Since 2008, more servicemembers have died from suicide than the entirety of the GWOT since 9/11. We have lost 7,260, almost a Division’s worth of troops, from suicide since the DoD started public annual reporting in 2008. For active duty we have lost 5,001, more than a Brigade/Regiment. To put it in perspective, we are losing the equivalent of 1 Light Infantry Battalion in suicide deaths every single year since 2012.
That tragic level of lost combat power and readiness is staggering and horrific, but when we break down the numbers from the DoD’s annual suicide reports, a trend emerges that may allow us to intervene and reduce the loss by up to 1/3rd each year. It boils down to the legal and investigation use within each of the services. As demonstrated in the graphic, Administrative/Legal/Investigation issues are directly linked to a contributing factor for 32.8% of suicides and 29.47% of suicide attempts every year. Let’s take a deeper look at the numbers and how we can immediately start addressing it.
Attention wanes the longer the posts go on, so I’ll start with the fix. When a SM is suspected of violating a law or regulation, they are investigated. While under investigation, their immediate commander places an investigative hold on that person’s personnel file (each service uses different vernacular). This specific code prevents several favorable things from happening like moving to a new unit or base (PCS), receiving awards, attending certain schools/training, and a number of other actions. That investigation can then lead to adverse action against the SM depending on what that command decides to pursue. Every time a SM is investigated or an investigation results in adverse action, that immediate commander has to counsel that SM on the personnel file code and what is happening. These two touchpoints are important for our ability to address suicide across the force.

From the DoD’s annual suicide data, Administrative, Legal, and Investigation issues are listed as a specific stressor potentially contributing to that SM committing suicide. From the previous graphics for both suicide deaths and attempts this stressor contributes to 1/3rd of the numbers every year. If we tie a specific stressor event to a trigger that requires commanders to push resources towards affected SMs, we can head off the downward spiral in a servicemembers psyche. We can change each service’s command regulation to require that immediate commander to order the SM to go have a conversation with the unit Chaplain or the Military Family Life Counselor (MFLC, located in almost every Brigade level unit and higher) in the same counseling session they are already required to have when an investigation or adverse action occurs. For SMs who are already a high risk (this is a function done based on indicators/issues each command team already prepared and briefed to higher HQ), a command directed behavioral health visit will be directed to connect the SM with a BH specialist.

The irony of me recommending a command directed behavioral health visit shouldn’t be lost to anyone after I was command directed twice for “emergency command directed BH” for different whistleblowing issues, but I stand by its ability to intervene at the right time to save a SMs life. While in command I utilized a CDE (Command Directed Evaluation) on multiple occasions for different SMs. This intervention tool saved the lives of kids (trainees) who were actively cutting themselves or getting caught trying to end their life in the bathroom. Each branch has criteria the command must meet and follow for CDEs based on the corresponding DoDI, so there would be no additional legwork on changing this aspect of command policies.

In fact, I emailed some of my collected data and the formal proposed command policy change to the Army G1 at the time, GEN Gary Brito. He emailed me back within 24 hours and thought it was a great idea. Unfortunately, like many things in the Army ideas die on the vine with bureaucracy. I was handed off to the chief Psychiatry Consultant to the US Army Surgeon General and after a reply from the COL praising the effort but expressing some concerns about resources, I never heard anything additional. The exact language to use for the Army, that the other services can be modeled after, is in the screenshot of the formal proposed change and the email I sent to the G1 below.

When the DoD IG fails in its mission, the cost is as grave as the wages of sin—death. This can manifest directly through the despair of a servicemember who loses faith in the system, leading to suicide (or as was nearly my fate when Officers, unaccountable due to the IG's inaction, ordered my medical detainment and near death). Or it can occur indirectly when the IG's failure to tackle fraud, waste, and abuse leads to a decline in standards, culminating in preventable equipment failures that claim servicemembers' lives. Either way, the result is clear: harm comes to America's sons and daughters, and our military's readiness suffers.

I experienced firsthand what happens when the IG, through willful negligence or incompetence, turns a blind eye to leader misconduct and violations of the law throughout the force. I had the unique experience of being able to interact with thousands of SMs over the last few years and aid them during the covid mandate fight. Seeing every IG, almost on cue, deny these SMs claim about the very clear violation of the law and their rights (all because Terry Adirim wrote lies on a piece of paper), was devastating. How could this happen, it seemed so straightforward and clear cut?
It was medical detainment (and near death) for filing a criminal complaint for UCMJ violations that I witnessed and the “unsubstantiated” DoD IG letter I received months later (after never receiving a call from any investigator) that demonstrated to me just how useless the IG system was.

This last “unsubstantiated” was the third such response from the IG and the video of my family being held on the side of the road and the picture of dangerous substances with instructions to forcibly inject into me, didn’t manifest itself out of thin air one day…it began over half a year before those events with the failure of the DoD IG. I’ll explain:
I was suspended from command on 22 March 2021 after making online whistleblowing remarks on 16 March 2021 about female trainees receiving additional rounds to qualify on rifle marksmanship (a graduation requirement) so that the number of female infantry OSUT graduates could stay above a certain percentage.
For males this percentage was 90%, if for any reason you dipped below a 90% graduation rate you would have to by-name explain to the Brigade Commander why you dipped below the % and concessions would be made to either “catch those trainees up” (by bending standards and allowing additional attempts outside of POI by sending them to other units to only participate in that event again where they would magically pass) or why you and your Drill Sergeants failed that trainee.
If that trainee caught covid at any point, the virus would be used by Brigade to explain why that trainee failed and often they would be placed in another unit to restart and try again. I do not know what the female graduation percentage rate was at the time because I was not in command of an integrated unit. At the two infantry OSUT battalions who trained females, both would give a female who was not meeting the “standard” an additional interview with that battalions commanding Officer before any decision was made by that Officer to recycle or initial-entry separate them.
I was made aware of this by my Drill Sergeants who attended a “Sensing Session” with the TRADOC Command Sergeant Major on or around 09 March 2021. The female Drill Sergeants assigned to those battalions who witnessed the events were exceptionally upset by the unfair practices and the violation of graduation requirements.

These comments ended up being posted on a social media account. Representatives Cotton and Crenshaw had launched a Critical Race Theory “Tip” line website and I sent in a narrative (as seen below) explaining to that site after being suspended. At the reading of my suspension, the BDE CDR made it known that this investigation was being directed by the commanding general of MCoE (the base and training command I lived and worked at). That General was Major General Patrick Donahoe.

The following is the order for 3rd Infantry Division and the base of Ft. Stewart & Hunter Army Airfield to vaccinate their Soldiers. Pay attention to the 2nd and 3rd pics with the red box. They ordered ALL medical exemptions deleted from Soldier's records. Not only is it against AR 600-20 and AR 40-562 (the reg that covers vaccinations and medical exemptions) but it is patently illegal and dangerous. Non-medical personnel do not have the authority to order a standing and valid medical order (exemption) to be deleted. Where other units did this behind...

3 years ago today, while on leave, I showed up to a mass GOMOR Counseling on Ft Benning to make sure the base command was following the HQDA orders and providing accurate information to the Soldiers who refused.
3 days later I would be detained/arrested by base LE & denied lawyer I was arrested for having the nerve to follow my Oath of Office and my duty of responsibility to Soldiers as an Officer. My egregious sin in the eyes of the command? I asked a question and informed Soldiers of their rights under the law when it comes to EUA products...

This time of year is appropriate to remind The People that our senior leaders, especially those "leading" at HKIA like LTG Chris Donahue @CDonahue1792 had significant advanced warnings of the Abbey Gate bombing prior to it happening. A Marine there recorded this 4 hours prior... You all know Chris Donahue, he's the "leader" who's disastrous decisions at HKIA lead to tens of thousands of SIV holders and American citizens being left outside the gates of HKIA to be harassed by the taliban while thousands of unvetted randos got free rides abroad.