Given multiple reports stating that Zubimendi said yes to Liverpool, only to then change his mind, it looks like the club wasted precious time trying to negotiate a payment structure for the transfer fee- and this allowed the player to get cold feet and ultimately change his mind Liverpool had the option of quickly aiding the player to trigger his buyout clause (apologies- it appears I was misinformed and there would have been no tax liability for the £51m)- but chose instead to try and negotiate a fee instead.

So I spoke last week with someone involved in Spanish football. He told me that though buyout clauses are part of all contracts in Spanish and Portuguese football (as it's part of employment law), in reality, buyout clauses are very rarely exercised. The reason for this is because Spain's tax authorities can treat any funds transferred by Liverpool to Zubi (even if for a few hours) as income, and this would then be liable to 47% tax charge- so £51.5m could increase to £75.7m.

One of Jurgen Klopp's numerous legacies is his significant part in helping Liverpool to be restored as a financial footballing juggernaut. The image below shows the impact he has had (comparing key metrics from the season before he joined us with estimates for the current season) The club is on track to break through the £300m mark for commercial revenue next season (which would make it the second Premier League club to legitimately achieve that feat)- and that's thanks to Klopp's role in making Liverpool one of the most marketable brands in football.

Liverpool Football Club's accounts for the 2022/23 season were finally published on Friday, and they provided some interesting insight into the club's financial standing. I share here some of the highlights. Turnover amounted to £593.8m in a season where the club finished fifth in the PL and made it only to the first knockout round of the CL. The turnover was comprised of (change on 21/22 in brackets):
Commercial: £272.5m (+£25.8m)
Broadcast: £241.6m (-£19.2m)
Matchday: £79.8m (-£7m)

The Deloitte Football Money League for the 2022/23 season has been published, which reveals that Liverpool's turnover remained almost exactly the same- despite a far less successful season on the pitch (turnover was £594m for both seasons). The club dropped from third in the previous season's ranking to seventh. Topping the list was Real Madrid- their income grew to £723m, driven largely by a significant increase in commercial revenue. In 21/22, their revenue was only £10m higher than Liverpool's.

Today's announcement that Liberty Equity is investing into Liverpool Football Club is positive news, but not something to get overly excited about. It's reported that the investment will allow most/all of the club's bank debt to be cleared. As of 31 May 2022, this stood at £159.4m- a figure that had likely reduced by £10m or more during 2022/23.

Following on from great analysis by @slbsn of CFC's finances and how it all relates to the PL's Profitability & Sustainability Rules (PSR), any punishment relating to losses relative to the PSR Calculation in excess of £105m would be implemented THIS season.

https://twitter.com/slbsn/status/1690075269971755009

In the latest set of rules, the PL has set out clear timelines for dealing with breaches of PSR- and the latest the process can continue to would be 6 June.

Liverpool are strongly linked with RB Leipzig midfield dynamo, Dominik Szoboszlai.

Reports have suggested the player's contract contains a release clause worth £60m that can only be activated if paid in full.

Paying such a fee up-front would be beyond LFC, surely? Not really. Welcome to the world of football receivables finance. In very simple terms, this means that a funder would pay the transfer fee to a selling club and then a buying club would repay the funder through future instalments.

Liverpool's deal with Nike enters its penultimate season, which means the club are to commence negotiations during 23/24 with the sportswear giant on potentially extending the deal.

Below is a thread setting out its importance to the club, and what factors will influence talks. The deal was entered into from the start of the 20/21 Premier League campaign, following a court case with former kit manufacturing partner, New Balance, where NB tried unsuccessfully to argue that it had matched Nike's offer and should therefore continue as LFC's partner.

Despite the loss of Champions League football next season, Liverpool's turnover should still remain very healthy and not far off the level club will achieve for 22/23. Revenue levels this season are likely to be in the region of £580m (slightly below last season's record £594m). Next season, I estimate that the club's turnover will be marginally lower, at approximately £570m.

FSG had several parties ready to make very big offers in recent months but nobody was willing to go up to £4.5bn+ (which is what would be enough for JWH to part ways with Liverpool). It was Mr. Henry that made the ultimate - not unanimous - call not to entertain any offers. He chose for FSG to remain as custodians of Liverpool not because he feels the club's fortunes will be stronger with his group at the helm; rather, it's purely a money call. JWH would rather wait, feeling that the club's value will continue to appreciate.

There is increasing chatter that FSG will be soon be selling a minority stake in Liverpool Football Club. Countless performances this season have shown that a sizeable overhaul of the first team squad is needed. Will FSG use proceeds from the sale to swell the transfer kitty? The hope and expectation will be that FSG do make most or all of the funds generated from the sale to boost the club's finances. In terms of how much FSG might generate, it will depend on how much of a stake they sell.

The Deloitte Football Money League has, for the first time, revealed some of Liverpool Football Club's key financial information for the 2021/22 season. Though the information made available is limited, it still throws up some interesting insight. Here, I share my analysis... Firstly, the turnover generated by Liverpool is a record-high for the club (£594m). Turnover is worked out through three key revenue streams:
broadcast (£266m)
commercial (£233m)
matchday (£95m).
It doesn't factor in revenue from player sales (more on that later).

2023 is shaping up to be one of the most pivotal years in the history of Liverpool Football Club. Decisions that need to be made will alter the course of its history for a long time to come. Key amongst them is a choice FSG need to make- stay or go. For me, it's obvious- go. Some will disagree with this, but they have done some wonderful things for Liverpool. Made inspired recruitment decisions (e.g. Klopp, Edwards). Modernised Anfield. Upgraded training facilities. Improved management structures within the club. Grown key revenue streams.

IF Liverpool were to sign Jude Bellingham and Enzo Fernández at a combined cost of £200m or more, financing the deals would be feasible. Signing both would not require the full amounts to be paid at once to Dortmund and Benfica respectively. Fernández has a reported release clause of €120m (£103m). This isn't necessarily the same as a buyout clause where a specified figure has to be paid in full 'by the player' (though really by the purchasing club)- there can be scope for negotiation of the fee structure.

If and when FSG sell Liverpool Football Club, their prime motivation (beyond securing a maximum return on their investment) should be to leave the club in a position where it is financially able to compete with other clubs in a way they simply can't right now. This is a point Jurgen Klopp acknowledged before the PL game versus Man City a few weeks ago. Selling to owners who can make the club more financially competitive is, whether people like it or not, the only way to remain at the top of the table.

2021/22 Financials

TURNOVER
MUFC: £583m
LFC: £580m+ (est.)

WAGE BILL
MUFC: £384m
LFC: £350m (est.)

INTEREST AND DIVIDENDS PAYABLE
MUFC: £54m
LFC: £4m (est.)

AGENTS' FEES
MUFC: £29m
LFC: £22m

SUMMER 2022 NET SPEND
MUFC: £204m
LFC: £8m Liverpool's accounts will not be published until early-March but the above estimates should be pretty close to the actual figures.

Effective succession planning is the key to sustained growth and success for organisations of all types- and football clubs are no different. For Liverpool, I feel a disjointed approach to succession planning has led to the club's recent on-field woes. The model FSG had developed and put in place at Liverpool was inspired by the 'moneyball' concept- in addition to using data to find value-for-money incomings, using data to know when to move players on and replenish the squad was arguably almost as important.

Been hearing tons about how our players are exhausted from last season, which is apparently one of the key reasons why we've started this season so poorly.

In 20/21, City with a smaller squad played 61 games (just one less than we did in 21/22). Many of their players then went to the Euros before returning to City with barely a break or pre-season. They also only had essentially one incoming and one outgoing from their first team squad in the summer 2021 transfer window (Aguero out, Grealish in).

Liverpool's atrocious start to the new season is down to numerous factors. Injuries, tactical changes, retaining players beyond their best before date and the physical and mental after-effects of 21/22 are amongst them. The root causes, however, are loyalty and under-investment. Lets start with the contentious shout that the club has under-invested in the squad. I put out a thread a few weeks ago in which I highlighted that the club's post-2018 net spend amounted to only 2% of the club's overall turnover; far lower as a percentage than any domestic rival

As we move into the closing stretch of the summer transfer window, many Liverpool fans' now annual tradition of agonising over the club's transfer activities is in full swing (especially after Monday's result). This thread considers whether complaints of under-investment are fair There can be no question that the club went through a stellar purple patch on the recruitment front between the summers of 2016 to 2018; Gini, Mane, Matip, VvD, Mo, Robbo, Alisson and Fabinho proved to be fantastic signings, with the likes of Shaq and Naby being solid additions.