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Inst for Science Profile picture
Inst for Science
@TheGoodISIS
A think tank focused on nuclear nonproliferation. Employing science in pursuit of peace since 1993. contact us: media@isis-online.org
Damon Golriz Profile picture 1 subscribed
Mar 1, 2023 • 5 tweets • 1 min read
NEW Breakout Numbers: Iran could have enough weapon-grade uranium for its first nuclear weapon (25 kg) in 12 days, using 60 percent enriched uranium stock. In another twelve days it could produce a second quantity. Adding in the use of 20 % stock leads to five within one month.1/ Our 12 days estimate is in line with the US govt estimate made public yesterday. This is the first public breakout estimate from the US in a long time and the first to acknowledge significantly less than a month. 2/
Feb 13, 2023 • 7 tweets • 3 min read
NEW: We have identified the likely location of Iran's new Narigan mine at 31.72379, 55.68888. The location is near the village of Narigan & consistent with the reported 35 km distance from Bafq. It is also 90 km south of Iran's only currently operating uranium mine at Saghand. 1/ Image The Narigan mine is just getting started. This Maxar image from Oct 23, 2022 shows mining preparations: the large spoil pile indicates substantial "overburden removal" in the area. Once mining is fully underway, ore will be moved to a segregation pad for sorting and blending. 2/ Image
Dec 2, 2021 • 59 tweets • 9 min read
A long thread covering the highlights of our new Comprehensive Survey of Iran's Advanced Centrifuges: In the last 2 yrs, Iran has accelerated its deployment of advanced centrifuges, following a lull of 3 yrs created by the JCPOA. Iran has demonstrated its commitment to replace the IR-1 centrifuge with advanced centrifuges, which can produce considerably more enriched uranium. 1/
Jun 17, 2021 • 9 tweets • 2 min read
As of about June 14, Iran had reportedly produced 6.5 kg 60% enriched (hexafluoride mass) or 4.4 kg uranium mass only. reuters.com/world/middle-e… 1/ Iran’s IR-6 production-scale cascade has produced 60% enriched uranium at an average daily rate of 0.126 kg/day since May 22, using less than 5% LEU as feed, skipping the intermediate step of producing 20% material. 2/
Jun 14, 2021 • 18 tweets • 3 min read
NEW: The International Inspectors Hold the Key to Truly Bringing Iran into Compliance with the Nuclear Deal’s Key Peaceful Pledge isis-online.org/isis-reports/d… 1/ A major goal of the Biden Administration is to sculpt a return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) where Iran comes into full compliance with the deal in exchange for lifting all U.S. nuclear sanctions. 2/
Feb 25, 2021 • 12 tweets • 3 min read
NEW: Analysis of IAEA Iran Verification and Monitoring Report isis-online.org/isis-reports/d… with @StrickerNonpro 1/ Highlights:
- Iran started to produce near 20 percent enriched uranium on January 4, 2021, in 1044 IR-1 centrifuges located at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP). 2/
Jan 11, 2021 • 15 tweets • 4 min read
NEW Institute satellite imagery analysis: Update on Natanz: Construction Progresses Towards Large-scale Tunnel Complex isis-online.org/isis-reports/d… 1/ Since our October 30, 2020, report on the construction of a new centrifuge assembly facility in the mountains near the Natanz enrichment plant, construction has progressed and tunnel entrance locations can now be identified with certainty. 2/
Jan 4, 2021 • 7 tweets • 2 min read
A few tweets in response to breakout questions now that Iran is enriching uranium to near 20 %. (Side note: The law does not require the production of 120 kg within two months, it requires an annual production of 120 kg.) 1/ We do not know how many centrifuges at Fordow are currently dedicated to 20 % enrichment, although reports are that its approximately 1000 IR-1 centrifuges in six cascades connected as tandem cascades will be used, at least initially. 2/
Aug 7, 2020 • 6 tweets • 2 min read
IMPORTANT UPDATE: 1. As we are looking further into the reporting of a possible yellowcake production facility near Al Ula, Saudi Arabia, we keep in mind lessons were learned from Syria, both Al Kibar and Marj as Sultan. 2. The former, a nuclear reactor in a nondescript box, with minimum visible security barriers; the latter, a uranium conversion facility with no outward signatures.
Jul 31, 2020 • 8 tweets • 3 min read
1. US media should not jump on the recent, false claims by Iranian news agencies on Iran's Nour-1 satellite imaging capabilities. The images circulating in Iranian media provide no basis to claim that Nour-1 has the capability to take high resolution electro-optical spy images. 2. The electro-optical images as published by Tasnim News and others were not taken by the Nour-1 satellite, but are commercially available satellite images as shown in our own analysis and others, @AuroraIntel, @inbarspace.
Mar 3, 2020 • 6 tweets • 1 min read
As of Feb 19, 2020, Iran's enriched uranium stockpile of up to 4.5 % is 1020.9 kg in uranium mass, or 1510 kg in uranium hexafluoride mass. This is up significantly from 372.3 kg uranium mass ( 550.7 kg UF6 mass) on Nov 3, 2019. However, a relatively large quantity of that amount is enriched to less than 2%. 268.5 kg uranium mass (397.2 hex mass) out of the total 1020.9 kg (1510 kg hex mass)  is enriched to less than 2 %.
Jul 10, 2019 • 12 tweets • 2 min read
NEW from @TheGoodISIS: Conversion of Fordow: Another Unfulfilled Hope of the Iran Nuclear Deal: Fordow now includes semi-indigenous nuclear equipment production

Read here: isis-online.org/isis-reports/d… Our latest report contains four key findings:

1) The Fordow uranium enrichment facility has never been repurposed, as promised in the JCPOA. Everything required to enrich uranium to weapons grade could be quickly reconstituted in the underground portion of the facility.
Apr 25, 2019 • 7 tweets • 2 min read
1. A thread on the administration's consideration of terminating or suspending waivers for civilian nuclear work at Iran's Fordow, Arak, & Bushehr sites. In short: people are blowing this way out of proportion as far as killing the deal. 2. Fordow is now revealed with certainty to have been a military enrichment facility designed to produce highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons. Iran should be required to shut it down. isis-online.org/isis-reports/d…
Nov 14, 2018 • 7 tweets • 2 min read
"Albright, who has gone to Tel Aviv several times to comb through the archive—most recently two weeks ago—says he is certain the information, which has also been verified by the U.S. government, is authentic." Albright: “The archive is littered with new stuff about the Iranian nuclear weapons program...It’s unbelievable how much is in there.” One of his key conclusions from studying the documents was that the Iranians “were further along than Western intelligence agencies realized.”
Oct 29, 2018 • 22 tweets • 3 min read
Documents we have analyzed from Iran's nuclear archive indicate that rather than halting its nuclear weaponization work in 2003, Iran was carrying out an elaborate effort to break the AMAD program into covert and overt parts. 1) The overt parts would be centered at research institutes and universities, and any effort that could not be plausibly denied as civilian in nature was left as a covert activity. 2)
Oct 23, 2018 • 21 tweets • 3 min read
We have obtained a set of documents and photos from the atomic archive in Iran which provides the public its first look inside the Parchin nuclear weapons development facility and at the type of nuclear weapons related activities that took place at the site. 1) This report, in particular, for the first time publicly correlates photos from inside the main building, called Taleghan 1 by Iran, to satellite imagery. 2)
Jun 12, 2018 • 20 tweets • 3 min read
Statement on the Singapore Summit: Key pledge in the written statement promises to work toward denuclearization, yet it does not include concrete commitments or arrangements to do so. This discrepancy requires clarification.

See: isis-online.org/isis-reports/d… 1. President Trump consistently stated that North Korea has committed to denuclearize and will do so expeditiously.
May 22, 2018 • 5 tweets • 1 min read
Comments on Trump/Moon presser:

1. Shows that Trump seems informed and knowledgeable about the facets of the proposed negotiation, despite criticisms.

realclearpolitics.com/video/2018/05/… 2. His point that denuclearization should occur rapidly, if at all, makes sense given North Korea's penchant (and historically the United States,' truth be told) of waffling on commitments with large amounts of time in between steps).
May 14, 2018 • 6 tweets • 3 min read
Thread: Here's something: That hit piece on @FDD and @mdubowitz? Well ALL THREE of the critics of Mr. Dubowitz quoted in that article are funded by @plough_shares to the tune of 385K a year. No disclosure of that fact. What gives @nytimes @GardinerHarris? First up we have Barbara Slavin, director of the Future of Iran Initiative at Atlantic Council, at 75K for 2017.
May 1, 2018 • 21 tweets • 3 min read
*New thread* Is Iran violating its agreements? What new information has been revealed in the Iranian atomic archive? Do these revelations show that Iran has violated its agreements? Perhaps so, but this needs more study by US and allied governments. 1/
Apr 30, 2018 • 12 tweets • 2 min read
*Thread* Based on a background briefing, there is much new information about Iran's nuclear weapons program in this massive set of information obtained by Israel; they were even surprised by size and scope of Iran's nuclear weapons program. 1/ They obtained tens of thousands of pages of printed documents and handwritten notes and 150 gigabytes of data. 2/