For those wondering, this is not U.N. aid. It is a warehouse controlled by the Egyptian Committee (ERC), which operates outside the U.N. 2720 system and moves/distributes aid on its own. This is one of three major state-led Gaza aid efforts — Egyptian, Emirati, and Jordanian. 🧵

https://twitter.com/cogatonline/status/1961006178969829665

A broader view of this yard is here, six seconds into an Egyptian Committee promotional video from Aug 26. The picture below shows a view inside the warehouse. facebook.com/61570901403004…

The U.N.’s Gaza aid channel is plagued by near-ubiquitous looting of food aid. But UNICEF has successfully delivered 380 tons of food in the last two weeks, while WFP and WCK have delivered none. The apparent key to UNICEF’s success? Hiring security. 🧵 Non-food aid gets through at much higher rates than food, but even there UNICEF is particularly successful. Since the start of August, 82.1% of UNICEF aid has arrived successfully, at a higher rate than the Red Cross (11% successful) and volume than any aid org except WFP/WCK.

The +972/Guardian articles alleging that the IDF’s internal data indicates it has killed fewer than 9,000 militants in Gaza misconstrues the available data, improperly combines IDF and Hamas-run Gaza Health Ministry figures, and fails to ask key questions. Very long thread 🧵 BLUF: Is it possible the IDF is overstating militants killed in Gaza? Yes. But these articles do not present a convincing case about the existence or extent of an undercount, and instead ignore data limitations and common sense to make a flashy claim.

3 months after Gaza aid resumed: Aid flows increase, but looting of food aid is near-universal; GHF aid expands, commercial traffic picks up, and airdrops continue. The emerging status quo turns aid into a profit source and harms the vulnerable. Long 🧵(one on prices to follow): Goods flow into Gaza via several channels: U.N.-facilitated aid under the 2720 mechanism (~1/3), the GHF (~1/3), and a mix of airdrops, state and NGO donors outside the U.N. mechanism, and commercial traffic. COGAT reports 182,592 tons of aid have entered Gaza since May 19.

This is too harsh. The U.N. dashboard -- which is, to be clear, an incomplete picture -- does contain a disclaimer that it only reflects aid transferred via the 2720 mechanism. Moreover, it provides much greater detail about this aid channel. Short 🧵on 2720 and aid metrics:

https://twitter.com/cogatonline/status/1957798016712339488

Security Council Resolution 2720, passed in December 2023, set up a mechanism that would coordinate between aid “consignors” (organizations sending aid) and COGAT. Aid under 2720 is tracked from manifest to delivery (or looting) via QR codes. info.un2720.org

Update on prices and aid flows in Gaza (8/13): Nearly all U.N. aid is still looted, with success varying heavily by org; food/goods prices are lower but stabilizing at a high level; cash commission rate has collapsed but remains well above normal; GHF aid and airdrops expand. 🧵 In the week Aug 3-10, 91.3% of attempted aid deliveries (by weight) under the U.N. mechanism were looted. However, WCK and UNICEF saw much higher success rates than WFP, all of whose aid was looted.

GHF's distribution of RUSF nutritional supplements, which are intended for children 6 months-5 years old with moderate acute malnutrition (MAM), is a welcome development that should be expanded to all sites. A few more details: 🧵

https://twitter.com/GHFUpdates/status/1955294707040354640

Although GHF says the RUSF (Ready-to-Use Supplementary Food) packets are for severe malnutrition, they are not. Severe acute malnutrition (SAM) is treated (in part) with RUTF (Ready-to-Use Therapeutic Food), which replaces rather than supplements meals.

Data from the Gaza Chamber of Commerce indicates food prices have begun to drop sharply in Gaza due to increased aid flows and resumption of some private sector inflows yesterday. But this does not mean the crisis is easing. 🧵 Prices of 6 of 8 food prices tracked by the Chamber are now cheaper than they were on May 20, when aid, had just resumed. While the collapse in prices is a good sign, food is still extremely expensive—the May 20 prices were 10-100x pre-war prices.

Yesterday (8/4), the Hamas-run Gaza Health Ministry (MOH) released its 12th list of the dead (via Telegram and WhatsApp) since the Israel-Hamas war began, containing 60,198 entries and covering up to July 31. Longer analysis of data quality and demographics 🧵: Like all published MOH lists, the July list does not distinguish between civilians and combatants and attributes all listed deaths uniformly to Israeli action. Nor does it include the dates of death (none of the lists have) or collection methodology (which most iterations have).

Yesterday (7/15), the Hamas-run Gaza Health Ministry (MOH) released its 11th list of the dead (via Telegram and WhatsApp) since the Israel-Hamas war began, containing 58,380 entries and covering up to July 15. An analysis🧵: Sourcing:
The list on the MOH Telegram: t.me/MOHMediaGaza/6…
As an archived PDF (along with all other versions of the list): archive.org/details/moh-de…
The MOH dashboard can be accessed here: sehatty.ps/public/
All archived dashboard iterations: archive.org/details/moh-da…

This list, which covers up to May 11, is a subset of the full list of 52,958 reported deaths published this only via a small Health Ministry WhatsApp group on May 19. I analyze the full list in my new @WashInstitute report: 🧵 washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysi… The full list (PDF) is here, along with the 8 previous Health Ministry lists: archive.org/embed/moh-deat…

A spreadsheet version with demographic/data processing is linked here and in my piece: archive.org/details/moh-de…