NR Senior Fellow @FPRI; Consultant & Researcher; Kurdish Affairs, Iraq, Extremism; PhD @Penn Words in NYT, WashPost, Foreign Policy, Guardian, The New Region.
Jan 15 • 7 tweets • 4 min read
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I watched the portions of the interview between Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and the Erbil-based Shams TV that were released by the Syrian government’s Al-Ikhbariyah channel.
A few initial observations below, focused mainly on his remarks regarding the Kurdish issue and rights in Syria—as opposed to the Aleppo military campaign. I will address this in greater depth on my Substack later.
First: Much of President Sharaa’s discourse relied on familiar platitudes such as “Kurdish rights are protected in the constitution,” “I believe in Kurdish rights in Syria” and acknowledgments that Kurds have been oppressed in Syria and other general statements about Kurds being an integral part of Syrian society. Some of these statements were undoubtedly positive in tone. Others, however—such as the claim that Kurdish rights were protected in the constitution—were factually inaccurate. As such, they are highly unlikely to resonate with Kurdish audiences, particularly given his government’s record at critical moments of the political transition—from the handling of the so-called national dialogue conference, to the unilateral declaration of a new Syrian army, the issuance of the Constitutional Declaration, the formation of a transitional government, and a parliamentary appointment process that resembled an internal primary of former HTS and allied figures rather than a genuine election. Actions speak far louder than words.
Second, rather than addressing Kurdish grievances, the interview appeared to rationalize the use of force against Kurdish actors in Aleppo, with clear signals that similar approaches could extend to other parts of northeast Syria.
Third, President Sharaa’s rhetoric appeared designed to drive a wedge within the Kurdish community by deploying a “good Kurd” and “bad Kurd” strategy. He employed a layered divisive framing: first, by asserting a distinction between Kurds as a community and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) as a military-political actor; second, by saying the SDF was incapable of making decision due to leadership divisions; and thirdly by equating the SDF with the PKK—an argument that closely echoes long-standing Turkish government discourse and obviously not conducive to fostering a conciliatory spirit with Kurds at this time.
