(1/7) Judgment on Wednesday, 21 January 2026 at 10h00: The Constitutional Court declined to confirm an order of constitutional invalidity made by the High Court which declared section 10(2) of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 unconstitutional. 2/7) The Recognition Act places customary marriage on an equal footing with civil marriage. A customary marriage, when the parties to it enter into a subsequent civil marriage, is not dissolved. Rather, the later civil marriage subsumes the customary marriage.

(1/6) Judgment on Monday, 20 May 2024 at 10h00: On a proper interpretation of section 47(1)(e), is Mr Zuma disqualified from standing as a candidate for the National Assembly? (2/6) What effect does a remission of sentence have on a “sentence” for the purposes of section 47(1)(e) of the Constitution?

(1/6) Hearing tomorrow at 10h00: Should Madlanga J, Majiedt J, Mhlantla J, Theron J and Tshiqi J recuse themselves from hearing this matter? (2/6) Is a conviction and sentence against which there is no appeal, a conviction and sentence for the purposes of section 47(1)(e) of the Constitution?

(1/6) Judgment: Capitec provided its customers with a loan cover free of charge. Accordingly, the loan cover had a nil value. Although the loan cover was supplied free of charge, this did (2/6) not disqualify it from constituting a “taxable supply” under the Value-Added Tax Act. The supply of loan cover was a mixed supply, made in the course or furtherance of Capitec’s

(1/3) Judgment: First judgment:Recalculation method in Schedule 1A of the Electoral Act is rational and constitutional. Third judgment: Recalculation method is an unjustifiable limitation on voters’, independent candidates’ and smaller political parties’ political rights. (2/3) Judgment: Signature requirement contained in section 31B of the Electoral Act is an unjustifiable limitation of independent candidates’ rights to freedom of association, to make political choices, and to stand for public office, as per the second, majority judgment.

(1/8) Judgment: The Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (LRA) does not distinguish between a “suspended” and a “terminated” strike. A “strike”, as defined in the LRA, does not exist during the period that the strike has been suspended. Only an unconditional right to strike exists. (2/8) Accordingly, during the period that the employees of Trenstar (Pty) Limited (the respondent) suspended their strike, their exclusion from the workplace despite their tender of services was in terms of a lock-out.