I'm going to make an effort to set aside my characteristic cynicism and pessimism for one second here and say there is one silver lining -- the pilot zones.

In this @haaretzcom piece from September 2025, I even recommended such an approach.

BUT led me add some caveats:🧵haaretz.com/opinion/2025-0… In and of themselves, the "pilot zones" will fail if they are, at any point in the near future, made the exclusive responsibility of Lebanon.

Wishful thinking aside, the entire process that led up to the framework agreement, including the agreement itself, is an outgrowth of Iranian pressure on the United States, with Tehran effectively saying: Washington, if you want quiet on the Iranian front, we want quiet on the Lebanese front. That resulted in American pressure on Israel to curtail its campaign against Hezbollah.
fdd.org/analysis/2026/…

So, Iran has established a dynamic whereby it is asserting gradually growing control over Israel's freedom of action in Lebanon -- by making that freedom of action a deal-breaker for the continuation of U.S.-Iranian talks and reaching a final agreement between Washington and Tehran.

When @MouinRabbani claims Hezbollah originated in 1982 as a response to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon...

https://twitter.com/DavidADaoud/status/2038971621902287273

and when @MouinRabbani even more absurdly claims Hezbollah is not a proxy of Iran:

-Hezbollah's 1985 Open Letter: "We, the sons of the umma of Hezbollah, consider ourselves an inseparable part of the global Islamic umma...we are the sons of the umma of Hezbollah whose vanguard God granted victory in Iran...we adhere to the orders of one, wise, just leadership represented by the Wali Al Faqih." umambiblio.org/AR/book_detail…

-Hassan Nasrallah -- in the Q&A section after announcing the 2009 Political Document. Nasrallah is asked:

Q- "In 1985, you spoke of one wise leadership, the wali al-faqih, and your commitment to that leadership. Today you speak of development and transformation in the party. How do you reconcile building the state with commitment to that leadership? Has Hezbollah become a fully Lebanese party? And does building state institutions mean Hezbollah is abandoning resort to arms?"

A-Nasrallah: "Our position on the issue of Wilayat al-Faqih is an intellectual, doctrinal, and religious position, not a political position subject to review.” “موقفنا من مسألة ولاية الفقيه هو موقف فكري وعقائدي وديني وليس موقف سياسي خاضع للمراجعة.”
nahjalwelaya.com/nasrolah-moata…

-Then Deputy Secretary-General Naim Qassem, January 5, 2016 interview with Al Mayadeen's Islamiyun Wa Baad:

"the Open Letter was a “permanent and continuous document” — Arabic: “وثيقة دائمة ومستمرة” — and the 2009 Political Document made only “minor/trivial” adjustments (تعديلات طفيفة) that had no effect on Hezbollah’s core ideology. youtube.com/watch?v=NJwWBq…

-Then Deputy Secretary-General Naim Qassem, in an Al Ahed item on June 20, 2022 described the original founding “document of the nine” as reflecting Hezbollah’s Islamic vision, commitment to Wilayat al-Faqih under Khomeini, and belief in jihadist resistance against Israel, and then identified the February 16, 1985 Open Letter as the public/political declaration of Hezbollah’s ideological, jihadist, and political vision.

Re the Document of the Nine, Qassem said:
“Hezbollah was founded in 1982 after the Islamic and clerical forces and personalities active on the scene came together to form a committee composed of nine individuals called the ‘Nine-Member Committee.’ It was composed of: three from the Clerical Gathering in the Beqaa, three from the Islamic Committees, and three from the Islamic Amal Movement. The nine carried one document that had been agreed upon by the parties represented in it, setting out their Islamic vision, their commitment to the line of Wilayat al-Faqih under the leadership of Imam Khomeini, their belief in jihadist resistance action to confront ‘Israel’ and liberate the land, and their readiness to form a unified framework as an alternative to all the frameworks that had produced the Document of the Nine.”

Re: The Open Letter, Qassem said: "Hezbollah announced its public and political presence on the first annual commemoration of the martyrdom of Sheikh Ragheb Harb, on February 16, 1985, through a document setting out its intellectual, jihadist, and political vision, which was called the ‘Open Letter.’ With it began declared political action and media appearance accompanying the work of the Islamic Resistance."
alahednews.news/article.php?ci…

Hezbollah's Al Ahed News: Hezbollah has amassed a massive arsenal of precision loitering munitions [FPVs].
alahednews.news/post/97643/ "During the fifteen months following the ceasefire in November 2024, the Resistance in Lebanon continued to develop its loitering munitions. Technical modifications were introduced to the aircraft, enabling them to operate via fiber optics—a feature that renders them immune to jamming and prevents their signals from being tracked for the purpose of interception or downing—according to informed sources who confirmed this to the Al Ahed news website."

An attempt to make some order out of the contradictory reports on a Lebanon ceasefire going into effect tonight:🧵 1-A ceasefire in Lebanon was Iran's idea. That being a tough pill to swallow doesn't make it any less factual. Look at the sequence of events:

03/09/26 : President Joseph Aoun calls for direct negotiations with Israel to achieve a full truce -- misreported as "peace" --; an end to Israeli land/air/sea attacks on Lebanon; urgent support for the Lebanese armed forces; Lebanese forces taking control of the recent tension areas and seizing weapons, including Hezbollah weapons and stores; then direct talks to implement those steps. presidency.gov.lb/posts/alreys-a…

03/09/26 -- Israel responds with disinterest, says Lebanon's initiative was "too late" and Jerusalem was "focused on eliminating Hezbollah." The Israelis also made clear at various points their objectives were: this war being part of a process leading to Hezbollah's demise, and the occupation of parts of south Lebanon for varying, but indefinite, periods of time. mako.co.il/news-military/…

03/06/26 -- Washington also shows disinterest. @USAMBTurkiye is quoted in Axios saying: Stop with the bullsh*t” on disarming Hezbollah, or there was nothing to discuss; “If it’s not real action about Hezbollah’s weapons, there’s no point.” axios.com/2026/03/09/leb…

Nothing changes on the Lebanese domestic scene in the intervening period:
1) Hezbollah did not relent from fighting, and in fact became more defiant, even threatening to force Beirut to rescind its March 2, 2026 decision proscribing Hezbollah's military activities,
2) The Lebanese State has not undertaken a single action to concretely curtail Hezbollah's activities,
3) LAF refuses to implement the March 2 order x.com/LebarmyOfficia…
4) Beirut couldn't even successfully expel Iran's ambassador-designate because of pressure from Hezbollah/Amal, a failure for which the Israeli MFA's official account has been (unprofessionally, in my opinion) trolling Lebanon. As late as March 30: x.com/IsraelMFA/stat…
5) Lebanon is still afraid enough of Hezbollah being able to ignite a civil war that @nawafsalam had to cancel his Tuesday trip to Washington "in light of current domestic conditions: -- namely, growing sectarian friction and tension. x.com/nawafsalam/sta…

Then, suddenly, on April 9, Bibi pulls an about-face and says "In light of Lebanon's repeated requests to open direct negotiations with Israel, [he] instructed...open[ing] direct negotiations with Lebanon as soon as possible," while nodding to Nawaf Salam's call that day to demilitarize Beirut -- another unimplemented decision. embassies.gov.il/multilateral-o…

Lebanese Deputy PM @TarekMitri to @ALJADEEDNEWS: Lebanon insists on a truce to facilitate negotiations and there will be no negotiation under fire.

محليات/568442/نائب-رئيس-الحكومة-طارق-متري-لـالجديد-لبنان-مصرّ-على-هدنة-تسمح-بالتفاوض aljadeed.tv/news/ Lebanese Deputy PM @TarekMitri to @ALJADEEDNEWS: We learned of negotiations when @Netanyahu announced his position

.@EylonALevy and @Aizenberg55 are making the right point. Al Manar isn't just a run-of-the-mill TV station., and Ali Shuaib wasn't a normal journalist whose non-combatant status is clear.

But the evidence they're relying upon to prove it is insufficient to demonstrate their claim. Because, as Alex correctly notes, no, the mere presence of Hezbollah flags at a funeral or draped on a coffin isn't dispositive. Hezbollah has occasionally given civilians such honors.  See, for example, Fatima Al Siblani, killed in an 02/26/26 Israeli airstrike in Beit Msheik Farms, west of Baalbek.

nna-leb.gov.lb/ar/news/415913/

longwarjournal.org/archives/2026/…

HOWEVER 🧵: 1- Al Manar is not merely a "pro-Hezbollah outlet," any more than Inspire Magazine is "a pro-Al Qaeda outlet" or Dabiq, Al Tawheed, or Al Bayan were "pro-ISIS outlets." Al Manar is Hezbollah's main and direct TV station, owned and controlled by the group, even though the control structure is layered. The legally visible shell company is Lebanese Communication/Media Group, which remains identified as the parent company by Al Manar's site in the footer (see attached photo).

It's actually not so clear that the Israeli strike in Doha is illegal:
-Hamas committed an armed attack against Israel
-Qatar is knowingly harboring Hamas, is unlikely to take any action against them
-The attack targeted Hamas, not Qatar

A thread on int'l law and the strike:

https://twitter.com/Raminho/status/1965474303303983272

International law, particularly as it has developed in the shadow of the UN Charter, is primarily concerned with relations between States. As a result, only States could commit an “armed attack,” which, given the purpose of the Charter, makes sense at face value. Nevertheless, international law did not require that the unlawful use of force be committed directly by the State itself.

In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ relied on customary international law reflected in Article 3(g) of General Assembly Resolution 3314, determined that either 1) the “sending” by a state of an armed group “to carry out acts of armed force of such gravity as to amount to” an armed attack 2) “or its [i.e. the State’s] substantial involvement therein” as an armed attack by the sending State itself. The Court noted that, “If such an operation, because of its scale and effects, would have been classified as an armed attack rather than as mere frontier incident had it been carried out by regular armed forces,” then it would be deemed an “armed attack” for the purposes of Article 51, by the State itself – which opens itself up to an array of situationally appropriate consequences if it either orders a non-State actor to carry out armed actions crossing a minimum threshold of violence against another State, or it is somehow “substantially involved” in the act itself.

Interview of Ahmad al-Sharaa, aka Abu Muhammad al-Julani, w @SyriaTV, in which he addresses Israel's ongoing strikes in Syria. I've tried to find the full video, to provide a transcription, to no avail. The full text of his relevant comments from the website's non-verbatim summary of the interview below:
"Al-Sharaa told Syria Television that Israel's excuses had become weak and do not justify its recent violations [of Syrian sovereignty], noting that the Israelis have violated the rules of engagement in Syria in a very clear manner, which threatens to ignite an unjustified escalation in the region.

Al-Sharaa stressed that the situation of Syrians [lit. the Syrian condition] is exhausted after years of war and conflict and does not permit entering new wars. He stressed that the priority at this stage [emphasis own] is reconstruction and stabilization, and not sliding into conflicts that may lead to further destruction.

Al-Sharaa called on the international community to urgently intervene and assume its responsibilities regarding this escalation, stressing the importance of containing the situation in the region and respecting Syrian sovereignty. He also stressed that diplomatic solutions are the only means to guarantee safety and stability, not ill-considered military adventures."

syria.tv/%D8%AE%D8%A7%D… See here also by @Syriatvnews reporter @Abu_Orwa91. So, what happens when Syria's state is no longer "fragile?"

https://x.com/Abu_Orwa91/status/1867944594488398209

Hezbollah Sec.Gen Naim Qassem's speech begins. So far, he's been eulogizing Hezbollah's media official Mohammad Afif and his companions who died alongside him.

https://twitter.com/DavidADaoud/status/1859233980400161168

Naim Qassem threatens to strike "heart of Tel Aviv" for recent Israeli strikes inside Beirut, including Afif's killing

Some recent positions taken by @walidjoumblatt on Hezbollah -- Thread 1-May 7, 2022: Walid Joumblatt describes the government's decision to take action against Hezbollah in May of 2008 as a mistake, says both he and Hassan Nasrallah erred and "fell in a trap" created by outsiders. Describes Wafic Shuqeir as his "friend."

Syrian State TV: the Israeli airstrike hit a building in Al-Mazzeh neighborhood I. Damascus t.me/ORTAS_News/230…

https://twitter.com/davidadaoud/status/1774802794135887992

The Israeli strike in Damascus' Al-Mazzeh neighborhood hit a building near the Iranian embassy. Footage:

Hezbollah Sec.Gen Hassan Nasrallah's speech is live now almanar.com.lb/live/
Nasrallah: On the day of the wounded of the Resistance, we have added new wounded men and women to their ranks because of the open front with Israel since 10/8/23, and they are our responsibility to take care of