Navalny stood out among the Russian opposition for being a political animal. He was interested in power, agency, change - not merely moral condemnation of the Putin regime.

A thread 1/13 Navalny had a remarkable capacity to feel free, no matter what physical restrictions were put on his liberty. This sense of freedom endowed him with an historically rare kind of courage. 2/13

A flop for both Carlson and Putin. Or a limited success: a destructively productive concept poorly executed.

I will analyse Putin's part. 1/8 Narratively, the 2 hours had 3 parts. (1) A half hour long history lecture by Putin (2) an hour on how Putin is a victim of the West - which has tricked him over and over and (3) a half hour on how mistreating Russia hurts the West. 2/8

There is much debate between experts on the prospects of a NATO-Russia conflict a few years from now.

I want to make three points about how we might understand this debate.

1/8 (1) Putting military issues aside, disagreement among experts re a future Rus/NATO conflict is mostly disagreement about how constitutively linked war and regime security are for the Putin regime.

2/8

Imagine that my house is on fire. I take action! But instead of putting the fire out, or calling the fire-brigade, I lean out of the window and declare my right to freedom from fire'.

Eventually, I do call the fire brigade and try to put the fire out - but . . . 1/5 ... I consider these actions secondary to my declaration of 'freedom from fire'.

The next day, you see me and my neighbours marching down the street, holding a placard: 'say no to fire'.

I also put 'say no to fire' in my Twitter bio, and tweet outrage at those who haven't. 2/5

My reaction to the recent Spectator interview with the radical geopolitical activist and mock-spiritualist Dugin.

Spoiler alert: criticism of the article is fair.

But first, who is Dugin, and what does he think of Putin, and vice versa?

1/20 For Dugin, Putin has some of the right form but none of the right content. Putin's politics is about Putin, Dugin thinks, but not about what Russia truly needs.

However, Dugin thinks Putin is necessary.

2/20

Putin’s regime will collapse in the long run; he won’t be a beneficiary of the global changes he has unleashed. But in 2023, he had a good year. Thread. 1/6 In 2023, Putin successfully redefined his global war as a local war for the world's consumption. His aims remain global - propelled by regime security and a mystical vision of overturning whatever is left of the International order. 2/6

Putin's war messaging to Russians, and the West's illusions about stopping the war.

Very quick thread. 1/7 At the turn of the year, Putin's message to Russians is:

(1) We are in a forever war with the West, with Russia's survival at stake

(2) There is no war, get on with your lives please

2/7

In his 4 hour long 'Direct-Line' slash press conference,
Putin set out a "minimum effective dose" approach to the 2024 'election'. He knows it's a necessary legitimation ritual, but he can't bring himself to strain over it.

Thread. 1/12 Putin didn't want to be there. He finds his predicament not critical but exhausting. He is not worried about keeping the show on the road, but he is worried that it all now takes double the mental labour, since February 2022.

2/x

Dear chronic illness community, I want to talk to you about dance!

I know I know. You are thinking, many chronically ill people are too sick to take a shower or read a book. They can no more dance than go to the moon!

Let me explain.

1/18

#pwME #chronicillness Yes, chronically ill people usually can't dance.

Moreover, systemic exercise intolerance is a central feature of a condition like myalgic encephalomyelitis. Deterioration from exertion often takes a long time to recover from, and sometimes, can do permanent damage.

2/18

Understanding #LongCovid needn’t be complex. Quick thread.

Think of it not as ‘struggling to recover from Covid’ but as a syndromic illness triggered by Covid. By implication, a mild Covid infection can trigger life-altering Long Covid in some of the population.

1/10 At this point we can lean on 30 years of scientific literature on ME, formerly called CFS. It teaches us 77 things which apply to #LongCovid. Here are four of them.

2/10

It's 1 year since the death of Gorbachev. In his own historical context, he was an example of ethical adequacy in high power.

His project was always doomed - he tried to reform a system that was unreformable. But he was tested by vast historical forces and came through.

1/8 Gorbachev had blood on his hands, but he let the USSR break up without massive violence; he gave his citizens more freedom; he worked with Western leaders to end the Cold War. And he didn't try to exchange departure for security.

2/8

Navalny - or rather his Twitter profile - has produced a thread calling Girkin a "political prisoner".

Here are my quick thoughts on why his account has said this, and what we should make of it.

First, what did "Navalny" actually say?

1/7 He said that Girkin has been legitimately sentenced by a Dutch court, but is illegitimately arrested in Russia, making him "a political prisoner".

Acknowledging the Dutch verdict, Navalny adds that an investigation should be conducted in Russia too. Why is he saying this?

2/7

My thoughts on Western commitment to Ukraine, in light of the NATO summit, and the future of Putin's escalation against the West.

A short thread. 0/6 1/ Putin's sense that he can keep Ukraine out of NATO by keeping the war going is reinforced.

Even if Putin loses Crimea (and survives), he won't stop firing on 🇺🇦territory. His conception of regime security equals war & a wide escalation against the West later in the decade.

In my capacity as a moral philosopher -

The Q isn't whether it is just or morally unambiguous for the US to send cluster munitians to Ukraine. The Q is whether it is military necessary - and whether that necessity outweighs all other political considerations.

A thread. 1/12 First, let's look at what the question is not.

The Q is not whether Ukraine should use cluster munitions - it is whether the USA should give Ukraine cluster munitions (Ukraine has already used some).

2/12

I'm often asked, when did post-truth politics begin in the West?

I usually answer: Iraq. Here's a little story to illustrate my answer.

Shortly before the war, in 2003, I had a meeting with a UK cabinet minister, to make the case against invading.

1/12 The meeting lasted 40 minutes and there were two others present. During that time, the minister made two incompatible arguments for the war.

2/12

Putin's speech reveals weakness and new possibilities for the politicisation of the Russian space.

We shouldn't exaggerate the crack in Putin's aura of legitimacy, but it is there, it is irreversible, and he feels it himself.

Thread 1/6 Putin feels incandescent rage at Prigozhin, and that came through again. Betrayal is the higher moral crime for him, and images of political betrayal are for Putin traumatic.

Putin spoke as though Prizoghin's march presented an existential threat to his life.

2/6

Prigozhin. A fake, Kremlin-controlled revolutionary turned real one?

Let's try to get to the bottom of this - I will write at a mile a minute so this won't be a well organised thread.

1/x Some wider context - it is extraordinary, that Putin let Prigozhin raid the penal colonies for tens of thousands of men. An act of necessitated faith more apt for a scenario of not war but civil war.

2/x

Good piece by @sarahmanavis on Russell Brand's algorithmic self-propulsion.

But there's more going on here. Grasping this issue is crucial for protecting our democracies.

A quick thread based on my experiences as a political philosopher on YouTube.

1/17

https://twitter.com/arusbridger/status/1669725053015973894

There are actually 2 things intersecting here.

(1) a crisis of trust in public institutions and the doubt that anything is really true, and (2) algorithm-mediated audience capture.

2/17

Boris Johnson is evicted from parliamentary politics, for now. But the populist challenge to Western democracies will only grow.

Our institutions will struggle to quarantine populist leaders who are out to break the democratic game.

We need to wake up.

1/16 Democracy can be thought of as having two senses, a substantive sense, and an everyday sense.

The substantive sense takes democracy as a purposive goal we move toward.

The everyday sense of democracy means: free elections, courts that work, a free press, and so on.

2/16

My brief thoughts on Kakhovka - a thread.

It's hard to measure the human cost of this. Today our thoughts are with the most vulnerable, ill, disabled, elderly - but the human and ecological consequences will ripple for years.

1/6 There is also indication of Russian troops obstructing evacuation.

It's worth noting that the origins of the dam are themselves a destructive expression of the Soviet project of subjugating nature.

2/6

Unprecedented drone attacks on Moscow. A quick Twitter take from me - there will be a YouTube commentary tonight.

First, the big picture - 1/x In the months to come, the war will increasingly migrate onto Russian soil.

Taking the war onto Russian soil is Ukraine's goal. Ukraine will do this with any weaponry they can muster.

Sometimes, the aim will be military, sometimes psychological and political.

2/x