I have recently spent some time in Berlin, Brussels and Paris trying to find out how the EU might greet a prime minister Keir Starmer. Here are a few conclusions. 1/ One, everybody will hugely welcome the most pro-European PM since Tony Blair. And one who makes a big change from a variety of disparate, difficult Tories. 2/

The key point to grasp about the white paper on the NI protocol is that it has nothing to do with Brexit or Remain/Leave rows. It is about promises and the rule of law - and the government's intention to break both Johnson agreed, signed and triumphantly ratifed the NIP in late 2019. It lays down in detail all the checks and barriers required between GB and NI. He, not the EU, created a hard border in the Irish Sea.

Two months after Britain left the single market and customs union in favour of the TCA, a short thread based on my piece in this week’s issue.1/ Most obvious: multiplying complaints from seafood and pork exporters to fashionistas and musicians. Some are teething problems, but most flow directly from Boris Johnson’s choice to prioritise sovereignty over market access in the TCA.2/

As so often, the consensus today is that we will get a Brexit trade deal, probably during next week. But I have my doubts.(Thread) 1/ The consensus is based on assumption that both sides are logical and rational. A deal benefits both, no deal harms both. Biden wants a deal too. Hence there will surely be one. 2/

Even by his own low standards, Boris Johnson’s Telegraph article plumbs new depths of shoddiness and dishonesty (short thread) 1/ It was obvious to anyone who thought for 5 minutes that Northern Ireland and specifically the border with Ireland would be a massive problem if the UK voted for Brexit 2/

Why is Boris Johnson’s government refusing to extend transition for a year, when case for is clear, and treaty allows it to be agreed before end-June? A short thread based round my comment in this week’s issue. 1/ Transition of 11 months was always extremely short to get a complex deal agreed and ratified. But covid-19 distraction, problems of negotiating remotely and two extreme mandates have made much worse by producing deadlock in UK/ EU talks. 2/

Trouble ahead on EU/UK negotiations, a short thread after a few days in Brussels based on my article this week. 1/ The gap between Barnier’s draft guidelines and Johnson’s speech/statement is wide, and because Johnson refuses even to consider an extension time is exceptionally short. 2/

What we have learnt about Brexit’s next stage, short thread based on my Economist piece this week. 1/ First, Parliament no longer matters. The sight of MPs rejecting all amendments to the WAB, however reasonable, and passing all its new provisions, however undesirable, confirms that the Johnson government can do what it likes now. A far cry from the days of Theresa May. 2/

Why I am worried about Johnson getting Brexit done, short thread based on my piece in this week’s Economist./1 With a Tory majority, Parliament seems sure to ratify the Article 50 withdrawal agreement Johnson renegotiated in October in time for Brexit on January 31st./2

Listening to another Commons Brexit debate just after spending two days in Brussels I am struck yet again by how little Tory Brexiteers (even ministers) understand the EU or how it works (thread) They do not grasp how little trust there is in Theresa May’s government, after it whipped for the Brady amendment to vote against the deal she negotiated and said was the only one available

Reflecting ahead of tomorrow’s Brexit votes, I see curious contradictions and peculiar paradoxes making debate both harder and less predictable (short thread). 1.The Cooper/Boles bid to demand A50 extension dismissed as efforts to stop Brexit. Yet what they want is to prevent no-deal Brexit on March 29th. Many back the May deal. And Brexiteers admit extension needed for necessary legislation. Why must extension equal no Brexit?

Clear from de Rynck at LSE that Commission guidelines will be tough. Says mutual recognition and equivalence regimes can work only within single market, EP involvement and overarching role of ECJ. This means pretty firm rejection of May baskets idea. Commission will also oppose May plan for special new joint and equal legal body for dispute resolution. De Rynck spoke of needing a single legal framework for the single market, meaning no option for Parliament to reject future rules

A quick trip to Brussels leaves me worried by big gap between EU27 and UK for phase 2 (short thread) In particular, no appetite for May’s three buckets/baskets of regulations, or for IFG/IPPR versions of the concept of regulatory divergence. All seen as cherry-picking. Brussels sticking to line that single market indivisible, you cannot have benefits without all the obligations