Putin promised escalation in response to deep strikes. Will it happen and what are the risks? 🧵👇
Escalation is not automatic. Two criteria: (1) Effect of strikes on the course of the war. I.e., decision delayed until effects are clear.
OR (not and) (2) Need to ... (1/4)
... maintain credibility of earlier signal.
Complicating factor - new president in 2 months, may work either way.
In the end, possible no escalation will follow or purely symbolic.
In that case, next risk is perceived reinforcement of a very popular view that ... (2/4)
Feb 21, 2022 • 4 tweets • 1 min read
A lot of unanswered questions in Putin's speech.🧵 (1) Recognition required a simple statement that efforts by Macron and Scholz to revive the Minsk process failed and Ukraine was trying to take Donbass back by force. Why such a long speech? 1/4(2) I know the correct narrative but an intense shelling campaign by Ukraine was a solid choice: it put him in a no-win situation and choosing between bad options. Will he accept a long-term victory by Ukraine? Not impossible but... 2/4
Dec 21, 2021 • 5 tweets • 1 min read
Current crisis has deep roots. Idea after end of Cold War was common security space and joint decisions. That's why OSCE. Gradually, after 1st wave of enlargement, NATO began to make its own decisions first, more countries joined, etc. Now NATO is in effect THE decision maker.
Russia remained outside and was told it would never be member of the club. Yet NATO decisions affect it. If it is not inside the house, it can shout outside to be heard or affect some members but that was always classified (mostly by US and new members) splitting Alliance.
Dec 3, 2021 • 4 tweets • 1 min read
The thesis that NATO enlargement was not a concern to Russia until Maidan is factually incorrect. Opposition began in the 90s (1st wave) and never ceased. There were attempts to mitigate consequences but none succeeded. 1/4 nationalinterest.org/feature/russia…
E.g., Rome and NRC. The statement (nato.int/docu/comm/2002…) provided for consensus and national capacity. Promising attempt but... Getting together to accept NATO consensus is not the same as getting together to discuss future decisions first (then NATO could vote... 2/4
Nov 21, 2021 • 6 tweets • 2 min read
Great article as always and great threads by @scharap and @OlyaOliker. Worth noting same approach was used by Clinton vis Ukraine re: nuclear weapons and it worked well. Best time for Minsk 2 was 2015 - Ukraine could be more ... (1/N) politi.co/3FpZzac via @politico
...responsive. Obama missed a chance for a proactive approach (his policy on Russia overall was a disaster, really).
Nowadays much more difficult, perhaps impossible. 1st, this policy will not have support in the US: domestic politics stuck in Obama perspective. (2/N)
Feb 17, 2019 • 7 tweets • 3 min read
@russianforces@pranayrvaddi@Woolaf@baklitskiy@nukestrat Takes more than one tweet to respond, sorry for thread. 1/ If you want the other side to take your concerns seriously, you need to take its concerns seriously as well. If not, then you got conflict. ...
2/ I'm sad that so many polisci grads know prisoner's dilemma, but do not know the shadow of the future - just are not taught it. In my experience, a widespread drawback of US diplomacy - not everyone, but too many - is the "lawyers' malaise:" you win your case and ...
