Events in Russia often seem, as previously tweeted, both entirely unpredictable & massively overdetermined. But the headscratchery of June 23-24 is one for the record books. As promised Friday, I have thoughts. Lots. Three 🧵 worth. So: 🧵 No 1, WTF (do I think) happened? 1/5 No, this wasn’t all part of Putin’s master plan. If you think that, I’ve got a speech to give you . You know, one I reschedule and then release pre-recorded, promising dire consequences for people I deem traitors to whom I will later that day grant amnesty. 2/5

Could forcing Russians fleeing mobilization to go back to Russia foment revolution? Maybe. But I wouldn't count on it, and in the meantime, I'd look for ways to limit the war machine and be humane towards those fleeing it. A 🧵. 1/18 The last time Russia had anything revolutionish was 1991, after 70 years of communist rule, when the rest of the Soviet Union was embarked on revolutions as well. It led the USSR's collapse, though far from all of the successor states were or are democracies. 2/18

Narratives about humiliating or not humiliating Russia may miss the point. Russia has, at this point, fairly effectively self-humiliated. The question is whether or not to try to increase its incentives to negotiate rather than keep fighting. A🧵1/13 One argument holds that Russia must be completely militarily defeated, and then the West/Ukraine can dictate terms. That sounds great. But what does this defeat mean exactly? Back to Feb 23 lines? Further? Does it require Russian state failure? 2/13

Our @crisisgroup latest on the situation in Ukraine is aimed at Western leaders, who must craft policies that support Kyiv, avert escalation with Moscow, and make a negotiated solution Kyiv can live with more likely in the nearest possible future 🧵 1/13 crisisgroup.org/europe-central… This isn't going to be easy. 2/13

Inspired by @scharap FT piece suggesting NATO admit it has zero plans to invite Ukraine to join, a thread of truths officials can't speak & why, focused on the current Ukraine/European security crisis. I'm forgetting stuff. I'll add, but you, too--Add your own! Argue with me! 🧵 1) the one Sam highlights: Ukraine & Georgia are nowhere near joining NATO. NATO officials can't say this because they don't want to appear to give in to Russian bullying. & also because it won't be enough--Russia wants a promise of never, not an admission of can't see how

Why escalated war in Ukraine is very possible. A thread. For more, read our briefing 1/16 crisisgroup.org/europe-central… Russia is deeply unhappy with the current security/political order in Europe. Call it insecurity, call it status, call it sour grapes. Result is the same (I call it insecurity and status, which are related, and view sour grapes as part of status) 2/16

After the Putin-Biden virtual summit, what next? In our new @CrisisGroup briefing, we lay out what has led up to the military buildup we see today, and argue that a sustainable solution is going to require a lot more talking 1/11 crisisgroup.org/europe-central… Fundamentally, we think the US approach evidenced yesterday is on the right track--make clear to Russia that the repercussions of escalated aggression will be met with a lot of things they don't want, including sanctions and a continued military buildup. 2/11

You may not like where @scharap ends up in yesterday's @politico piece, but instead of getting mad at Sam Charap, ask yourself what it would take to craft a more viable policy. politico.com/news/magazine/… 🧵1/11 He's arguing that since Western states aren't going to fight for Ukraine, and Russia clearly, evidently, will, the current path leads to another serious escalation, in which more Ukrainians (& Russians) die, followed by an even worse status quo than today's. 2/11

Thread: Reading the memorandum of the conversation between Trump and Zelenskyy, I have thoughts 1/14 Zelenskyy was well-briefed for this discussion, and his marching orders were to get on Trump’s good side. 2/14