pressure” sanctions campaign highlighted two things to US adversaries: 1) US participation in an agreement may very well hinge on the next election, and 2) in the sanctions-relief-for-nuclear-limits bargain, the advantage goes to the US. 2/

In defending against questions about why it is producing HEU, Iran cites the example of naval reactors and notes the recent AUKUS nuclear-powered sub arrangement to point to double standards. So are the nonpro risks of that deal already manifesting? Not really…1 Iran has long cited potential interest in nuclear propulsion as a reason it might want to enrich to 90%. It also began enriching to HEU (60%) long before the AUKUS announcement. 2/

As a former Deputy NIO and someone who has written similar documents, I have to comment on the ODNI's COVID-19 assessment. Bottom line: I'm sure it will disappoint many, but it is not "inconclusive," and it does many of the things these types of assessments should do. 1/ It doesn't definitely settle the debate over COVID's origins, but it does have other useful judgments: COVID wasn't a bio weapon, it probably was not genetically engineered, and China didn't have foreknowledge of the virus. 2/

ICYMI: Last week, @csisponi and @CNASdc released our new report that looks at how geopolitical trends will shape the future nuclear landscape and the U.S. ability to manage it.

A thread: 1/

csis.org/analysis/towar… First, why did we write this report? For starters, there's been a lot of focus recently on how technological developments are impacting deterrence, stability, and proliferation, but less on where geopolitics fit in. 2/

An initial thread on the Iran section of the new State Dept. compliance report. I'll leave it to the lawyers to opine on whether the report was used as designed, but there's a lot of substance worth mentioning. A few key insights... 1/ 1. The report reaffirms that the 2007 NIE got it right, and that "Iran is not currently undertaking the key nuclear weapons development activities judged necessary to produce a nuclear device." (The same judgment included in the DNI's ATA in January).

There's a lot of bad info floating around out there about how the IC works and how it does the Worldwide Threat Assessment. So as someone who has helped draft these documents (including on issues like Iran!), let me try and set a few things straight in this thread: 1/ None of the judgements in the ATA are new or surprising (or at least they shouldn't be) to those who regularly receive intelligence. The IC doesn't break new news in the ATA. That means that Trump and others have known about these assessments on NK and Iran for some time. 2/