1/5 Why did Macron change its public stance on Russia? A net assessment based on 4 reasons.

1. He was mugged by reality. The fact is that Putin lied to him, proved deaf to attempts to how goodwill, while Russia doubled down on aggression. 2. He realized that his European agenda (a true legacy issue for him) implied embracing the Ukrainian cause and being more sensitive to Central European concerns.

[Eurobomb special!]

1/8 After Trump’s statement, there is a lot of confusion in the US and in Europe about the question (wrongly) known as “Eurobomb”. 2/8 First, two things. One is that nobody in his or her right mind should think about France or the UK “sharing the decision to use nuclear weapons” (consultations are a different matter of course) or “sharing the national nuclear budget”.

[THIS IS NOT A DRILL]

(1/10) As the temperature heats up, a few notes on the nuclear deterrence dimension and first lessons of the Ukraine war. (2/10) Deterrence at large failed on 2/24. The asymmetry of stakes was probably too great. And sanctions have failed to reestablish deterrence. But nuclear deterrence succeeded (so far): Russia is deterred from attacking us, we are deterred from attacking Russia.

(1/6) Thrilled to publish this monograph and thanks to the @ACEurope team @benjaminhaddad @dmarusic @b_judah for having commissioned and reviewed it, as well as for its thoughtful comments and suggestions.

atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-resea… (2/6) Standing military alliances are proliferating, expanding and deepening. Is this good or bad for international instability? Does it create a risk of escalation to the point of perhaps triggering a new world war à la 1914?

[1/6] Comme ce papier semble avoir été apprécié, je vais résumer ses arguments pour ceux qui n'y ont pas accès dans son intégralité:
lefigaro.fr/vox/monde/brun… [2/6] (1) Le texte de M. Guaino se trompe d'analogie historique: la situation actuelle a peu à voir avec 1914 et en revanche davantage à voir avec les années 1930.

(1/9) [Hot take on reported (leaked documents by @elpaisinenglish) US and NATO responses to Russian demands, focusing on the most concrete or newest points] (2/9) NATO-Russia: we’re ok to engage constructively in meaningful dialogue, to achieve concrete results. We’re ok for a civilian hotline to maintain emergency contact. We’re ok to work on incidents prevention at sea and in the air.

(1/14) [Quick thread / A few points on the Ukraine crisis] (2/14) Those who claim that "Putin will certainly to this" or "Putin won't certainly do that" engage in pure speculation. History should teach us to be modest.

(1/14) [Fil rapide / Ukraine] Quelques points sur des questions que l’on me pose souvent : (2/14) Ceux qui affirment avec assurance que « Poutine va faire ceci » ou « Poutine ne va pas faire cela » sont dans la pure spéculation. L’histoire devrait nous apprendre une certaine modestie dans ce domaine.