THREAD > In August, @SoutheastAsiaDC convened a trilateral U.S.-Australia-Philippines track 2 strategic dialogue in Manila. Today, we publish the findings: csis.org/analysis/build… Discussion covered 4 key themes: aligning strategic outlooks and threat perceptions; confronting Chinese gray zone activities; alliance obligations in a Taiwan contingency; and the current limited ability of the security triangle to respond to a South China Sea crisis.

THREAD > US just released the 21-agency Natl 5-Yr Strategy for Combating IUU Fishing, mandated by the 2019 Maritime SAFE Act. Here's some of the obviously Asia-related stuff, esp. Vietnam and Taiwan. The strategy ranks priority regions where IUU fishing is most prevalent and will get the most attention. Tier 1 (purple), Tier 2 (yellow), Tier 3 (blue). All of SEA and the Pacific Islands are Tier 1. South and NE Asia are Tier 3.

I was just asked about the oft-heard (from Beijing) claim that no one rejected ROC/PRC claims in the SCS from the time they were made in 1947 until the 1970s. I happened to be working on manuscript rewrites and so had at my fingertips the following proofs that is a lie: 1946: Philippines gains independence on July 4. Within a month, VP Quirino tells the press he'll claim Spratlys. Sends a letter to this effect to MacArthur. He'll reiterate this in 1951.

Also 1946: French forces visit Itu Aba, reiterate sovereignty, and sail away

THREAD > @AsiaMTI IDs 23 of the Chinese militia vessels swarming Whitsun Reef by cross-referencing media released by the Philippine govt w/ commercial AIS. Let's start with these five: Yuemaobinyu (粤茂滨渔) 42881, 42882, 42883, 42885, and 42886. amti.csis.org/caught-on-came… That name should sound familiar in the Philippines. The Yuemaobinyu 42212, hailing from Dianbai like these 5, sank the Gem-Ver 1 at Reed Bank 2 years ago in an incident never fully explained or compensated by Chinese authorities.

THREAD > the SEA section of the strategy doc is laughably thin and divorced from the reality of the last 4 years. That's been covered. So let's talk about what exactly it would've meant to "highlight ASEAN centrality as a core component of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific." Anyone?

https://twitter.com/EvanLaksmana/status/1349173945774317568

Sure, showing up to ASEAN summits, appointing ambassadors (incl. to the Secretariat), and talking about things that SEA actually cares about would've been helpful. But once you do that (a la Obama admin) how do you operationalize a strategy based primarily on ASEAN centrality?

THREAD on new @QuincyInst report. The SCS argument boils down to the US should wash its hands of the whole issue. Essentially, cut a bilateral deal to reduce close-in surveillance in exchange for Chinese promises not to impose future restrictions on foreign military activity. The authors (@Dalzell60 @resplinodell @JessLee_DC) seem to view defense of freedom of the seas/int'l law and supporting SEA partners' rights as not worth the risk. They include some boilerplate recs about supporting a COC, etc. But those (and SEA) are afterthoughts in the piece.

THREAD > This weeks' 1st SCS fun fact(s), on the expansion of Beijing's maritime claims. I'll skip the birth of the U-shaped line. You can read Chapter 2 when the books is finished, or just go ask @bill_hayton and @Chris_PC_Chung. We'll start instead post-Chinese Civil War. In response to the 1951 San Francisco Peace Conference, Zhou Enlai declares "sovereignty" over the island groups. No mention of waters. In 1952, the PRC adopts the U-shaped line (soon to be 9 dashes) & list of 159 islands. Again, no indication of a claim to waters.

THREAD > Brunei continues its impressive record of slow-walking any South China Sea cooperation w/ Beijing while still making China think it might be willing to play ball. This 1st meeting of the intergovernmental steering committee is latest case in point xinhuanet.com/english/2020-0… The meeting took more than a year to come together after it was announced in late 2018. At that time they also announced they would establish 10 working groups incl. one on maritime cooperation. Still no working groups. And no timeline for next meeting of the steering committee.

THREAD > Someone please prove me wrong. During today's CSIS conference on the ECS, SCS, and Pacific Islands I emerged as the clear contrarian on one point: I don't buy the argument that China's artificial islands are useless in a war or would be easy for US forces to neutralize. First, they're enormous. As I recall @tshugart3 once pointed out, Mischief Reef is about the size of the 495 beltway around DC. Pearl Harbor Naval Base could fit in the lagoon at Subi Reef. That's a lot of ordinance to drop.

THREAD > Fact checking this fact check. First, the author argues that China doesn't claim historic rights in the SCS in excess of the maritime entitlements allowed by UNCLOS. This is a doozy. The author basically argues that bc China's claim is unclear, it doesn't really exist.

https://twitter.com/DavidAWelch/status/1155923286263508994

China certainly claims vast if ill-defined historic rights throughout the SCS well beyond UNCLOS entitlements. Ex: MFA statements and govt-issued maps show China claims historic fishing grounds in Indonesia's EEZ maritimeawarenessproject.org/wp-content/upl…

THREAD > Another round of South China Sea fan fiction seeking to confuse and misdirect regarding the well-documented and publicly acknowledged (in China!) operations of the maritime militia. scmp.com/week-asia/geop… Again, rather than try to directly grapple with the mountain of evidence presented by @AsiaMTI, @AndrewSErickson and others, Zhang Hongzhou throws a half dozen alternative theories at the wall to see what sticks. So here we go.