People seem to understand that total arbitrage goes down as slots get faster, but another suprising fact is that sandwiching goes down too!? I brought in Slippage Monster to explain to math below 1/8
The first is that transaction failure is extremely bad UX. Users are typically willing to trade off a few hundred basis points of execution for higher success rates. With this in mind lets write out a utility function for the user in terms of success rate 2/8
Jun 12, 2024 • 10 tweets • 3 min read
Does your proof of stake blockchain have weak pullout game? In our latest paper, @mikeneuder, @mallesh, and I share a few tricks to help you reduce wait times while achieving the same security when designing exit queues. 1/9
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Designing exit queues is all about balancing security and flexibility. If you let too many validators exit within a short period then accountability guarantees go out the window, but locking validator stake in for too long is bad for staker welfare, meaning the protocol has to give out more, in the form of emissions, to compensate. 2/9
Jan 30, 2023 • 9 tweets • 2 min read
New paper alert🚨 🧵
@malleshpai, @eljhfx, and I investigate "Censorship Resistance in On-Chain Auctions"
Bids submitted to an on-chain auction, must be included in a block by a block proposer. The proposer holds a temporary monopoly on inclusion. He can use this to extract monopoly rents by in the form of tips. He might also accept bribes in exchange for censoring competing bids.
Jan 28, 2023 • 4 tweets • 1 min read
'Twas the night before EC, and all through the lab
Researchers were typing, with papers to grab
The figures were plotted, the data was crunched
Their methods described, without even a hunch 1/4
The papers were submitted, with hopes high and bright
For acceptance at EC, their goal in sight
They'd worked through the nights, and through the days too
Their hard work would pay off, they knew it was true 2/4
Sep 4, 2022 • 15 tweets • 3 min read
Long awaited second auction theory rage thread. This time combinatorial auctions. 🧵
Combinatorial auctions are mechanisms for allocating more than one good when bidder's valuations over items may have complementary structure. 1/14
For example suppose a bot is looking to sandwich a transaction which is garenteed to be at txindex 6 within the block. If the bot is able to include a tx at index 5 and 7 he will be able to sandwich and make a lot of profit. With only one or the other he makes nothing. 2/14