SHORT THREAD: Sharing some of latest PRC research concerning long-term sustainability of its presence in the South China Sea. The research, spanning across different fields ranging from geomorphology to force projection, demonstrates Beijing's intention to assert dominance. This paper, involving China Coast Guard, studies ship-UAV coordination. Objective is clearly to enable persistent maritime domain awareness and sovereignty assertion actions. The vaunted CCG force expansion obviously cannot sustain such high operational tempo across a vast SCS.

Grey zone. It starts with something small - even deemed inconsequential enough to warrant a strong response. Then the aggressor pushes the envelope further, gambling the move as below the likely threshold of the victim’s lash-back. And it goes on. english.kyodonews.net/news/2023/09/1… The grey zone aggressor calculates and calibrates his next move based on the victim's response. If the victim responds, the aggressor retreats. If the victim responds in a lackluster manner, or not respond at all, the aggressor advances. At the same time, the aggressor...

Laughable statement from the PRC embassy in Manila. I shall try to poke holes at some of those comic points raised. Thread follows. https://t.co/TBknYc3hh7ph.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/sgdt/20230…
"The historical context of the issue of Ren’ai Jiao is very clear, and China’s position on it is consistent and firm."

When PRC becomes a signatory of UNCLOS, legal supersedes historical imperatives. But this point was already raised many times, the arbitral award is clear. 1/n

Virtually little movement since the Single Draft Negotiating Text (SDNT) was promulgated for the first time in June 2018 by ASEAN member states and PRC. Thread to follow. https://t.co/USGOs6tWHMmfa.gov.sg/Newsroom/Press…
In Oct 2019, the session held in Da Lat, Vietnam was originally meant to be the second reading of SDNT. However, thanks to the standoff in Vanguard Bank between Beijing and Hanoi, this was not called the second reading. Vietnam didn't pull its punches. vietnamnet.vn/en/chinese-ill…

A serious question begets a serious answer. Would anyone regard this as anything more than rhetoric? There's a legal answer to the status of Tsugaru Strait and how different it is to Taiwan Strait. To begin, reminder that PRC is a State Party to UNCLOS. Thread follows.

https://twitter.com/RnaudBertrand/status/1650145041107783684

Per UNCLOS, coastal states can claim up to 12nm of territorial sea (TTS) limit. Japan chose to claim up to 3nm on both sides of the Tsugaru Strait - which measures about 10.5nm. Coastal states may not claim the full 12nm, and this of course harks back to customary law. 1/

Great update by AMTI on the PRC maritime militia activities in the SCS. While the distinction between Professional and Backbone fleets is useful, the underlying trends concerning manpower would be difficult to overlook. Short thread follows. amti.csis.org/the-ebb-and-fl… According to this 2017 study by researchers at the People's Armed Police Academy, majority of PAFMM members fall within 40-50 years old bracket, whereas younger able-bodied males mostly no longer desire to work in the fisheries industry.

All the hype about so-called "unsinkable aircraft carriers". Ever wondered why each of these outposts is so under-populated considering the infra can hold about a regiment of troops? Fact is that geomorphologically these artificial islands are unstable. scmp.com/news/china/dip… What I understand, and this comes from a PRC government official who I shall not name, the artificial islands were built in haste. Environmental impact assessment and structural feasibility studies, which would have been required, were pushed wayside to expedite the project.

I can fully vouch for a trip to the Yamato Museum - it's certainly worth your time and expense, I guarantee. asahi.com/ajw/articles/1… My personal experience back in December 2018.

Taiwan Strait constitutes international strait. Beyond the 12nm territorial sea limit on both sides of the waterway, there's a considerable high seas corridor where international users exercise freedom of navigation and overflight. You hamper this at your own peril.

https://twitter.com/AmbQinGang/status/1560431574964965377

Context of the Ambassador's tweet. news.usni.org/2022/08/08/u-s…

Event thread: #SLD honoured to be a delegate at the 19th Shangri-La Dialogue, after a long Covid hiatus. Will be tweeting as much key snippets as possible in those sessions I attend. Please bear with me if I miss out details or share vaguely at times. 🙏🏼 First Plenary Session: Next Steps for the United States’ Indo-Pacific Strategy, by U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin.

In line with the prevailing context, this ASEAN-US Special Summit emphasized post-COVID economic recovery, sustainable development, education and public health constituting the bulk of contents in the White House factsheet, with just 1 smaller section on maritime cooperation. Link to the factsheet: whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/…

PRC's Supreme People's Court and Supreme People's Procuratorate jointly issue new guidelines on litigation for marine natural resources and environmental management. Some preliminary observations about potential ramifications. THREAD follows. spp.gov.cn/spp/xwfbh/wsfb… Scope of this set of guidelines includes the maritime zones per UNCLOS, though added "other waters under national jurisdiction" [我国管辖的其他海域]. This is similar language found in the Coast Guard Law promulgated in February 2021, which would South China Sea waters. 1/

"For me what is important is the reported heavy casualties at colonel and above, the backbone of the Russian army, not just generals." The loss of battalion leaders tends to bear greater morale impact than the loss of generals on the rank and file. reuters.com/world/europe/r… Having served in an infantry battalion before, I can't emphasize more how much a battalion CO often plays the fatherly figure to the rank and file across the companies. Battalions are usually the basic fighting unit, and hence tend to be cohesive.

Before anyone labels the confirmed BrahMos sale to the Philippines as a breakthrough move, do note that Indonesia has operated the ship-based Russian-origin Yakhont and Vietnam the land-based variant Bastion-P for some time. India is certainly a new entrant to the game. Indonesian Navy official release on the Yakhont test-launch in April 2011, from the frigate KRI Oswald Siahaan. tni.mil.id/view-26141-rud…

Besides the genius of “Tiger of Malaya”, what’s most interesting in the course of my research that prepared my lecture on Malayan Campaign to the officer cadets back then, was the handy tactical pamphlet issued to each soldier, Read This Alone - And The War Can be Won.

https://twitter.com/asiainww2/status/1456889278538162176

What’s so interesting about this pamphlet is to start with the background in the run-up to December 1941. War in China back then bogged down; it’s akin to a python attempting to swallow an elephant instead of a deer. Imperial Japan needed resources to fuel this war effort. 1/

MINI-THREAD: Yesterday (15/5) at Zhoushan, the PLA Eastern Theater Command Navy dispatched the 38th Escort Task Force for counter-piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden. Notably, destroyer Nanjing debuts for such mission. My updated table below. xinhuanet.com/english/2021-0… My first observation is that from 2019, the composition of a typical ETF has stabilized to 1 destroyer, 1 frigate and 1 replenishment oiler. Prior to that, shortfalls in destroyers would mean either 2 frigates were deployed, or that there'll be LPDs filling the slot sometimes. 1/

THREAD: following reports of PLA Navy Type-022 Houbei catamaran missile fast attack craft harassing a motorboat chartered by ABS-CBN journalists in the Spratlys, Beijing's pretense about just using "white hulls" to promote SCS peace and stability is well over. Context is impt. In recent years, especially after the disparate PRC maritime law enforcement agencies were unified under a single China Coast Guard, there has been internal debate within the agency about the challenges they face when carrying out maritime sovereignty and rights protection. 1/

That's a load of crap, if you bother to dig out the list of transgressions which took place since late 2016. Crying victim and blame-push in order to justify asking Americans to pay to keep VFA? Want to have your cake and eat it, I suppose. cnnphilippines.com/news/2021/2/16… Exhibit 1: “It is not enough that China now gives the impression that it is giving ‘permission’ to our fisherfolk to fish in the waters around the shoal… giving permission is an act of ownership, it should not stop our claim of ownership over the shoal.” philstar.com/headlines/2016…

@fravel Thank you Professor Taylor. Under Ch3, clause 20, the CCG is authorized to order foreign organizations or individuals to cease such unlawful activities or to dismantle/remove the structures, floating or fixed, within waters and on islands and reefs under national jurisdiction... @fravel And the subsequent mention is that if the foreign organizations or individuals fail to heed those orders, CCG is authorized to stop those activities (i.e. construction of those structures) or forcibly dismantle/remove them...

THREAD: The 25th Standing Committee session of PRC's 13th National People's Congress passed the Coast Guard Law, which has been under deliberation and opened to "public consultation" for the past few months since last year. Some key takes below. reuters.com/article/us-chi… 1. There has been much reported in the press focusing on the authorization of CCG to open fire at foreign vessels. The first that came to my mind is that beyond how it could impact regional maritime flashpoints e.g. SCS disputes, it's a common practice worldwide anyway. 1/

THREAD: Since there's no background context provided here, I shall chip in to dispel the notion that the SCS arbitration brought forth by then Aquino Administration against Beijing in 2013 is "destabilizing" as claimed here.

https://twitter.com/resplinodell/status/1349784772541882373

Scarborough Shoal falls within Philippine EEZ. Due to its capacity shortfalls in enforcing fishery protection, Manila's enforcement in the shoal against foreign fishermen operating there had at best been intermittent throughout the decades. 1/