Senior Research Fellow, Proliferation and Nuclear Policy @RUSI_org. Iran nuclear; military threats to nuclear facilities; nuclear trade; other nuclear things.
Jun 22 • 4 tweets • 1 min read
My (very) preliminary reaction to the strikes on #Iran overnight. Top line: lots of questions, few details.
But, for me, fundamental hasn’t changed: military action alone can only roll back the programme by degrees not eliminate it fully.
🧵
rusi.org/in-the-news/da…
If FFEP was indeed damaged (which remains unclear) that would be a significant setback for the programme. FFEP is a critical site, enriching to 60% using advanced centrifuges and 20% feed.
More unknowns: where existing HEU stocks may be, if there are any secret sites, etc
Jun 14 • 6 tweets • 2 min read
Good piece but we need to nuance the discussion on radiological risk. As per my earlier post, enriched uranium is indeed radioactive, but the hazard is primarily chemical. Doesn’t mean it’s not bad but let’s be accurate.
nytimes.com/2025/06/13/us/…
U-235 and U-238 have half-lives of ~700 million and ~4.5 billion years, respectively. Both undergo alpha (α) decay. Meaning, enriched uranium is only weakly radioactive and poses radiological risk primarily through inhalation/ingestion (α particles blocked by skin).
Apr 17, 2020 • 8 tweets • 2 min read
Latest UN Panel of Experts report on #DPRK sanctions evasion has just been published: undocs.org/S/2020/151. Some interesting bits, a thread. (1/?)
DPRK apparently continuing to deploy IT workers abroad, securing freelance contracts with unwitting clients in Canada, China, Russia, Serbia, Ukraine and the US. (2/?)
