BETTER THAN IT COULD BE, BUT WORSE THAN IT SHOULD BE. Quick thoughts on 6 months of Russia's war in Ukraine.
1) This is likely a protracted war for years to come that will go on until Putin's death. It's now clear that it did not begin in 2022, but in 2014 or even in 2003. And it might continue with periods of recess and escalation until Putin's death, at least. Contrary to the popular idea, the problem is not only Putin, but the Russian elites and society, the lack of fundamental changes in their thinking after 1990.

ЛУЧШЕ, ЧЕМ МОГЛО БЫ БЫТЬ, НО ХУЖЕ, ЧЕМ ДОЛЖНО БЫТЬ. Наблюдения по итогам 6 месяцев войны.
1) Вероятно, война затяжная, будет идти до смерти Путина. Она началась не в 2022, а в 2014 или даже в 2003. И будет с периодами затишья и эскалации идти до смерти Путина, как минимум. Вопреки популярной идее, проблема не только в Путине, а в элитах и обществе РФ, отсутствии радикальных изменений в их мышлении после 1990 г. Анализируя состав и взгляды элит с начала 1990х, поведение общества, убеждена,что реваншизм постсоветской России был исторически неизбежен.

In our new article by Post-Soviet Affairs with Kirill Petrov we discover a remarkable continuity b/w Soviet and Putin-era elites. We analyzed Putin's top 100 elites and found that the share of those with Soviet nomenklatura ties NOW (30 years after the USSR collapse) is ~60% 🧵1/ Most of these 60% come from the middle and lower, and not the highest, Soviet nomenklatura ranks. The share of people with a nomenklatura past is much (TWICE!) higher than the share of siloviki.2/

Коллеги, в Post-Soviet Affairs наконец-то вышла наша важная для понимания происходящего статья с Кириллом Петровым!
Почему происходит ре-автократизация политической системы России? Почему демократические силы в России так быстро потерпели поражение? 1/
tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.108… Наш ответ:в России после распада СССР фактически (и до сих пор) не произошло смены элит! Мы проанализировали бэкграунд топ-100 путинских элит и выяснили, что доля элит с номенклатурным происхождением СЕГОДНЯ (30 лет после распада СССР) составляет примерно 60% современной элиты.2/

Here is a friend's attempt to talk to her Russia-based father about the Bucha atrocities. Note how polar opposite her father's propaganda-driven vision of the world is!
“I tried talking to my father about Bucha, where his family home, paralyzed sister and a brother still are. 1/ ...His brother does not answer phone for many days. Dad gets very nervous when I talk about the executions of civilians, his mind refuses to accept it. I also didn’t want to send him photos -many resources don’t work in RU anymore, and I am also worried for his health. 2/

This widely-read article by a RU journalist claims that Western sanctions have so far consolidated RU elites. It seems to imply that w/o sanctions once the war started business and officials would have split from regime and condemn the war. That’s not the case, let me explain: 1/

https://twitter.com/maxseddon/status/1509597448708239367

Such conclusions fundamentally misread the nature of the Russian regime.
1) Rally ‘round the flag is a common occurrence during the early days of war. In RU, neither elites nor population expected the war (this was decided by Putin and very narrow circle), 2/

In my new article I argue that Russians’ support for UKR war (50-60%) is not due to lack of information only. People who try to reach out to Russians often encounter direct refusal to believe evidence of atrocities committed by RU soldiers in Ukraine 1/ nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/why-… even when directly provided evidence of it—even when such information is presented by their blood relatives. It is common for Russians to deny and refuse to believe these facts, instead claiming that such facts/photos/videos are fake. 2/