Let's use DIA's new chart to examine China's potential nuclear warhead arsenal in 2035.

BLUF: Yikes.

On ICBMs - let's say all 60 FOBS have just one warhead. Let's conservatively assume that only half of ICBMs are deployed with one warhead. That 380 single warhead ICBM/FOBS 1/7 The remaining ICBMs (320 of them) are deployed with more than one warhead. If they have 2 warheads, that is 640. If they have 3 warheads, that is 960.

That means, in an easily plausible future scenario, China will have 1,340 warheads on just their ICBM leg alone.
2/7

I must disagree with Dr. Mastro's latest piece in @TheEconomist.

Paring back U.S. nuclear weapons is one of the most counterproductive / provocative actions the United States could take.

A mini-thread (and link to the original article) below 🧵👇 ... 1/n Link: economist.com/by-invitation/…

I don't know why SLCM-N is so controversial, but it regularly causes critics to overstate, hyperbolize, or leave out info entirely.

It is ok to disagree on whether to pursue SLCM-N, but let's get the facts straight.

A thread 🧵on this misleading piece:
bloomberg.com/opinion/articl… Rather than SLCM-N taking a "u-turn" from a change in presidential administrations, it is more accurate to say the Biden Administration made a u-turn on the desirability of SLCM-N.

In just four years, the Biden Admin went from opposing to supporting it with no reservation. 2/n

As promised, a 🧵 on the new @DefenseIntel report on nuclear threats.



I've seen a lot of comments that this is an underwhelming doc and doesn't provide much new. I think that is due to misplaced expectations.

There is, I believe, some good stuff. 1/n dia.mil/Portals/110/Im… First, a note on expectations.

The Intelligence Community (IC) is inherently uncomfortable publishing open source documents. By citing an open source, they worry they are implicitly endorsing the entirety of the source or the author. 2/n

A great read on these apparently leaked Russian nuclear-themed slides.
Some analysts have essentially shrugged as not presenting much new; I agree inasmuch as Russia would obviously have targets in Europe.

But, the implications are deeper. Mini 🧵... 1/nft.com/content/237e1e… US and NATO officials who are focused on strategy must recognize what these approximately 2,000 Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons represent: an asymmetric trump card (as Russia perceives it) against a conventionally superior opponent. 2/n

Finally got to read through @heatherwilly 's transcript of Acting ASD for Space Policy @NarangVipin talk at CSIS. Wow.



Recommend everyone read through it. Here are some interesting nuggets I have not seen others pick up on. A 🧵... 1/ncsis.org/analysis/nucle… Out of the gate, Dr. Narang is signaling to both the arms control and the deterrence-focused communities that there is a paradigm shift underway.

Threats cannot change this radically without fundamentally affecting U.S. assumptions and strategy. 2/n

Some thoughts on US nuclear modernization, expansion, and fears of an arms race.



Pranay Vaddi, Senior Director at the NSC, spoke at the ACA annual conference last Friday and his remarks have gotten widespread coverage.

A moderate-sized thread 🧵... 1/nnytimes.com/2024/06/07/us/… First, it is interesting to look back at National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan's speech to the same conference back in 2023.



Vaddi echoes in 2024 many of the same themes that his boss did a year ago. 2/n whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/…

@zhaot2005 makes some good points in his latest at @ForeignAffairs, while some points are more debatable, and others can only be resolved in time.

A not-so-quick thread on China's nuclear expansion and its motivations. 🧵... 1/n

https://twitter.com/zhaot2005/status/1786372934811955680

One thing that stands out in his article is the personality-driven nature of China's government and decisions on nuclear weapons.

If President Xi wants it, he gets it. So, it is unsurprising if there is little in Chinese strategic literature that explains this buildup. 2/n

All fair points. Let me sketch out a (very) condensed case for SLCM-N with the caveat that I haven't had my coffee yet.

Starting w/ the broadest and then down to the narrower reasons: the more the US can deter regional war, or deter escalation of regional war, the better. 1/

https://twitter.com/slip_trace/status/1772095131958517964

For political reasons, land-based nuclear weapons in allied states are difficult, and doubly so in, say, Japan. That leaves air- and sea-based. Bombers and DCA need bases to fly to and from - and again, in the Pacific, these are high on China's priority target list. 2/

A thread on ASD John Plumb's OSD testimony before the House Armed Services Committee yesterday on the topic of strategic forces.

Some very interesting nuggets for those who know how to look.



Shall we? 🧵... 1/14 armedservices.house.gov/sites/republic…
A succinct statement of the threat - and notable that there is an increasing focus on threats to the US homeland in these written testimonies.

OSD + NORTHCOM have been voicing their concerns about Russian and Chinese strategies of coercion (backed by improving capabilities) 2/14

NOW: USSTRATCOM and USSPACECOM are testifying before the SASC.

The Strategic Posture Commission gets a shout out early in opening statements and the USSTRATCOM testimony.



A thread... armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/…
I haven't seen a reference so early in a STRATCOM testimony to RU and CH chem/bio capabilities in a while.

Another reminder of why the United States continues to reject, on a bipartisan basis, calls for a no first use policy.

New State Department report on Russian (non)compliance with the New START Treaty.



The report tries, painfully, to walk the impossible tightrope of explaining why RU noncompliance is a big deal, but not a danger to US security.

Let's explore. A🧵.. 1/7state.gov/wp-content/upl… The report lists four major Russian actions that have led to the finding of noncompliance:

1. Failed to allow US inspections
2. Failed to convene for a BCC (consultation)
3. Failed to provide treaty notifications
4. Failed to provide telemetric data

2/7

🚨NDAA conference text is now available🚨



Let's take a look at the nuclear weapons, missile defense, and sundry other sections.

Join me on this thread🧵... 1/15 docs.house.gov/billsthisweek/…
Sec. 1633 - Independent Assessment by STRATCOM (my shorthand title)

In short, the Commander of US Strategic Command tells the Nuclear Weapons Council (which sends the report to Congress) whether the United States is on track to meet its deterrence requirements.

2/15

My thoughts on the B61-13, the new "modern variant" of the B61.

BLUF: This is a wise move, but should have been linked to a broader re-assessment of U.S. nuclear deterrence requirements.





A mini-thread 🧵... 1/11defense.gov/News/Releases/…
media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/27/20… Most of the commentary on the B61-13 so far has focused on how it is the Biden administration's attempt to comply with Congressional requirements while retiring the expensive larger yield B83.

This is likely true, but, in my opinion, only half the story.

2/11

The bipartisan, consensus 2023 Strategic Posture Commission report (no small feat given the topic) is now 24 hours old.



Let's address the two main criticisms of the report's recommendations:

1. Start an arms race
2. Too great a fiscal burden

🧵... 1/14armedservices.house.gov/sites/republic… The report says that the United States should plan to procure more bombers, submarines, LRSOs, and theater nuclear forces.

Two groups said these recommendations, if implemented, would start an arms race.





2/14armscontrol.org/pressroom/2023…
fas.org/publication/st…

Nuclear Posture Review mega-analysis thread continued! See below:

https://twitter.com/Matt_Costlow/status/1585681062893584392

A very good paragraph. The United States may have to fight through a nuclear environment - very important if there is any hope of restoring deterrence during a conflict.

Now, dear readers, let's get to the Nuclear Posture Review. My analysis below! media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/20… Good to see no silly language about conventional or cyber / space "substituting" for nuclear.

It also includes the Nuclear Posture Review and Missile Defense Review. Stick around for my analysis below!

https://twitter.com/Matt_Costlow/status/1585654561045348352

Great to see the language of "tailored" deterrence carrying over into the Biden administration. How we deter Russia versus how we deter China will be different because they are different.

I hate to even link to this article, but the fundamental misunderstandings in it are just too much to ignore from people who should know better.

Nuclear war deserves better analysis.

thebulletin.org/2022/10/rhetor…

A reluctant thread 🧵... 1/n "Rather than [escalation] being controlled, these transitions [conv to nuclear] are simultaneously enabled, increased in probability, and accelerated by the very existence of such [non-strategic] weapons."

Where is the evidence? Certainly not in history. 2/n

A preemptive thread on Russian nuclear employment in Ukraine (if it does occur, with all fervent prayer it does not)

*A collection of bad takes and the proper responses*

(with all the caveats that it will depend on the circumstances, etc.)

A thread🧵... Bad take: "The US nuclear arsenal [or, insert favorite weapon here] didn't stop this, so the US can lead the world in responsible nuclear behavior by eliminating them."
Response: The US hasn't brought nuclear deterrence into Ukraine discussion, not meant to deter RU use there 2/n

Ukraine and Taiwan are different crises, with different actors and different stakes - BUT, they are both connected in that any potential conflict with Russia or China will require a solid understanding of nuclear deterrence. The US needs a strategy:
nipp.org/wp-content/upl… My new co-authored report with Keith Payne describes what an updated "victory denial" deterrence strategy might look like and specifically how it can be applied to deter China from invading Taiwan. But such a strategy is also central for deterring Russia from attacking NATO.