Dalam artikel @BeritaHarianSG tentang laporan penelitian gelombang 2023 Tinjauan Barometer Asian dari @IPS_sg , itu juga tidak diskusi pengukuran demokrasi dalam reka bentuk pengelitian. beritaharian.sg/singapura/tinj… Kerana tinjauan digabungkan prestasi ekonomi dan kestabilan sosial dengan pilihan raya yang bebas dan adil, kebebasan pers, dan kebebasan berhimpun, itu sulit untuk mengatahui yang apa responden sedang bereaksi.

相比與 @straits_times 和 @ChannelNewsAsia ， @zaobaosg 報導 @IPS_sg 新加坡版「亞洲民主動態調查」研究報告發佈會中，有提到該研究測量民主的方式，所引起的爭議。因為研究法物質經濟和社會穩定等條件，與選舉和集會、新聞自由都一起劃入「民主」的定義， 比較難知道受訪者回應主要是因為權益和程序民主的考量，還是其他物質考量。在方法上，這幾題其實可以分開，然後問受訪者對不同題的比重、重要性或正/負面感覺，來理解受訪者對個別議題的相對觀點。又，研究在試圖測量民主時，並沒有列入行政權限、權力分立等非競選時期的一班民主操作，令人有些遺憾。

So the @ChannelNewsAsia report on the @IPS_SG Asian Barometer survey provides more detail than the @straits_times , which is useful in understanding its key limitations. The report itself does not make them explicit. See the definition of democracy posed to respondents.

In lumping econ performance & distribution w/ political & civil rights (& also voting, which was mentioned in the event, but not the article) as democracy, it becomes unclear which sentiment is actually doing the work for respondents.

Having been at the launch event, it is a really pity that @straits_times & Goh Yan Han were able to include the limitations of the Asia Barometer survey. They include the lumping of sentiments abt econ performance, distribution w/those abt democracy.
straitstimes.com/singapore/s-po… Perceptions of democracy tended to focus on electoral procedures & some substantive issues like f'dom of press, assembly & protest, but not institutional features such as restraint on executive authority, separation of powers that are important during electoral off-cycles.

Spoke w/ @straits_times abt 🇸🇬’s Protection fr Online Falsehoods & Manipulation Act (POFMA) 5 yrs on. I fear many risks remain unaddressed. Unfortunate that the POFMA Office didn’t respond to the ST in the interests of greater transparency. 🪡🧵1/-straitstimes.com/singapore/five… Below are my full responses to the ST.

Q: Looking back at 5 years of Pofma - what do you think are some more key moments that we should take note of, that give us a clearer understanding of what Pofma's purpose is meant to be & the "threshold" for something to be Pofma-ed? 2/-

Fascinating piece. Glad to have had a conversation with @ShibaniMahtani on the diaspora nationalism involving 🇸🇬’s ethnic Chinese population.

https://twitter.com/shibanimahtani/status/1683647052323110912

This @washingtonpost follows other research & reporting over the years. They include from earlier this year (2023), a piece on the UFWD & 🇸🇬 business & civil associations by the @straits_times Also: straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia…

Nice! Glad to see this out! My co-authors & I argue that coercion & pressure from 🇨🇳 hardens attitudes on Taiwan against accommodation.

https://twitter.com/jjps_eds/status/1639251113584238592

Interesting that this piece from @CSIS provides a similar, but more general explanation about gardening positions toward economic coercion by 🇨🇳. csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/20…

Glad to have this piece out with @CarnegieChina & @CarnegieEndow . However one sees “one China,” I think it’s important to understand the different positions out there, especially where & when they shift (or not). carnegieendowment.org/2023/02/09/man… Since “one China” is of limited importance to most states, they may adjust positions as convenient to themselves & sometimes not adjust language.

Thanks to Today Online for reaching out.
Please see my full responses in the 🧵below. 1/n

todayonline.com/singapore/expl… 1. Is there a conflict of interest as a backbencher MP with no political office?
There are several related issues at stake here. One is the potential for conflicts of interest, given that MPs are responsible for legislation. 2/n

So this bit of the🇨🇳readout highlighted by @EvanFeigenbaum piqued my interest. I wonder how🇨🇳“non-intervention” applies wrt to political/united Front work in🇺🇸.

https://twitter.com/evanfeigenbaum/status/1592180315099131905

Note that in the recent CCP 20th Party Congress work report, Xi noted the following in a sub-section titled “Consolidating & developing the broadest possible patriotic united front.” fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx_66280…

1. Interesting to see some of the 🇺🇸🇨🇳 differences in the readouts from the Xi-Biden meeting. Following just my read/interpretation. A 🪡🧵See below for full texts of both statements:
whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/…

content-static.cctvnews.cctv.com/snow-book/inde… 2. Re: Taiwan, 🇨🇳 statement indicated a hope that 🇺🇸 words and actions regarding Taiwan are consistent. 🇨🇳 hopes that 🇺🇸 realises its commitments to not support Taiwan independence and not use Taiwan as a tool to seek advantage against or limit 🇨🇳.

@teocheehean 🇸🇬 is right to express some hesitation over 🇺🇳’s position over Taiwan’s status in this report by @ChannelNewsAsia channelnewsasia.com/singapore/sing… /"UN member countries recognise China as a member of the UN and that Taiwan is a part of China. And that, I think has been a settled position in the UN for many, many years since 1971 when China took the seat,

The long Chair statement from the East Asian Summit Foreign Ministers’ Meeting from Aug 5 has a paragraph calling for restraint re: “cross-Strait” developments, citing the UN Charter, TAC & risks of escalation. h/t @kalvinfks Note that the statement did not specify which strait or which actors, presumably doing so could be too sensitive. It notes that “many countries reiterated One-China policy,” but not Beijing’s “one-China principle.” asean.org/wp-content/upl…

Came across a somewhat inaccurate translation of my comments in a given to Yip Wai Yee for a piece The Straits Times. 

My preferred translation is:

雖然世界大多關注（裴洛西）行程如何提升兩個超級強國間的緊張，莊嘉穎博士，新加坡國立大學政治系副教授，另外提到幾點供其他國家考慮。 雖然世界大多關注（裴洛西）行程如何提升兩個超級強國間的緊張，莊嘉穎博士，新加坡國立大學政治系副教授，另外提到幾點供其他國家考慮。

「一個美中雙方可以擱置差異，或在不傷害第三國家利益情況下競爭的世界，暫時或許比較難實現，」他說。

1/ Thanks to @mariasiow & @SCMPAsia for reaching out for this piece about the @pewresearch survey on attitudes & trends across 19 countries, out at the end of June 2022. Questions, my full responses & some thoughts below. Warning, long🪡🧵.
scmp.com/week-asia/poli… 2/ 1) Why do you think the majority of Singapoeans polled have a favorable view of China and Chinese leader Xi Jinping? Considering that in other countries where the survey had polled, the majority held an unfavorable view of both the country and its leader.