I wrote this thread yesterday after reading an article about how Norway is preparing for a possible war in the future, after last night's attack by russia on Romania, it becomes even more appropriate...
1/ Europe is quietly relearning a Cold War lesson:
national defence is not only military.
It is also:
🔸️power grids
🔸️ports
🔸️railways
🔸️telecoms
🔸️food supply
🔸️hospitals
🔸️cybersecurity
🔸️public trust
🔸️civilian preparedness
🔸️continuity of government
This is often called "total defence", "comprehensive security", or "whole-of-society resilience".
NATO explicitly treats civil preparedness as part of collective defence under Article 3: nato.int/en/what-we-do/…
The reason is simple:
modern conflict does not begin with tanks crossing borders.
It begins with cyberattacks, sabotage, disinformation, infrastructure probing, economic coercion, GPS interference, arson, intimidation and attacks on public confidence.
That is hybrid warfare.2/
The Nordic and Baltic countries are among the most important case studies because they sit closest to the Russian threat environment.
Their planning is not abstract.
Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are preparing for a world where Russia may not launch a conventional invasion tomorrow, but can still attack society below the threshold of formal war.
That means preparing civilians, municipalities, businesses and infrastructure operators — not just armed forces.
When elected officials begin communicating like conspiracy influencers, something fundamental has changed in politics.
What we are watching is not simply the spread of “conspiracy theories,” but the mainstreaming of conspiracist aesthetics and communication styles into modern political culture itself 🧵
Research on populist political communication has increasingly examined how modern political actors use emotional narratives, anti-elite framing and “hidden truth” rhetoric to build audience engagement and identity.
This shift has accelerated dramatically in the algorithmic age, where politics increasingly competes not just for votes, but for attention.
Jan 1 • 7 tweets • 4 min read
Elon Musk & X: promises that didn’t materialise
X as a "free speech platform"
Musk repeatedly described X as a platform for maximum free speech, neutrality, and viewpoint diversity.
What actually happened by end-2025:
Selective enforcement of rules
Journalists, researchers, and critics suspended or throttled,
Government requests complied with quietly,
Amplification skewed toward paying or ideologically aligned accounts
🔗 Reuters — Researchers, journalists sanctioned on X: reuters.com/technology/mus…
🔗 Amnesty / human rights critique: amnesty.org/en/latest/news…
X didn’t become a free-speech platform, it became a selective speech platform with algorithmic preference.
X would "defeat bots and spam"
Musk said fixing bots was a top priority and would be largely solved.
Reality by 2025:
Bot networks persist in ever increasing numbers.
Spam replies increased after verification changes.
Researchers documented coordinated amplification.
"Pay-to-boost" made manipulation easier, not harder.
🔗 Reuters — Researchers warn of coordinated manipulation on X: reuters.com/technology/res…
🔗 Center for Countering Digital Hate: counterhate.com/research/twitt…
Sep 4, 2025 • 8 tweets • 2 min read
Ever notice how Trump-world accounts sound less like leaders & more like 15-second adverts?
🚨 “Record highs!”
🚨 “Strongest ever!”
🚨 “America winning again!”
It’s propaganda disguised as ad copy — short, hyped, and hollow. Let’s unpack. 🧵
2/ They cherry-pick numbers: GDP, oil output, stock market blips.
But ignore the bigger picture:
– $34 TRILLION national debt 📉
– Crumbling infrastructure 🚧
– Skyrocketing healthcare costs 💊
– Schools & communities underfunded 🏫
That’s not “winning.”
Jul 10, 2025 • 7 tweets • 1 min read
🧵 “Ukraine’s army is full of Nazis!”: not quite. Let’s fact-check that Le Monde report that is being pushed at the moment by various pro Ru sources🧐
1/ Le Monde identified 350 soldiers posting Nazi symbols online — not military policy, not battalion patches, but personal social media misuse.
2/ Of those, ~200 were from the 3rd Assault Brigade, a large and visible unit descended from Azov. But again — 200 soldiers ≠ entire army.
