NatSec, memes, and NatSec memes. Simulation theory enjoyer and military balloon enthusiast. Views/memes are my own
Apr 8, 2023 • 4 tweets • 1 min read
Thing is that an invasion of Taiwan would inherently lead to immense economic disruption for China (which the article notes) regardless of the sanctions regime. If that's baked in, I'm skeptical that the threat of some sanctions on top will be much of a deterrent.
In other words, if Beijing decides to invade Taiwan it means they're willing to stomach an extraordinary amount of economic pain. I doubt we can add enough additional pain to change their calculus if indeed they come to that decision.
Mar 7, 2023 • 4 tweets • 2 min read
@LouisMVezian Well as said I wouldn't have much a problem with it if the ROC spent way, way more on defense. But with the budget they have now they need to make hard choices and heavily prioritize asymmetry because that's what they need against the truly existential threat.
@LouisMVezian If Canada was stronger than the US and was claiming it as its rightful territory, it wouldn't make a ton of sense for the US to be buying LPDs for the defense of Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands.
Mar 7, 2023 • 5 tweets • 2 min read
Peacetime resupply could be done with smaller LST/LCU-type transports at much lower cost. The critique of Yushan isn't that the ROCN doesn't need amphibious transports, it's that an LPD isn't a very cost-effective way of meeting their needs compared to alternatives. 1/5
In fact, the US Army recently tried to auction off a couple of its General Frank S. Besson-class LSVs and they originally were built for $26 million to give you an idea of cost. ROCN could've put in an offer or built similar craft domestically. 2/5 thedrive.com/the-war-zone/2…
Feb 23, 2023 • 16 tweets • 5 min read
Very interesting report from @StaciePettyjohn and @hannahddennis examining escalation in a Taiwan war. The most eye-opening takeaway for me is that China will have more options for graduated nuclear use than the US. 🧵 1/16 s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org…
China could employ low-yield nukes against a number of critical US military targets that are on allied or noncontiguous US territory (Guam being the notable example). In contrast, most key PLA targets are on the mainland so nuking them would be a bigger escalation. 2/16
Feb 4, 2023 • 10 tweets • 3 min read
Thread on the downing of the Chinese spy balloon 1/10
First off the bat, it took the USAF much less time to shoot it down than I had anticipated. Y'all have probably seen me share the story of when it took six days for CF-18s to down a weather balloon. What explains the discrepancy? 2/10
Feb 3, 2023 • 4 tweets • 1 min read
To everyone saying "shoot it down" it's a lot harder than it sounds.
One thing I left out in the original thread is that balloons are so slow it's hard to distinguish them from chaff that modern SAMs are designed to ignore. It's a problem made worse if they actually carry chaff.
Nov 17, 2022 • 4 tweets • 1 min read
I'm not against more capacity but do you have to fund it by cutting R&D? If you want an additional $45 billion a year for procurement I can think of better ways than slashing the R&D budget by about a third. warontherocks.com/2022/11/the-bi…
I'm also not sold on the idea that there's such thing as a "healthy" R&D-Procurement ratio. The 1980s was a very different context. The Soviets had pretty much no chance of reaching tech parity by that point, China is a different beast. Also things cyber warfare didn't exist.
Oct 18, 2022 • 21 tweets • 5 min read
It's important to update your analysis as new information arises and the recent chip ban has made me to rethink parts of my previous thread on the Davidson Window. While I'm not totally convinced yet, I think that the ban *could* affect China's timeline WRT Taiwan.🧵 1/21
Part of my skepticism of the Davidson Window was based on the PLA's heavy emphasis on emerging tech. My reasoning was twofold: first, if you plan to move by 2027 it doesn't make sense to pour money into capabilities that won't mature til the 2030s at the earliest. 2/21
Sep 16, 2022 • 12 tweets • 3 min read
My thoughts on the Davidson Window are well-documented but leaving that aside I think this article presents an overly tech-centric approach to dealing with near-term risk. 🧵1/12
Don't get me wrong, tech is important and I think AI will have a huge impact on warfare. And I agree with Flournoy/Brown that DoD needs to be faster when it comes to fielding new tech. But I'm skeptical that the AI/autonomous systems they talk about will be ready by 2027. 2/12
Sep 15, 2022 • 14 tweets • 4 min read
Ok I know this is supposed to be comedic but it also makes some serious (and IMO misleading) points so I think it warrants a serious response.🧵 1/14
First, there's the 700,000 troop figure. I can't find any serious source that argues for this as the requisite number so I don't know where it's coming from. The active-duty ROC military is only 165,000-strong so an invasion force of 500,000 would achieve a 3-1 ratio. 2/14
Jul 6, 2022 • 10 tweets • 3 min read
I'm not sure people realize how big of a deal this is. High-altitude balloons might not be as sexy as autonomous weapons or hypersonics but I think they have the potential to be just as revolutionary for warfare, if not more so. 🧵 1/10
Balloons can basically do everything satellites do but better. No rocket launch means lower cost. Closer proximity gets better performance from sensors and comms. They can offer persistence measured in months. It's like a GEO satellite at lower altitude. 2/10
