I've recently received a few requests in private to provide links to some work I've had published irl that complements my commentary here on @X. Not everyone will be interested, of course - but for anyone who is, here is a curated 🧵 of such works.

Just to give structure to the posts that follow, here's the plan. Shorter works are first, and among those I'll start with posts that engage specifically with the ongoing conflict in #Gaza since this is very much still a current issue & it forms a large part of my motivation to get active on X in the first place. Then I'll include links to a few shorter works that engage with #LOAC from a more conceptual approach that may be useful to anyone interested in the theory behind practical application of int'l law. The next category will be a few longer journal-length works that engage with some aspect of LOAC. Finally, I'll close by including links to some of my works on #AI & #AutonomousWeapons since I get the sense that this subject may be of interest to some folks who are also interested in the preceding topics. That's the plan for the posts that follow below.

Also, each post will provide a short observation to help situate that particular work in the broader context of public discourse involving LOAC. When available, I'll provide links to posts here on X rather than directly to the work itself.

Two notes before we get started.

First, this isn't meant to be a complete anthology of my works to date. The goal is just to select material that I think would be most of interest to folks who also have an interest in my content here on X.

Second, you will notice that the blog site Lawfire is disproportionately represented among the platforms that have published works selected for this 🧵. While Lawfire doesn't have its own X page, the editor for that blog, my dear friend Charlie Dunlap, is also executive director of the Center on Law, Ethics and National Security (LENS) @DukeLaw. LENS, in turn, manages the X page for @DukeLawNatSec (QTd) - which also posts about nearly every article or other entry published on Lawfire. I am a huge fan of Lawfire in part because it is one of very few blog publications that is geared almost exclusively to the practitioner perspective and that does not exhibit the humanitarian bias that almost every other blog does (ranging from subtle to rabid, depending on the particular platform). If you don't follow @DukeLawNatSec, I strongly encourage you to do so, along with following Lawfire & the LENS Center irl.

Ok, with those preliminary observations out of the way, let's get to the 🧵 of selected works.

1. The QT'd post links to Part I of a two-part Lawfire article analyzing Oct 2023 "attack" on Ah-Ahli hospital in Gaza. Because this incident occurred so early after @Israel initiated the counter-Hamas campaign following Oct 7 and because it involved a major coordinated effort of lawfare & disinformation, politicians & media professionals should have been put on notice early on in this armed conflict (if not long before) not to trust any information coming out of Gaza at face value. Sadly, that lesson was not learned at the time - and even worse it generally never has been still to this day.

For the post(s), Part I explores social & political rhetoric involving the incident for context and also canvasses some primary LOAC considerations involved. Part II (next post) then addresses the broader context by... 2. Part II of the article on Ah-Ahli hospital incident then explores broader context of the divergence between humanitarian & doctrinal approaches to #LOAC in applied context.

https://x.com/DukeLawNatSec/status/1732429138965758178

Headline for this story suggests BBC Verify is "investigating" @Israel's strike on #Gaza's European Hospital. If this story by @MerlynThomas qualifies as a legitimate "investigation" pursuant to @BBCNews Editorial Guidelines, this media company may have different definitions for terms such as "public interest," "truth," "fair," & "accurate" than much of its audience.

I've investigated this media investigation. As we shall see, there is very little analysis provided in the story that is true, fair, or accurate. As such, it is difficult to describe this story as consistent with the public interest.

Intent of this 🧵 is to focus on journalist & "expert" commentary addressing relevant #LOAC rules. These include attacks on medical facilities, warnings before attacking medical facilities, proportionality & feasible precautions in the attack.

Screenshots from video story are attached when referring to specific excerpts from the story, and timeline counter is retained in each screenshot as a pinpoint citation to that excerpt.

Bottom line: analysis of this BBC Verify story helps demonstrate why news media is generally not competent to "investigate" whether incidents that occur in armed conflict comply with relevant LOAC rules. The cumulative effect of thousands upon thousands of such incompetent media "investigations" in sustained combat operations such as ongoing armed conflict in Gaza & region gradually distorts prevailing public opinion by constructing the perception that lawful conduct is illegal.

Each post in 🧵 below analyzes one specific LOAC rule (2 to 4), then final post (5) presents some concluding reflections.

1/5 2/ Attacks on medical facilities.

At the outset of the analysis, it should be noted that this was not an attack on a hospital. According to evidence presented in the story, the attack was directed against an underground object located under & in the vicinity of the European Hospital. Even so, a major component of legal "analysis" in video story is an assertion that this attack may have constituted a #LOAC violation because it "targeted" a hospital.

One source who provides seemingly expert commentary is Prof Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne. He asserts evaluating lawfulness of attack involves 3 parts. First is "whether there was a command and control center being used by #Hamas within this hospital. If there was, and if that can be shown by @Israel to be true, the strike wasn't necessarily lawful" (7:13 - 7:26).

That's the claim. Now let's take a look at what int'l law actually requires.

Pic 1 presents art. 12 of Additional Protocol I (1977) to 1949 Geneva Conventions (AP I). 🇮🇱 hasn't ratified AP I & this treaty wouldn't apply to fight against non-state armed group such as #Hamas anyway. However, this provision is generally regarded to reflect customary law. As an information paper published by @IsraelMFA regarding application of LOAC to current conflict notes, "the special protection afforded under international law to objects such as hospitals is reflected in IDF procedures" (pic 2, available: gov.il/en/pages/hamas…). Because art. 12 of AP I provides significant detail regarding what the "special protection afforded...to objects such as hospitals," current analysis will refer to these provisions even though text of AP I doesn't apply as a matter of *conventional (treaty) law.

Notice Hill-Cawthorne's assertion that presence of command & control (C2) center "within this hospital" is emphasized above. Yes, presence of C2 facility within a hospital would render the medical facility a military objective & therefore subject to deliberate attack. However, evidence presented in this story demonstrates nothing "within this hospital" was object of attack.

Pic 3 shows extent of damage depicted in story from cellphone video footage taken within hospital minutes after attack. It's essentially cosmetic damage: broken wall tiles, some collapsed ceiling tiles, and such. Near the beginning of video story, we're shown CCTV footage of a person who was sitting in a plastic chair in very close proximity to one particular blast. The chair & person get knocked over backward, but then the person gets up & hustles away. Analysis in story (I believe correctly) suggests "bunker buster" munitions with delayed fuses were utilized to attack underground objects while significantly limiting above-ground effects. Pic 4 shows placement of at least 13 damage sites BBC Verify was able to identify. Not one is inside the hospital. A couple in the courtyard, several in parking lots, several more in the surrounding area. Not a single one in the hospital.

These factors suggest the object of attack was indeed a C2 node located *under hospital & surrounding area, along with #Hamas fighters believed to be located there. Notice in pic 1 that articulation in AP I establishes hospitals "shall not be made the object of attack". This means attacks must not be deliberately directed against hospitals (note green highlight in pic 1 confirming civilian medical units receive same protection as military once as long as enumerated criteria are met). Directing an attack against an apparent C2 facility located under hospital & surrounding area while utilizing munitions designed to limit effects of attack to avoid damaging hospital is not making a medical facility the "object of attack."

I also emphasized Hill-Cawthorne's assertion that presence of C2 facility in vicinity of hospital must be "shown by Israel to be true." This is incorrect for two primary reasons. First, Israel has no obligation to "show" anyone anything about what was object of attack. One reason there is no such obligation (among many others) is that sensitive intel is often utilized to determine target is a military objective. I've been involved in more targeting ops than I could ever hope to count, both in training & in combat, so I know from extensive experience that Top Secret info that could compromise collection method(s) if that intel were released to public is often utilized to identify & confirm targets. Another reason this assertion is inaccurate is because what matters in terms of assessing compliance with LOAC distinction rule is knowledge & intent of personnel responsible for attack AT THE TIME, not whether it turns out an apparent C2 node was, in fact, present at hospital. This is what it means to make something the "object of an attack." If a C2 facility is *believed to be present & that is what is attacked, personnel responsible made what they believed AT THE TIME to be C2 facility the object of attack. If it turns out later they were wrong in that belief, they still made the apparent C2 facility the object of attack AT THE TIME. What Hill-Cawthorne does instead is a common mistake among those who have no actual experience applying LOAC in practice - he converts distinction rule into an effects-based construct. This is doctrinally incorrect - focal point of distinction rule is knowledge & intent of attacker AT THE TIME, not whether their belief turns out to be correct AFTER the attack.

Before moving on from LOAC distinction rule & what it means to make hospital the "object of an attack," it is worth noting that journalist's commentary throughout story repeatedly provides caveat that @IDF did not substantiate assertions regarding presence of C2 facility. This is a tactic journos often utilize to cast doubt on claim that target was believed to be military objective AT THE TIME of attack. As indicated above, there is no obligation to confirm details regarding target assessment to media or anyone else. If there were, militaries would be routinely in the habit of leaking info regarding sensitive intel collection methods to the public and, by extension, to their adversaries (current or future). Emphasizing a military element didn't substantiate assertion regarding characterization of target as military objective is a tell-tale sign of media coverage that is biased against the military element that is the subject of media coverage.

Breaking Down Misleading News Coverage of Gaza -- @60Minutes Edition

Subject: Request by @Israel for @POTUS Biden Administration to Deliver 2,000 Pound Bombs

Read on for a🧵presenting in-depth analysis of this spectacularly misleading segment posted today by 60 Minutes. 1/8

https://twitter.com/60Minutes/status/1878604473301381286

2/ @60Minutes segment is structured to focus on several substantive points highlighting that requested 2,000 lb munitions have been controversial throughout the conflict in #Gaza. This previous context is presented to create the suggestion, though never specifically articulated, that the audience should regard the request by for more 2k lb bombs with suspicion. After all, the segment is about to summarize for the audience many concerns that have been raised by use of these munitions during the conflict in the past.

Next post traces arc of the story to outline main points presented in segment that seeks to construct concern for munitions requested by Israel. Subsequent posts analyze each substantive point in sequence. Final post in🧵then consolidates analysis to situate this 60 Minutes segment in broader context of misleading media coverage of Gaza conflict.

🚨🚨 NEW sham report by @airwars claiming patterns of civilian harm in 1st weeks of #Gaza conflict "are unprecedented in modern warfare". How to recognize as a sham?

In a word: methodology. This report reveals - again - perils of effects-based analysis in armed conflict. 🧵1/8

https://twitter.com/airwars/status/1867247313061818725

2/Let's start with what report claims to demonstrate. In intro (p.1), report asserts "manner in which @Israel has conducted the war in #Gaza may signal the development of a concerning new norm: [...] a higher threshold of acceptance for civilian harm than ever seen before."

To support this claim, @airwars would need evidence of what @IDF intends for each incident it analyzes. This is only way to determine Israel's threshold of acceptance of harm. Instead, consistent with Airwars standard methodology, report analyzes only observed effects of airstrikes - and disregards any assessment made public by 🇮🇱 unless it's corroborated by external evidence Airwars team identifies.

Next 4 posts explore fundamental flaws in report methodology that, individually and collectively, indicate findings are incapable of demonstrating what Airwars claims data analyzed in report "may signal".

All You Need to Know About Decolonial Theory, in 8 Tweets

If you want to "know enough about decolonial theory", you can:

1): Spend career constructing new ways to blame ppl of W European heritage for afflicting those you consider disadvantaged;

or

2): Read this short 🧵.
1/8

https://twitter.com/Alonso_GD/status/1867638550725865954

2/Decolonial theory calls on ppl "of all nationalities [to] unite to smash settler colonial state & replace it w/socialism." "Settler colonial" = "capitalist" based on context, meaning intent is to "smash" capitalism & replace w/some brand of socialism.

https://x.com/seizethebanks/status/1864811602824093894?t=db40NghldTQ3VWUhpX-Rgw&s=19

A few initial observations re: announcement today from @IntlCrimCourt PTC I of arrest warrants issued for current @IsraeliPM @netanyahu & former @Israel_MOD Minister @yoavgallant. Bottom line: States Party should refuse to implement warrants until several errors or omissions are satisfactorily addressed by Court.

Analysis of announcement & suggested next steps are presented in this 🧵
1/9 2/ Issue of Palestinian "state"hood is front & center, as always. In decision published today, PTC I notes that "acceptance by 🇮🇱 of the Court’s jurisdiction is not required." This is technically true, but Court has no authority to decide on behalf of State Party that Palestine qualifies for statehood.

Yes, PTC I previously determined unilaterally that 🇵🇸 is "State" Party & this is sufficient to establish jurisdiction for events occurring in territory (art. 12(2)(a) of Rome Statute). So the Court can (arguably) exercise jurisdiction, but it can't compel States to recognize 🇵🇸 "state"hood. Meeting jurisdictional requirement is required for Situation to proceed.

Any State Party that recognizes 🇵🇸 statehood already aligns with Court's determination, so this isn't a ground to refuse to implement arrest warrants for those countries. But any State Party that doesn't recognize 🇵🇸 may refuse to implement warrants since Court can't force countries to recognize statehood, and 🇵🇸 "state"hood is precondition for exercise of territorial jurisdiction.

Yet more #legaldisinformation from @BBC in context of ongoing conflict in #Gaza, this time amplifying false narratives from @philippesands & others involving implementation of int'l law.

For brief analysis, a short 🧵

1/6
bbc.com/news/articles/… 2/Distorted legal narratives are set up w/commentary from @eranetzion noting @IDF members "must refuse" to "commit something that might be suspected as a war crime".

This is self evident. @IsraelMFA info paper summarizes #LOAC rules applied to #Gaza. 👇
gov.il/en/pages/hamas…

During #UNGA79 remarks today, PM Mia Amor Mottley of Barbados claimed "humanitarian catastrophe" in #Gaza "is the result of the disproportionate use of force by @Israel" & "there's no justification for it."

This claim was endorsed by some int'l law specialists, including @MarkKersten, who claimed "every state should be able to say this, w/o hesitation."

Is this (fairly common) assertion re: Israel, proportionality & Gaza consistent w/doctrinal int'l legal analysis? Short answer: no, not in the least.

Since PM's remarks don't differentiate between jus ad bellum (JAB, int'l law involving resort to force) & jus in bello (JIB, int'l law involving conduct of hostilities), both must be addressed.

Each aspect (JAB & JIB) is addressed, in sequence, in 🧵below 1/13 👇👇👇 2/Starting w/jus ad bellum (JAB, int'l law involving resort to force), exact meaning of "proportionality" is contested. An informed & fairly balanced definition can be found in @ILA_official "Final Report on Aggression and the Use of Force" published in 2018 (link 👇).

There is plenty to debate from this report & report itself doesn't qualify as binding source of int'l law. But, engagement with JAB "proportionality" is well informed & rather balanced. Next post presents proportionality characterization from ILA report, then following post presents similar articulation from DoD Law of War Manual as another example of "proportionality" treatment.

ila-hq.org/en_GB/document…

Classic #legaldisinformation from @amnesty & unfortunately on brand for this org. 2 substantive legal falsehoods to support 1 procedural misrepresentation - all in the same post.

Interested in doctrinal legal analysis of QT'd post & report linked therein? Read on for short 🧵examining each falsehood in an individual post. 1/5 2/ Substantive legal falsehood # 1: "wanton" destruction (1st pic).

Actual wanton destruction does qualify as war crime, but conduct by @IDF doesn't qualify as "wanton". Let's use grave breaches text of Geneva Convention IV (GCIV) of 1949 as textual example of crime (2nd pic).

"Extensive destruction" is "grave breach" if it is "not justified by military necessity" AND carried out "wantonly". Note the conjunctive "and" here.

@amnesty report linked in post QT'd above doesn't establish that destruction in eastern #Gaza is "not justified by military necessity". Rather, it offers merely conclusory assertions that destruction is "wanton". In fact, suggestion in report that IDF is creating "buffer zones" indicates destroyed property qualifies as military objective: object that by its "nature, location, purpose or use" makes an effective contribution to military action (3rd pic).

@ErikaGuevaraR suggests in Amnesty report that affected "homes were not destroyed as the result of intense fighting" & "Israeli military deliberately razed the land after they had taken control of the area." That may well be true, but these factors don't establish that "war crime" of "wanton destruction" has been committed since no indication of prospective military necessity is even considered (let alone conclusively refuted).

As doctrinal definition indicates, both elements ("not justified" and "wantonly") are required to conclude grave breach has been committed. 1st substantive assertion re: "war crime" of "wanton" destruction, then, is unsubstantiated.
❌

.@FCDOGovUK announced today suspension of around 30 (out of approx 350) licenses for arms exports to @Israel. I've now had a chance to review explanation of int'l legal basis published in support of decision. In short, @GOVUK's legal explanation is dangerously flawed & utterly unconvincing. 🧵below to explain this assessment.

Tbh, there are so many flaws in the legal explanation that analysis of each one would be unduly cumbersome on this platform. So, I'll stick to the highlights. 1/8

Press release announcing suspension is QT'd. Along with announcement, FCDO posted "Summary of the IHL process, decision and the factors taken into account" policy paper to explain decision to suspend. This policy paper is primary source of screenshots from 🇬🇧 position & analysis below. It's available at this link for reference. 👇👇👇
gov.uk/government/pub… 2/ Let's start with the actual controlling policy/legal standard. Policy paper linked above recaps relevant standard, captured in 1st pic below. Note red highlight on serious violation of IHL in the legal standard, bc this is important. None of the actual reasons provided in legal policy paper amount to serious violations of IHL. This makes explanation of decision to suspend export licenses legally insufficient, which means it is purely a political - and not legal - decision. Policy paper indicates that several factors "were key to the judgement" that UK "must" suspend export licenses (2nd pic).

It is worth noting that this domestic policy & legal framework is consistent with obligations reflected in Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), which UK + all EU countries have ratified. EU has its own internal standard that no longer applies to UK, but both UK & EU standards are consistent w/ATT. So, the analysis below can be extended to any State Party to ATT (including all EU Member States) that may be considering similar policy to this one announced today by UK.

Congrats to @Frances_Coppola, undisputed recipient of the prestigious #legaldisinformation #awardoftheday on #LegalTwitter for stringing at least 4 legal falsehoods together in 1 post regarding @Israel's right of self-defense pursuant to int'l law. How's that possible?
🧵1/14

https://twitter.com/Frances_Coppola/status/1826182003957301737

2/ Sentence highlighted here is 1st potential legal falsehood. There are 2 sentences following this w/3 separate claims regarding 🇮🇱's potential right of self-defense. If none of the 3 separate claims is true, this 1st sentence is false as well.

Let's check each claim & then circle back here (SPOILER ALERT - this 1st sentence is false, too):