Due to pro-war bloggers, Telegram is often seen as the main 🇷🇺 social media. However, it is only one pocket of the vast Russian media space! @Makarmia, @semenaff, and I have analysed how users discuss the war and mobilisation across Telegram, Vkontakte, and Odnoklassniki (11). 1/ VK and OK are at least as important as TG. After FB and IG ban, the audiences of all 3 platforms increased: VK-62%, OK-42%, TG-55%. We were interested in a) ideological spin, b) online astroturfing (Kremlin bots, trolls, etc), and c) reaction to mobilisation across platforms.

I and my colleagues have been extracting data from Russian media and social media to understand how both propagandists and social media users discuss the war. The first report is out. Two more will be published later. Some preliminary observations (15): 1/ The number of stories about the war on TV has been decreasing since Feb. Still a lot of propaganda, but twice less than in Feb-Mar. The key justifications for the invasion -  ‘demilitarization’, ‘denazification’, NATO expansion, Donbas people - are discussed less and less.

Reading this avalanche of tweets about Gorbachev, I can’t help but notice how difficult it is for people to handle cognitive dissonance and reconcile contradictory parts of his legacy. Twitter is like a Hollywood blockbuster with heroes and villains and nothing in between. Suppressing protests in Vilnius, Riga, Baku, Tbilisi, etc? Hiding the news about Chernobyl? Welcoming the annexation of Crimea? Yes.

As opposed to “unity/solidarity” in Ukraine, “kindness" is mentioned by respondents in Russia as their main national trait. Sounds very bizarre in the context of the barbaric war waged by Russia. But I think these results might give us some insight into how propaganda works (4):

https://twitter.com/te_rowley/status/1526949339431575552

1/ Remember all this endless toxic rain with threats to nuke London and DC, insinuations about nazism in Ukraine, and bragging about how great Russian military is winning the war produced by Skabeyeva, Solovyev, etc?

Why can Russian politicians claim to fight fascism and make absolutely fascist speeches? Shouldn’t it produce some cognitive dissonance? No, because fascism and nazism are understood differently. This great piece explains why. Key points (8): 

jordanrussiacenter.org/news/what-russ… 1/ Fist, in the USSR, the words “fascism” and “nazism” were not centred around Holocaust. Millions of Soviet citizens were killed, but the official narrative had no place for one group suffering more than another.

After reading some newly collected interviewers with war supporters, I am struck again by 2 themes which I frequently encountered before in my work. Instead of undermining the effect of propaganda, media skepticism and personal connections with Ukraine can often amplify it (7). 1/ Intuitively, it seems that people approaching the media with skepticism should not believe propaganda and should not support the war. If they have personal connections with Ukraine, they should believe propaganda less because they have alternative sources of information.

My previous tweet went viral because it resonated with what most people want today - Putin out of Ukraine (and hopefully in The Hague). Many saw a sign of an off-ramp. Unfortunately, I don't think it is. Some context about how these propagandists shows work in Russia (14). 1/ In the past decade, and especially after 2014, numerous political propagandist talk shows appeared on state television in Russia. They are used to deliver pro-regime narratives to audiences. They focus on criticism of NATO, Ukraine, praising Putin, etc.

Re my last tweet which (accidentally!) went viral. Several remarks.

1/ Just to be clear, it was a paraphrase! I was just describing what they said. Obviously, I don’t think that Ukrainian forces are destroyed or other bs they said. 2/ I don’t think it should be read as a sign that Putin is going to retreat. The overall framing of the show was still very supportive of the invasion. Other guests said that Putin should proceed with the invasion.

Just watched Russia’s main political talk show with notorious propagandist Soloviev (Mar 9). Couldn’t believe my ears. Two hardcore pro-Putin guests - Shaknazarov and Bagdasarov - acknowledged the impact of sanctions, military failures, and called for an end to the invasion. 1/ Many Russian elites are dissatisfied with the war. But these two could not say it spontaneously. This show is pre-recorded and carefully orchestrated. Which means that these discussions were approved and permitted.

Since the beginning of the war, Russian pollsters have been publishing terrifying results suggesting that the majority of Russians support the invasion. Here is my take on why these results are inflated for @opendemocracyru

Short summary (11):

opendemocracy.net/en/odr/russia-… 1/ Self-selection bias. Regime critics have reasons to be afraid to express their views. They trust surveys less than regime supporters and are less likely to participate. More supporters in a sample ->  the results look like more people support the government’s actions.