1/x I am happy to share our new @SSRN preprint w/ @ProfOnderco, in which we report findings from our latest survey experiment on public attitudes toward the use of nuclear weapons in Russia. We show that [...] 2/x […] when you present the participants with specific scenarios, there is virtually no change in support for nuclear use after the 2022 full-scale invasion […]

Our new paper (w/ @ProfOnderco) has just been published in the Journal of Conflict Resolution! We report the findings of our 2021 survey experiment in Russia, where we investigated [...] 1/n
journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/00… @IPS_FSV_CUNI @prcprague @FSV_UK @eliss_lab Russian public support for nuclear weapon use in the hypothetical conflict with NATO in the Baltics. Among other things, we examined the differences in support for a nuclear strike against NATO military base and a corresponding conventional strike option; [...]

1/ 🧵 ke včerejšímu prohlášení generálního štábu ruské armády, které ukazuje, jak chce Rusko v příštích týdnech pravděpodobně na Ukrajině postupovat a co se pokusí později nabídnout ruské veřejnosti jako „úspěšnou vojenskou operaci.“
eng.mil.ru/en/special_ope… 2/ Ruské politické vedení už nyní zjevně akceptovalo fakt, že vojenskou silou nebude schopno dosáhnout ani dobytí Kyjeva, kapitulace ukrajinských sil a změny režimu na Ukrajině, ani některých dílčích cílů na jihu země (dobytí Mykolajiva a Oděsy) /mapa @TheStudyofWar/

🧵 A quick summary based on the assessment of military analysts who previously provided some very accurate predictions concerning the Russian invasion (e.g., @KofmanMichael, @DAlperovitch, @RALee85 …). On the plus side: 1. Russians have been overconfident in many aspects [...] of the invasion (overconfidence is a common bias in international relations in general and matters of war in particular) and the results so far are worse than probably expected; 2. Russians have not (yet) achieved air superiority over Ukraine, something they probably [...]