NEW DEEP DIVE: Taleghan 2: Pre- and Post Strike Assessment – Everything there is to know about the building Israel attacked and its nuclear weapons connection, with plenty of imagery analysis



1/ isis-online.org/isis-reports/d… The Institute was able to confirm with a Western government that there is evidence that nuclear weapons related activities recently took place at Taleghan 2. Based on @Axios reporting and the Institute’s understanding, it appears likely that Taleghan 2 contained equipment to make high purity PETN plastic explosives. 2/

NEW IMAGERY UPDATE: Rapid cleanup underway at Iran’s attacked site at Parchin Military Complex, including Taleghan 2 site, former Amad site but also associated with nuclear-related equipment and/or activities recently. Within ten days after the attack, Iran covered the demolished building with a makeshift structure and erected a visual security screen to shield the immediate area from outside views. 1/ Very interesting in light of reporting that nuclear weapons related equipment was present at Taleghan 2 recently: The solid visual security screen supported by a wire frame shields the demolished building and the possibly sensitive equipment debris pile from being viewed by anyone passing by or involved in cleanup activities outside the immediate area (overhead observation excluded, but that is limited to the top layer of the pile and available imagery not of sufficient resolution to pick out details) 2/

NEW INSTITUTE REPORT: The Islamic Republic’s Work on Pharmaceutical Based Agents

(Just in time for this week’s @OPCW meeting, #CSP29)

1/isis-online.org/isis-reports/d… @OPCW The rise of the widespread use of easy-to-operate drones in the Middle East has increased the risk of Iran or its proxies using lethal and incapacitating pharmaceutical-based agents (PBAs), particularly fentanyl and medetomidine. 2/

NEW Breakout Numbers: Iran could have enough weapon-grade uranium for its first nuclear weapon (25 kg) in 12 days, using 60 percent enriched uranium stock. In another twelve days it could produce a second quantity. Adding in the use of 20 % stock leads to five within one month.1/ Our 12 days estimate is in line with the US govt estimate made public yesterday. This is the first public breakout estimate from the US in a long time and the first to acknowledge significantly less than a month. 2/

NEW: We have identified the likely location of Iran's new Narigan mine at 31.72379, 55.68888. The location is near the village of Narigan & consistent with the reported 35 km distance from Bafq. It is also 90 km south of Iran's only currently operating uranium mine at Saghand. 1/ The Narigan mine is just getting started. This Maxar image from Oct 23, 2022 shows mining preparations: the large spoil pile indicates substantial "overburden removal" in the area. Once mining is fully underway, ore will be moved to a segregation pad for sorting and blending. 2/

A long thread covering the highlights of our new Comprehensive Survey of Iran's Advanced Centrifuges: In the last 2 yrs, Iran has accelerated its deployment of advanced centrifuges, following a lull of 3 yrs created by the JCPOA. Iran has demonstrated its commitment to replace the IR-1 centrifuge with advanced centrifuges, which can produce considerably more enriched uranium. 1/

As of about June 14, Iran had reportedly produced 6.5 kg 60% enriched (hexafluoride mass) or 4.4 kg uranium mass only. reuters.com/world/middle-e… 1/ Iran’s IR-6 production-scale cascade has produced 60% enriched uranium at an average daily rate of 0.126 kg/day since May 22, using less than 5% LEU as feed, skipping the intermediate step of producing 20% material. 2/

NEW: The International Inspectors Hold the Key to Truly Bringing Iran into Compliance with the Nuclear Deal’s Key Peaceful Pledge isis-online.org/isis-reports/d… 1/ A major goal of the Biden Administration is to sculpt a return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) where Iran comes into full compliance with the deal in exchange for lifting all U.S. nuclear sanctions. 2/

NEW: Analysis of IAEA Iran Verification and Monitoring Report isis-online.org/isis-reports/d… with @StrickerNonpro 1/ Highlights:
- Iran started to produce near 20 percent enriched uranium on January 4, 2021, in 1044 IR-1 centrifuges located at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP). 2/

NEW Institute satellite imagery analysis: Update on Natanz: Construction Progresses Towards Large-scale Tunnel Complex isis-online.org/isis-reports/d… 1/ Since our October 30, 2020, report on the construction of a new centrifuge assembly facility in the mountains near the Natanz enrichment plant, construction has progressed and tunnel entrance locations can now be identified with certainty. 2/

A few tweets in response to breakout questions now that Iran is enriching uranium to near 20 %. (Side note: The law does not require the production of 120 kg within two months, it requires an annual production of 120 kg.) 1/ We do not know how many centrifuges at Fordow are currently dedicated to 20 % enrichment, although reports are that its approximately 1000 IR-1 centrifuges in six cascades connected as tandem cascades will be used, at least initially. 2/

IMPORTANT UPDATE: 1. As we are looking further into the reporting of a possible yellowcake production facility near Al Ula, Saudi Arabia, we keep in mind lessons were learned from Syria, both Al Kibar and Marj as Sultan. 2. The former, a nuclear reactor in a nondescript box, with minimum visible security barriers; the latter, a uranium conversion facility with no outward signatures.

1. US media should not jump on the recent, false claims by Iranian news agencies on Iran's Nour-1 satellite imaging capabilities. The images circulating in Iranian media provide no basis to claim that Nour-1 has the capability to take high resolution electro-optical spy images. 2. The electro-optical images as published by Tasnim News and others were not taken by the Nour-1 satellite, but are commercially available satellite images as shown in our own analysis and others, @AuroraIntel, @inbarspace.

As of Feb 19, 2020, Iran's enriched uranium stockpile of up to 4.5 % is 1020.9 kg in uranium mass, or 1510 kg in uranium hexafluoride mass. This is up significantly from 372.3 kg uranium mass ( 550.7 kg UF6 mass) on Nov 3, 2019. However, a relatively large quantity of that amount is enriched to less than 2%. 268.5 kg uranium mass (397.2 hex mass) out of the total 1020.9 kg (1510 kg hex mass)  is enriched to less than 2 %.

NEW from @TheGoodISIS: Conversion of Fordow: Another Unfulfilled Hope of the Iran Nuclear Deal: Fordow now includes semi-indigenous nuclear equipment production

Read here: isis-online.org/isis-reports/d… Our latest report contains four key findings:

1) The Fordow uranium enrichment facility has never been repurposed, as promised in the JCPOA. Everything required to enrich uranium to weapons grade could be quickly reconstituted in the underground portion of the facility.

1. A thread on the administration's consideration of terminating or suspending waivers for civilian nuclear work at Iran's Fordow, Arak, & Bushehr sites. In short: people are blowing this way out of proportion as far as killing the deal.

https://twitter.com/AlMonitor/status/1121163151691542528

2. Fordow is now revealed with certainty to have been a military enrichment facility designed to produce highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons. Iran should be required to shut it down. isis-online.org/isis-reports/d…

"Albright, who has gone to Tel Aviv several times to comb through the archive—most recently two weeks ago—says he is certain the information, which has also been verified by the U.S. government, is authentic."

https://twitter.com/TheGoodISIS/status/1062726946583265280

Albright: “The archive is littered with new stuff about the Iranian nuclear weapons program...It’s unbelievable how much is in there.” One of his key conclusions from studying the documents was that the Iranians “were further along than Western intelligence agencies realized.”

Documents we have analyzed from Iran's nuclear archive indicate that rather than halting its nuclear weaponization work in 2003, Iran was carrying out an elaborate effort to break the AMAD program into covert and overt parts. 1)

https://twitter.com/TheGoodISIS/status/1056964052495228929

The overt parts would be centered at research institutes and universities, and any effort that could not be plausibly denied as civilian in nature was left as a covert activity. 2)

We have obtained a set of documents and photos from the atomic archive in Iran which provides the public its first look inside the Parchin nuclear weapons development facility and at the type of nuclear weapons related activities that took place at the site. 1)

https://twitter.com/TheGoodISIS/status/1054785360109150210

This report, in particular, for the first time publicly correlates photos from inside the main building, called Taleghan 1 by Iran, to satellite imagery. 2)

Statement on the Singapore Summit: Key pledge in the written statement promises to work toward denuclearization, yet it does not include concrete commitments or arrangements to do so. This discrepancy requires clarification.

See: isis-online.org/isis-reports/d… 1. President Trump consistently stated that North Korea has committed to denuclearize and will do so expeditiously.

Comments on Trump/Moon presser:

1. Shows that Trump seems informed and knowledgeable about the facets of the proposed negotiation, despite criticisms.

realclearpolitics.com/video/2018/05/… 2. His point that denuclearization should occur rapidly, if at all, makes sense given North Korea's penchant (and historically the United States,' truth be told) of waffling on commitments with large amounts of time in between steps).