Quick takes on Moon-Biden summit: Biden seems to like Moon; they are also both devout Catholics. Moon is now the only source for Biden as someone who has met and negotiated with Kim Jong Un; Trump refused to concede the election much less debrief Biden of his 3 meetings with Kim Moon's insight into Kim since 2018 was Biden's only way to get a handle - firsthand - on what transpired. When you are a head of state, you can trust another head of state's advice like no other. With Moon's perspective, Biden can make better sense of the Kim-Trump correspondence

1/ Kim Jong Un may not acknowledge that Biden is President until Jan. 21, partly out of respect for Trump, who hasn’t and may never concede. Kim has adhered to his understandings with Trump since June 2018 and not tested long-range missiles or conducted nuclear tests. Kim's 2/ position to Biden is likely to be that the U.S. must build on his agreement with Trump. Conversely, if Kim were to test a long-range missile (provocation) in early 2021, he would unilaterally break his understanding with Trump’s successor. The likely reason Kim might break

Trump and Kim should meet again soon, says Moon koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2020/07/01/nat… There's good reason Biegun said no summit chance until after Election Day: The Republican convention ends 8/27, then it's the general election campaign with several debates in October. Trump will not make foreign trips in September-October. Every day will be spent on campaigning.

1/ As much as some think Trump got taken for a ride by Kim Jong Un, Kim must also think he got taken for a ride by Trump since March 2018. In the end, from Kim's point of view, there was no "there" there. The leaks from Bolton's book only serve as further evidence for NK to 2/ assert that the U.S. was insincere and deceptive in its communication with the DPRK, much as others insist the North has been with the U.S. I think the North hates an insincere, BS policy from the U.S. more than it does a consistent, principled hardline policy. Now there is

1/ I arrived in Seoul on June 16, 2000 to speak the next day at a Korean Political Science Association conference - one day after the 1st inter-Korean summit. I very well remember the US was not thrilled with the summit because it did not want the ROK to get out ahead of the US 2/ with North Korea. Nonetheless, Vice Marshal Jo met with President Clinton in early October 2000, and Secretary of State Albright made a reciprocal trip to Pyongyang late that month and met with Kim Jong Il. Of the three reasons Clinton did not visit Pyongyang by the end of his

1/7 The two Koreas are technically still in a state of war after 70 years and an armistice has been in place since 1953. Whether or not leaflet balloons violate a recent inter-Korean agreement, they cannot help but be seen as provocative by the North because they don't know 2/7 what's really in the balloons. The North is always highly suspicious and permitting balloons to fly over an armistice line when a war has not ended is the height of stupidity. Moreover, my estimate is that the groups doing the balloons are the "sour grapes" crowd whose allies

1/5 In December 1994, at the earliest signs of North Korea’s famine, my colleague, an NGO leader in Washington, DC, was asked by Kim Jong Il’s inner circle if he could request food assistance for the DPRK from European capitals. The European diplomats on the continent he met were 2/5 very surprised at the DPRK's request, thinking the North was able to feed itself, but nonetheless responded to him favorably. But days later, the ROK government of that time, aware of my colleague's inquiries, specifically contacted each European government my colleague met

1/18 "North Korea and the Shadow of Finlandization" -- The American public should not be under the impression that our problems with North Korea are solely related to its nuclear and missile programs, which indeed threaten not only South Korea and Japan, but the U.S. mainland. As 2/18 vital as these issues are to resolve after 30 years of their emergence, for the North, they are ultimately tools to achieve survival, security and independence from the interference of its bigger neighbors – an age-old story in the history of Korea. Korea's experience is of

1/4 North Korea routinely goes through their gyrations until they are actually "ready" to negotiate. Until that point, they are immersed in their internal processes. They accommodate or adjust to no one until they evaluate they are ready. Recall NK even postponed their June 2000 2/4 summit with Kim Dae Jung for a day without explanation. They just weren't ready even though observers worried SK would get stiffed and the summit would get canceled. Remember July 27 is "Victory Day" for NK and it's not surprising to see a military provocation and heated

1/4 The DMZ trilateral meetings this weekend should be seen as on par with Sadat's 1977 visit to Jerusalem, which led to the Camp David Accords; and, the rise of Gorbachev in the late 1980s with his efforts at Soviet reform. These events divided both regional actors and analysts 2/4 alike. Sadat would pay for his efforts with his life. Many Soviet experts doubted Gorbachev's efforts were for real until 1990, and some continued to doubt. Sadat's journey to speak at the Knesset and negotiate peace with Israel; and Gorbachev's reform efforts domestically

1/4 Why I think Trump "walked" at Hanoi summit: 1) Trump may have been bent out of shape by House testimony of "rat" Michael Cohen (Pelosi could have rescheduled hearing for March 1) and likely hardly slept the night before; 2) Trump has no patience for small steps and arms 2/4 control minutae, and sought a "big deal" to get this Korea thing over with; he definitely was not thinking of South Korea's best interests, and he's still asking ROK to pay more; 2) Bolton never met a wrench he didn't want to throw in the works of an arms control negotiation