Gabriel Epstein Profile picture
Policy & Comms Associate @IsraelPolicy4m. Former Research Assistant @WashInstitute. Graduate @SAISHopkins.
Feb 8 10 tweets 6 min read
This claim, which is about a new Hamas-run Ministry of Social Development program is untrue on multiple levels -- on figures, characterization, and comparison with the Hamas-run Gaza Health Ministry's death toll. Short 🧵 to explain: Last week, the Hamas-run Ministry of Social Development (MOSD) announced a program ("We are your support") to provide NIS 500 (~$160) to widows of Gazans killed in the war. Funding for this program is allegedly money confiscated from merchants for "criminal" activities post-ceasefire.Image
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Feb 3 4 tweets 4 min read
Mahmoud Essam Ibrahim Wadi, killed in an Israeli drone strike on December 2, 2025, was mourned as a Gazan photojournalist and drone photographer for several local and international outlets. However, pictures of his gravestone identify him as a "mujahid" (fighter). 🧵 Image
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Wadi appears on three major lists of media workers killed in Gaza: the Committee to Protect Journalists, the International Federation of Journalists, and the Hamas-run Government Media Office. Video from his funeral also shows a press jacket placed over his body. Image
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Jan 28 16 tweets 6 min read
The picture on the PA's reported "pay-to-slay" reform is more confusing than the article indicates. Without an actual U.S. audit to fully assess the new PNEEI need-based aid system, ensure the old system is completely gone, and prevent workarounds, there won't be any clarity. 🧵 The PA published the decree nominally cancelling pay-to-slay in Feb 2025 and invited the U.S. to audit in April, but laws to restructure the new body (PNEEI) weren't passed until July, and the new need-based beneficiary list wasn't set until even later. israelpolicyforum.org/making-the-pa-…
Jan 27 9 tweets 5 min read
An IDF strike in the Sudaniya area of northern Gaza on July 28, 2025, was initially reported to have killed 10 people conducting “aid security”. The five people ID’d at the time of the strike: a DFLP commander and four al-Aqsa Martyr’s Brigades operatives. Details in 🧵: Image
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Mohammed Hassan Nimr Abu Ali (ID#: 800405425, age 40) was part of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine’s Omar al-Qassam Brigades command in west Gaza City. His death was announced by the group almost immediately.
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Jan 9 15 tweets 6 min read
A new iteration of the Hamas-run Gaza Health Ministry’s casualties dashboard has been published, updated through the end of 2025. Short analysis 🧵: Image The current dashboard reports 71,400 deaths, while the November 10 iteration reported 68,832, with demographics in the table below (L). Of the 2,568 added deaths (many added via family reports from earlier in the war), roughly 54% are men 18-59 (R). Image
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Jan 2 4 tweets 4 min read
A Military Medical Services Nurse in Gaza and a Hamas fighter: Tariq Jamal Jamil Abu al-Atta (ID #: 800599920) was killed in a Mar 2024 airstrike along with his wife and children. While media/NGOs ID'd him as a civilian, multiple martyr's channels identify him as a combatant. 🧵 Image
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Abu al-Atta is listed in the Healthcare Workers Watch list of medical workers killed in Gaza (155th under nurses) and ID'd by the Institute for Palestine Studies as a Military Medical Services Nurse at a Deir al-Balah clinic. healthcareworkerswatch.org/wp-content/upl…Image
Dec 23, 2025 7 tweets 4 min read
A 12-year old "Little Mujahideen" for Gaza's Mujahideen Brigades: Suhaib Talal Nafiz al-Jundia (ID#: 432315653). Killed in December 2024, he was identified today both by his father and on a popular militant obituary page. Image In pictures posted by two of his father's Facebook accounts, al-Jundia appears with weapons and a vest bearing the Mujahideen Brigades logo (see the BBC image for comparison). The Brigades are part of the Palestinian Mujahideen Movement, the 4th-largest terror group in Gaza. Image
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Nov 11, 2025 16 tweets 5 min read
One month since the Gaza ceasefire went into effect, the death toll reported by the Hamas-run Health Ministry has increased by 1,968 to 69,182. What accounts for the increase, and what has the past month revealed about the death toll? 5 main takeaways: 1. Little of the post-ceasefire increase in the death toll comes from new deaths (13%). Instead, it comes from the bulk addition of deaths reported to the Health Ministry by families (61%), through a form open since Jan 2024, and recovery of previously unreported bodies (26%). Image
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Oct 20, 2025 20 tweets 11 min read
Without comment on the rest, this part misses a key point: while the ceasefire is having an impact, WFP’s newfound success in getting aid to its warehouses came more than a week earlier, when WFP began to send aid via Kissufim crossing and may have begun using security. Long🧵 Image WFP aid to Gaza was nearly uniformly looted from the time aid resumed on May 19 to the end of September. By a certain point, WFP aid being looted was the looting problem — Egypt/Jordan/UAE, other U.N. agencies, NGOs, and merchants adapted, but WFP did not. Image
Oct 18, 2025 6 tweets 2 min read
According to “The Guardian" channel, associated with Hamas, the group has launched its efforts to: 1) collect dud Israeli munitions and left-behind equipment (L), and 2) recover any of its own lost or stolen "resistance weapons" (R). Further consolidation of power and arms. Image
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There are legitimate reasons to collect unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other military equipment — it is dangerous to civilians and inhibits search-and-rescue and reconstruction. But Hamas has long repurposed UXO into IEDs, and wants a near-monopoly on weapons inside Gaza.
Oct 13, 2025 7 tweets 3 min read
The al-Majayda clan, which clashed with Hamas last week, has announced it will disarm and hand weapons over to Hamas following repeated assaults and threats against them. Hamas' bloody fight with the Dughmush clan and public executions of several members likely played a role. Image Predictions of civil war in Gaza are overblown -- Hamas is by far the most powerful and coordinated armed actor, while those it is clashing with are usually limited in number and often geographically isolated. Clans see no point fighting Hamas if it is likely to stay in power.
Aug 29, 2025 12 tweets 5 min read
For those wondering, this is not U.N. aid. It is a warehouse controlled by the Egyptian Committee (ERC), which operates outside the U.N. 2720 system and moves/distributes aid on its own. This is one of three major state-led Gaza aid efforts — Egyptian, Emirati, and Jordanian. 🧵 A broader view of this yard is here, six seconds into an Egyptian Committee promotional video from Aug 26. The picture below shows a view inside the warehouse. facebook.com/61570901403004…Image
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Aug 26, 2025 19 tweets 9 min read
The U.N.’s Gaza aid channel is plagued by near-ubiquitous looting of food aid. But UNICEF has successfully delivered 380 tons of food in the last two weeks, while WFP and WCK have delivered none. The apparent key to UNICEF’s success? Hiring security. 🧵 Image Non-food aid gets through at much higher rates than food, but even there UNICEF is particularly successful. Since the start of August, 82.1% of UNICEF aid has arrived successfully, at a higher rate than the Red Cross (11% successful) and volume than any aid org except WFP/WCK. Image
Aug 21, 2025 34 tweets 12 min read
The +972/Guardian articles alleging that the IDF’s internal data indicates it has killed fewer than 9,000 militants in Gaza misconstrues the available data, improperly combines IDF and Hamas-run Gaza Health Ministry figures, and fails to ask key questions. Very long thread 🧵 Image BLUF: Is it possible the IDF is overstating militants killed in Gaza? Yes. But these articles do not present a convincing case about the existence or extent of an undercount, and instead ignore data limitations and common sense to make a flashy claim.
Aug 20, 2025 20 tweets 7 min read
3 months after Gaza aid resumed: Aid flows increase, but looting of food aid is near-universal; GHF aid expands, commercial traffic picks up, and airdrops continue. The emerging status quo turns aid into a profit source and harms the vulnerable. Long 🧵(one on prices to follow): Goods flow into Gaza via several channels: U.N.-facilitated aid under the 2720 mechanism (~1/3), the GHF (~1/3), and a mix of airdrops, state and NGO donors outside the U.N. mechanism, and commercial traffic. COGAT reports 182,592 tons of aid have entered Gaza since May 19. Image
Aug 19, 2025 11 tweets 4 min read
This is too harsh. The U.N. dashboard -- which is, to be clear, an incomplete picture -- does contain a disclaimer that it only reflects aid transferred via the 2720 mechanism. Moreover, it provides much greater detail about this aid channel. Short 🧵on 2720 and aid metrics: Security Council Resolution 2720, passed in December 2023, set up a mechanism that would coordinate between aid “consignors” (organizations sending aid) and COGAT. Aid under 2720 is tracked from manifest to delivery (or looting) via QR codes. info.un2720.org
Aug 13, 2025 15 tweets 6 min read
Update on prices and aid flows in Gaza (8/13): Nearly all U.N. aid is still looted, with success varying heavily by org; food/goods prices are lower but stabilizing at a high level; cash commission rate has collapsed but remains well above normal; GHF aid and airdrops expand. 🧵 Image In the week Aug 3-10, 91.3% of attempted aid deliveries (by weight) under the U.N. mechanism were looted. However, WCK and UNICEF saw much higher success rates than WFP, all of whose aid was looted. Image
Aug 12, 2025 11 tweets 5 min read
GHF's distribution of RUSF nutritional supplements, which are intended for children 6 months-5 years old with moderate acute malnutrition (MAM), is a welcome development that should be expanded to all sites. A few more details: 🧵 Although GHF says the RUSF (Ready-to-Use Supplementary Food) packets are for severe malnutrition, they are not. Severe acute malnutrition (SAM) is treated (in part) with RUTF (Ready-to-Use Therapeutic Food), which replaces rather than supplements meals. Image
Aug 8, 2025 12 tweets 5 min read
While over 89% of food aid collected for delivery through the U.N. mechanism has been looted since May 19, a majority of nutritional aid and nearly all medical aid has arrived successfully (though a lower share has been collected from the crossings). Why the higher success rate? Image With food prices so high and serious need, looters target food trucks first. Convoys carrying nutritional and medical aid are often marked as such, and appeals go out via the Ministry of Health and other key actors to let them through. Image
Aug 7, 2025 13 tweets 4 min read
Data from the Gaza Chamber of Commerce indicates food prices have begun to drop sharply in Gaza due to increased aid flows and resumption of some private sector inflows yesterday. But this does not mean the crisis is easing. 🧵 Image Prices of 6 of 8 food prices tracked by the Chamber are now cheaper than they were on May 20, when aid, had just resumed. While the collapse in prices is a good sign, food is still extremely expensive—the May 20 prices were 10-100x pre-war prices. Image
Aug 5, 2025 20 tweets 8 min read
Yesterday (8/4), the Hamas-run Gaza Health Ministry (MOH) released its 12th list of the dead (via Telegram and WhatsApp) since the Israel-Hamas war began, containing 60,198 entries and covering up to July 31. Longer analysis of data quality and demographics 🧵: Image Like all published MOH lists, the July list does not distinguish between civilians and combatants and attributes all listed deaths uniformly to Israeli action. Nor does it include the dates of death (none of the lists have) or collection methodology (which most iterations have).