While pre­paring for Sec­re­tary of State Blinken’s visit, Beijing has had its sights on two sets of au­di­ences other than the US. One is China’s domestic audience. The other are the US’s allies in Europe and Asia. W/⁦@willmauldin⁩ in Beijing 🧵 wsj.com/articles/after… Days be­fore Blinken ar­rived in Bei­jing on Sun­day morn­ing, the first visit by an Amer­i­can cab­i­net-level of­fi­cial since 2019, Chi­nese of­fi­cials, state me­dia and aca­d­e­mics have all played up the no­tion that it is the U.S. side that has been the most ea­ger to meet

Looming over the new Xi-speak is what Beijing sees as increased challenges from Washington over a mission it views as sacred—the eventual reunification with Taiwan 🧵
wsj.com/articles/china… via @WSJ In recent meetings with Western diplomats and business executives, Chinese officials appeared to be trying to make a case that the U.S. will seek to goad China into war over Taiwan. The rhetoric is similar to how China has described Russia’s war in Ukraine. Beijing hasn’t ...

Since late May, China’s leader Xi Jinping has twice urged the na­tion to pre­pare for “ex­treme” sce­nar­ios or con­di­tions—trot­ting out a phrase­ol­ogy im­ply­ing pos­si­bil­i­ties of conflict as US-China competition intensifies 🧵 wsj.com/articles/china… At a top-level meet­ing fo­cused on na­tional se­cu­rity on May 30, the Chi­nese leader said, “We must be pre­pared for worst-case and ex­treme sce­nar­ios, and be ready to with­stand the ma­jor test of high winds, choppy wa­ters and even dan­ger­ous storms.”

Foreign firms in China have been warned before. In 2020, Beijing's market regulator launched probes into western consulting firms. But Xi didn’t think that effort went far enough. This time around, he put his state-security czar in charge 🧵
wsj.com/articles/china… via @WSJ "Securocrats" are replacing technocrats whose backgrounds in economics and finance once made them key to establishing China’s credibility with global investors and businesses. What’s emerging is an entire government apparatus geared toward domestic security...

Capture the moment: A decade into Xi Jinping’s rule, the puzzle pieces of his designs for China are in place, marking a definitive end to Deng Xiaoping’s reform-and-opening era 🧵 wsj.com/articles/xi-ji… via @WSJ Deng’s reforms transformed China from a poor, closed nation into an economic superpower and a stable driver of global growth. It is becoming increasingly clear the shift under Xi marks an end to the China the world had gotten to know in the past four decades ...

How Beijing has used golden shares encapsulates the evolving relationship between Xi Jinping, China’s most powerful leader since Mao Zedong, and its business sector. My latest on the Party's uneasy dance with private firms 🧵
wsj.com/articles/xi-ji… via @WSJ China's party-state is moving away from a public battle with some of the country's biggest private firms toward a quieter form of control. At the center of the effort is a push by various levels of government to take stakes in the private firms ...

A weakened Russia gives China upper hand in relationship, but China doesn't want its strategic partner severely crippled. BJ is pushing for ceasefire to prevent Russian defeat. Some say military assist cld be 'part and parcel' of its peace plan wsj.com/articles/in-ch… via @WSJ “Chinese military support would of course be a serious game-changer. It could also be part and parcel of Wang Yi’s ‘peace plan,’ or a call for a cease-fire along the current lines of territorial control by Russia and Ukraine.” @DrRadchenko

The Chinese balloon saga turned what was supposed to be a period of improving US-China relations ahead of other flashpoints into one now dominated by an extraordinary new and continuing point of friction W/@nancyayoussef @charleshutzler 🧵
wsj.com/articles/how-a… via @WSJ A quiet démarche by Washington to Beijing Feb. 1 over what U.S. officials believed was a spying mission set off a scramble in China’s corridors of power. Among quesetions asked: "Whose balloon is this?"

Beijing says Zero-Covid reversal was the right move at the right time. In reality, the abrupt U-turn--a result of a policymaking process driven by one person--has thrust China into a new public-health emergency. with @JChengWSJ @WSJ China team
wsj.com/articles/why-x… via @WSJ By the end of the Oct Party Congress, it was already growing harder for Xi Jinping to argue that his zero-Covid policy was working. Reports were flowing into Zhongnanhai of rising infections nationwide, a surge taking place despite the strict lockdowns ...

China’s leader Xi Jinping is facing a reckoning over his Covid strategy that he has managed to postpone for three years, as infections surge, economic growth plunges and public outrage is spilling into the streets. My latest 🧵 wsj.com/articles/chine… Pro­testers have di­rectly chal­lenged the au­thor­ity of Xi and the Party in scenes un­think­able just a month ago, when he se­cured a third term in power. “The mass protests rep­re­sent the big­gest po­lit­i­cal cri­sis for Xi,” said Minxin Pei …

Open displays of anger are rare in China. Having protests over same issue break out in multiple cities is almost unheard of. H/T @joshchin Now, "a lot of people are reaching their breaking point" over Zero Covid.
wsj.com/articles/chine… via @WSJ Latest protests in Shanghai and elsewhere followed demonstrations on Friday in Urumqi, the capital of the remote region of Xinjiang, where a deadly fire enraged city residents who had struggled with lockdowns of more than 100 days. @xinwenfan
wsj.com/articles/china…

The economy still matters to Xi Jinping. He needs growth to gird China for competition with US. Having just adjusted covid response, Beijing is now pulling back from a years-long crackdown on property to shore up growth. w/@yifanxie @caocli
wsj.com/articles/china… via @WSJ The PBOC and China's top banking regulator issued a wide-ranging series of measures aimed at bolstering housing demand and supply, according to a notice circulated on Friday to the country’s financial institutions. The new policies, signed off by Xi, unwind some of the previous..

Washington and Beijing are wrangling over whether Biden and Xi will meet around the G20 summit. Chi­nese of­fi­cials have only re­cently re-en­gaged af­ter ill feel­ings over the lead­ers’ last ex­change in July. By ⁦@charleshutzler⁩ and me 🧵 wsj.com/articles/a-bid… In a July call, Xi asked Biden to stop Speaker Pelosi from vis­it­ing Tai­wan, but Biden de­clined, de­fer­ring to Con­gress’s in­de­pen­dence from the ex­ec­u­tive branch. China then con­ducted large-scale mil­i­tary drills in re­sponse and Washington tightened export controls…

In China’s new leadership, pro-market economic pragmatists are gone -- a true changing of the guard in China’s orientation to the rest of the world, especially the U.S.-led West. My latest on how Xi has changed China 🧵wsj.com/articles/china… via @WSJ Officials who combined political standing w/technocratic skills, a mix that gave them global market credibility, are no longer in the upper echelons of the party, including figures such as Liu He, Xi’s economic adviser who negotiated a trade deal with the Trump administration ...

Xi Jinping once called China’s Belt and Road program “a project of the century.” Now, troubled loans and a slowing economy are forcing Beijing to give the program a makeover -- exposing the limits to Xi's vision to reshape global order 🧵 wsj.com/articles/china… via @WSJ The biggest ironic twist of all: Beijing has had to abandon its longstanding resistance to working with international institutions like the Paris Club, an association of large sovereign creditors including the US, Japan and France. So it finds itself having to accept intl norms.

The Xi-Putin call took place on Xi’s 69th birth­day, a sign of both lead­ers’ de­sire to re­in­force a per­sonal friend­ship that has helped take China-Rus­sia re­la­tion­ship to the clos­est point since the early years of the Cold War w/@shashamimi⁩ wsj.com/articles/china… The Chi­nese read­out of the call was em­blem­atic of Bei­jing’s po­si­tion in nei­ther crit­i­ciz­ing nor en­dors­ing Rus­sia’s in­va­sion in Ukraine, while the Russ­ian de­scrip­tion of the call con­tained lan­guage sug­gest­ing Mos­cow has Bei­jing’s back­ing of the war…

China is no stranger to hard balancing acts, but Xi's Zero Covid is making it hard for his No. 2, Premier Li, to fix the economy. Now, the party appears to be trying to unify the divergence in policy priorities. wsj.com/articles/beiji… via @WSJ State media, firmly controlled by Xi, buried a rare nationwide video call Li held last month to rally the troops to save the economy. Now, official papers are showing some love for Li's econ agenda while continuing to focus on Xi.

China's Forgotten Premier Steps out of Xi's Shadow

Xi Jinping is on track to secure another term. But Li Keqiang, the long-sidelined premier, is pushing back. If he succeeds, Li's biggest legacy as premier is to influence who the next premier is
wsj.com/articles/china… via @WSJ In recent months, Li has led a rear-guard action to press Xi to dial back some of his policies that have contributed to the economy's slowdown. That still doesn’t portend a major shift away from Xi’s broader push to expand the state’s role in the economy and ...

The Ukraine cri­sis is fur­ther erod­ing al­ready-low lev­els of trust be­tween the US and China, ex­ac­er­bat­ing their ri­valry for global in­flu­ence. With ⁦@learyreports⁩ ⁦@charleshutzler⁩ wsj.com/articles/xi-an… China’s leadership now has set­tled on a clearer strat­egy: It won’t op­pose Rus­sia, and it will sup­port Ukraine—what’s de­scribed in Beijing as “benev­o­lent neu­tral­ity.” In the US, some call China’s stance “pro-Russia neutrality.”

For the past decade, we've documented Chinese leader Xi Jinping's rise, consolidation of power and use of that power. Now, this piece is about the limits of his power, told through the economic backlash he has faced in implementing his visions.
wsj.com/articles/rollb… via @WSJ Please indulge me while I reup some of our previous stories. In 2021:
wsj.com/articles/xi-ji…

Beijing is trying to shift attention from its decision to align more closely with Russia in the weeks ahead of its invasion of Ukraine, to its effort to help find a way to halt the fighting. But its role likely will be very limited. wsj.com/articles/china… via @WSJ “If they were to square it with Russia, and they think it will help alleviate some of the pressure they’re facing, it wouldn’t be difficult for them to go through the motions,” @ajwsmall "The likelihood of their being able to contribute anything...is extremely minimal.”