I’m not sure this is accurate.

I’d say both realist/restrainers and prioritizers - both of which groups are more inclined to be focused on China - are in a turf battle against “Middle East First” Iran hawks inside the Trump admin.

https://twitter.com/shashj/status/1912764657527300442

It’s easy to portray this Republican foreign policy war as a fight between hawks and doves, since that’s an axis that Washington and the media understands (ie, weakness vs strength 🙄). 2/x

Just reading through the financial news pages is an astounding overview of self-inflicted damage.


The counterpoint is: these tariffs are intended as leverage & will enable the US to engage in more favorable trade in the future. That's certainly what the Treasury Secretary has been selling Wall St.

And it could work, though we'll probably still come out worse off.

I wrote a whole report getting at some of these points last year:

Yes, much of the early funding went to modernizing old weapons stores, but that hasn’t been the case for a while.

And yes, much of the funding remains here — but it’s a poor way of stimulating the US economy & an opportunity cost. Report here: stimson.org/2024/testing-a…

Every day is an adventure in waking up to see if we've suddenly decided to send US troops to annex the Western Hebrides for their strategically significant cod stocks. Cod Wars 2: The Empire Strikes Back.

Now we have text for the inaugural address, a few thoughts on foreign policy content:

1) the money quote is this one. Trump wants to be seen as a peacemaker (and a nobel prize probably wouldn't hurt). Whether he can do it is a different question... 2) the "end wars" theme runs through the address. He highlights the Gaza ceasefire, and repeatedly rips the previous administration for "stumbling into a continuing catalogue of catastrophic events abroad.”

The most tragic thing about this situation is that it was visible from a long way off, but notions of an ideal victory or miraculous breakthrough helped to stymy the steps that could have prevented us from getting to this point.

economist.com/europe/2024/10… .@ka_grieco and I wrote ten months ago about the need to pivot hard to a defense strategy that conserves manpower in Ukraine. Instead, we got more failed counteroffensives and whatever the Kursk operation is.

foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/how-uk…

Yesterday, US envoy to NATO argued that Europe should buy US weapons, not European ones. It's a short-sighted policy that could undermine Europe's developing defense industrial base.

But @StimsonCenter's own @nevadajoan has a new paper out that tackles this issue! 🧵 The paper argues that: "A more Europe-centric defense has historically faced three barriers... inadequate funding... concerns over sovereignty... & fear of a negative U.S. response. The first two roadblocks are shrinking," though the third remains.

stimson.org/2024/eu-defens…

A notable paragraph in this article from such mainstream authors; just a few months ago, this viewpoint was nearly beyond the pale in Washington.

reader.foreignaffairs.com/2023/04/13/the… Look, Im not saying I wrote basically this article late last year, but…

foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/ukrain…