🇺🇦🗽🇺🇸| Russia Deputy Team Lead & Analyst @TheStudyofWar | Russian Information Space, Kremlin Drama & Force Generation | opinions my own
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Jul 3, 2023 • 20 tweets • 6 min read
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) had once again decided to attack the vast milblogger community regarding their responses to Russian efforts to repel Ukrainian landings near Antonivsky Bridge.
This is not MoD’s first unsuccessful attempt at censoring milbloggers🧵🪡.
A Russian milblogger amplified a post from an unspecified Telegram channel, which criticized several prominent Kremlin & Wagner-affiliated milbloggers for contradicting the 🇷🇺MoD’s narrative regarding a successful defeat of a 🇺🇦 landing on the left bank. t.me/dva_majors/199…
Jun 15, 2023 • 24 tweets • 10 min read
The conflict between the Gerasimov & anti-Gerasimov camps within the Russian military command is unfolding against the backdrop of the Ukrainian counteroffensive.
A 🧵on 🇷🇺 Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky & his competition with Army General Valery Gerasimov for Putin's favor.
This is part 3 of the @TheStudyofWar's study into the Russian military command changes since the start of the full-scale invasion. Please check out my previous 🧵for a recap of Russian command changes in 2022.
The Kremlin may be attempting to reintroduce Kadyrovites as the main offensive force following the culmination of Wagner forces and their withdrawal from the frontlines.🧵
Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov claimed on May 31 that Chechen forces received a new order and assumed responsibility over the Donetsk Oblast frontline & that Chechen units need to start “active combat activities” and “liberate a series of settlements.”
May 24, 2023 • 23 tweets • 6 min read
Why did Russians fight so relentlessly for Bakhmut since May 2022?
Sharing my latest assessment with @TheStudyofWar on how the Russian offensive on Bakhmut lost its limited operational significance throughout the year.🧵
Ukrainian military officials reported that Ukrainian forces control an “insignificant” part of southwestern Bakhmut City around the T0504 highway — a tacit acknowledgement that Russian forces have secured the rest of western and northwestern Bakhmut, if not all of it.
May 18, 2023 • 12 tweets • 3 min read
Select Russian strongmen (siloviki) are likely attempting to signal to Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin that he must cease his political ambitions in Russia.🧵
Prigozhin responded to a media inquiry on May 17 about several allegations from Russian Telegram channels — which are reportedly affiliated with the Russian Presidential Administration and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) — about Prigozhin’s political aspirations in Russia.
May 16, 2023 • 14 tweets • 4 min read
Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s reported cooperation with Ukrainian intelligence is likely a component of his feud with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) rather than an attack on Russian President Vladimir Putin. 🧵
@washingtonpost reported that Prigozhin offered the Ukrainian intelligence information about Russian troop positions in exchange for a Ukrainian withdrawal from Bakhmut & two Ukrainian unnamed officials confirmed that Prigozhin had spoken to GUR officials on numerous occasions.
May 3, 2023 • 25 tweets • 7 min read
Ukrainian counteroffensives in late summer & fall of 2022 triggered at least 7 Russian command changes. Russian military failures exposed the growing public feud between Gerasimov & anti-Gerasimov camps.
This is part 2 of @TheStudyofWar's study into Russian command changes.🧵
This thread covers Russian command changes between August & late November of 2022 in response to Ukrainian counteroffensives.
May 1, 2023 • 24 tweets • 5 min read
Over the last 14 months there have been at least 19 senior Russian military command changes. Russian command changes are not coincidental but are driven by factional disputes and battlefield realities. Our team did a study to assess what drives these command changes.
Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin is likely attempting to persuade Russian President Vladimir Putin to go over to the defensive ahead of a potential Ukrainian counteroffensive.
Mar 14, 2023 • 17 tweets • 7 min read
A closely Kremlin-linked academic made accusations supporting our team's assessment that the Russian MoD may be deliberately expending Wagner in Bakhmut to curb Prigozhin's ambitions.
Russian political scientist Aleksey Mukhin—who contributes to the Valdai Discussion Club and Russian state media—commented on Prigozhin’s March 11 sarcastic announcement that he will be running in the Ukrainian presidential election in 2024.
The Russian MoD – specifically Shoigu and Gerasimov - is likely seizing the opportunity to deliberately expend both elite and convict Wagner forces in Bakhmut in an effort to weaken Prigozhin and derail his ambitions for greater influence in the Kremlin.
Mar 7, 2023 • 17 tweets • 6 min read
Russia's volunteer recruitment and crypto-mobilization campaigns are back. Here is what their return means for the Kremlin's mobilization efforts in the near term & Russian offensive prospects following the Battle of Bakhmut.🧵
Russian Telegram channels began increasingly advertising for recruitment into existing volunteer battalions after ceasing such recruitment calls in September 2022 at the start of involuntary reserve mobilization.
Feb 27, 2023 • 25 tweets • 7 min read
Remember Putin's volunteer recruitment effort over the summer? Here's how that effort went down.🧵🪡
Russia likely began to run out of combat-ready forces by late May 2022, forcing Russian President Vladimir Putin to decide between launching a volunteer recruitment campaign or ordering an unpopular involuntary reserve call-up. Here are the indicators:
Feb 6, 2023 • 15 tweets • 3 min read
Putin remains a risk-adverse actor & his decisions regarding Ukraine since his initial flawed invasion on February 24, 2022, indicate a likely disconnect between his maximalist objectives and his willingness to take the likely high-risk decisions necessary to achieve them.🧵
Putin has placed himself in the position of articulating maximalist & unrealistic objectives, calling on his government and military to achieve them—yet refraining from making the costly decisions the large & protracted conventional war he has embarked on likely requires.
Jan 29, 2023 • 13 tweets • 3 min read
The unfolding feud between Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and former Russian officer Igor Girkin (Strelkov) is likely a symptom Prigozhin's declining influence within the Kremlin.
Prigozhin decided to misconstrue Girkin's persistent criticism directed towards Prigozhin's political aspirations &exploitation of the info space as an attack on Wagner fighters. Prigozhin then accused Girkin of abandoning positions in Donbas in 2014 & invited him to join Wagner.
Dec 22, 2022 • 8 tweets • 2 min read
Putin significantly intensified his efforts to make peace with the critical pro-war community of milbloggers in the past 48 hours.
A🧵on Putin and Shoigu's statements at the Russian Defense Ministry (MoD) Collegium meeting on December 21.
Putin & Shoigu acknowledged some problems such as mobilization failures & lack of drones - echoing criticism from prominent Russian milbloggers.
Putin also asked the Russian MoD to accept all criticism and "hear those who do not hush up the existing problems."
Dec 21, 2022 • 6 tweets • 2 min read
Zelensky's visit to Bakhmut challenged Putin's efforts to extricate himself & the Russian Defense Ministry from persistent criticism - exposing that Putin still fixates on his presentation as a wartime leader, while focusing on absolving himself of the responsibility for the war.
While Zelensky was in Bakhmut, Putin decided to award Russian occupation officials, a propagandist, and a milblogger on the 300th day of his 3-day invasion, likely as part of his recent public appearances relating to various undertakings aimed at improving the Russian war effort.
Oct 5, 2022 • 15 tweets • 5 min read
There is a significant change underway in the Russian nationalist online blog community that warrants attention.
Sharing our assessment with the amazing @KarolinaAHird & @TheStudyofWar Russia Team on fragmentation of the Russian nationalist information space & how the infighting among nationalists can have significant domestic impacts and could even affect the stability of Putin’s regime.
Sep 15, 2022 • 7 tweets • 2 min read
In our recent report at @TheStudyofWar, we assessed that Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin is being established as the face of the Russian “special military operation” in Ukraine. A thread 1/7 understandingwar.org/backgrounder/r…
Prigozhin’s persona is likely aimed to pay lip service to milbloggers' requested operational changes following the defeat around Kharkiv Oblast to regain their support given that the Wagner Group has been able to make some incremental gains in Donetsk Oblast. 2/7
Sep 10, 2022 • 8 tweets • 2 min read
Russian milblogger discourse following Ukrainian counteroffensive in Kharkiv Oblast shows that the Kremlin struggles to address unexpected surprises in the information space. A thread 1/8
The Russian MoD failed to acknowledge the developing situation around Kharkiv Oblast and failed to establish a desired narrative, leaving milbloggers to fill this gap with criticism of Russian forces. 2/8
