Analyst @SCEEUS_UI @UISweden: https://t.co/IkOoexfbTM. Docent @NaUKMA. Editing @ibidem11 book series SPPS & Ukrainian Voices https://t.co/aevC6lICqu
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@SCEEUS_UI @UISweden @DUF_Forum @IDMVienna @RusVerstehen @TerekMedia @Konflikt_Sicher @Osteuropakanal @DGO_Berlin @swud_org @pw_portal @GSPSipo Putins Darstellung der #Großinvasion der Ukraine im Februar 2022 als provoziert durch westliche Pläne und Aktivitäten zum Angriff auf #Russland richtete sich sowohl an das heimische als auch an das ausländische Publikum... /2
PS: "#CentralEurasianStudies" seems to be ok if it denotes #CentralAsia, which can be seen to be in the center of both Asia and Eurasia, understood as continents rather than cultural realms.
@SWagenknecht @_AliceSchwarzer Aber stolz kann Deutschland auf die weit ins politische Zentrum reichende Unterstützung solcher Briefe nicht sein. Man hätte meinen sollen, dass gerade die deutschen Intellektuellen mehr aus dem 20. - sozusagen "unserem" - Jahrhundert gelernt haben.... /2
@Konflikt_Sicher @GSPSipo @EPC_CPE_News @UA_22_Ukraine @H__Ukraine @StimmeUkraine @DUF_Forum @CPD_UA @worldoftanks @AugenGeradeaus These vehicles - more so than most other conventional military technology - were once built and commissioned for a potential fight against Moscow's #imperialism in #Europe - rather than for usage against other potential enemies or for peace-keeping missions around the world. /2
@DUHK_2020 @DGO_Berlin @dgapev @Konflikt_Sicher @FiS_Heidelberg @VitscheBerlin @StimmeUkraine @GermanyinUA @UKRinDEU @DUF_Forum @DerDuod @GERonOstpolitik @VHDtweets ...with its long-lasting energy and modernization partnerships with Putin's regime. To permit other Europeans to give their German tanks to Ukraine is the least what Berlin can, in view of such responsibility, do today for Kyiv. /END
The purpose of #Ukrainian #battletanks, #fighterplanes, long-range #missiles, etc. is to make Russia's #defeats humiliating. Only disasters on the #battlefield in Ukraine and frequent hits against supply lines within #Russia will make many #Russians rethink... /2
@SCEEUS_UI @DUF_Forum @crimeaplatform @Konflikt_Sicher @DGO_Berlin @DerDuod @GSPSipo @TerekMedia @StimmeUkraine @UkraineworldD @ukrainian_week @DUHK_2020 @VitscheBerlin @FiS_Heidelberg @krus_stern Es wird womöglich weiteren Beschuss von Militäranlagen - insbesondere Flugplätze, die #Kertschbrücke und Raketenbasen - geben. Jedoch scheint mir eine Landoffensive auf die #Krim zunächst unwahrscheinlich.... /2
The March 2022 decision by #NATO to reject #Ukraine's request for a #NoFlyZone was taken quickly & resolutely. However, deeper repercussions of this seemingly clear-cut case have remained under the radar screen. What Kyiv wanted was not NATO's active participation in the war. /2
@SWagenknecht @FansMearsheimer @Konflikt_Sicher @WeLoveNATO @UkraineToNato @TerekMedia @GSPSipo @FiS_Heidelberg @prarmyua @PromoteUkraine @DAGATAGermany @LiberaleModerne Once #Finland enters @NATO, the length of the border between the Western alliance and #Russia will approximately double. #NATO will be able to attack #Putin's hometown St. Petersburg from two sides, from Finland approx. 170 km away and from #Estonia approx. 140 km away. /2
Victories in #Moldova, #Chechnia, Georgia, #Crimea, Syria, and the Donbas did not satisfy Russia. They triggered appetite for more victories. If #Russia is provided with another victory, this will not bring peace but merely provide time to prepare for achieving more victories. /2
One could imagine direct high speed @Ukrzaliznytsia trains from @rzeszow_airport & other EU airports near Ukraine's western border to Kyiv or even further east, and with direct flights to these airports from Berlin, Brussels, London, Paris, Stockholm, New York, Toronto, etc. /2
...which, in Resolution No. ES-11/1 dated 2 March 2022, as adopted by majority vote (141 votes for, 5 against, 35 abstentions, 12 absent) deplores in the strongest terms the #aggression by the #RussianFederation against #Ukraine.../2