I just read the Trump administration's National Security Strategy. Five initial thoughts:

1) Where's the geographic focus? A little all over the place...
- Western Hem is discussed first
- Europe gets the most mentions
- Asia gets the most pages, but nearly all about China
2) Language on allies is a big shift:
- Allies are depicted as a means to an end
- Days of "propping up the entire world order like Atlas are over"
- Allies must "assume primary responsibility for their regions"

After 14 years, I think the time has come to acknowledge that the "Rebalance to Asia" has failed.

I've spent the last decade writing and thinking about how to make the rebalance successful, so this is a painful realization.

A thread on my new piece for @RSIS_NTU 🧵 When it was announced, the rebalance included 3 pillars across 4 sub-regions:

Pillars:
- Security
- Prosperity
- Good Governance

Sub-Regions:
- Northeast Asia
- Southeast Asia
- South Asia
- Oceania/Pacific Islands

I have a new piece out from @RSIS_NTU on the Trump administration's approach to Asia.

This draws on SecDef Pete Hegseth's trip to the region, where he gave the administration's first major speech on its Asia strategy.

A quick thread... Overall SecDef exceeded expectations by giving a speech that was more traditional than revolutionary.

Portions of the speech were oriented toward an audience of one in the White House rather than millions in Southeast Asia.

But the speech was still seen as generally reassuring

SecDef Pete Hegseth is about to speak here at the Shangri-La Dialogue @IISS in Singapore.

This is his first major speech in the region, so will be watched closely. I’m going to live tweet it. Here we go… A successful SLD usually requires three things:
1) A reassuring speech
2) Thoughtful Q&A responses
3) Productive bilateral meetings

It pains me to write this, but I'm worried about the new AUKUS plan.

I have been very impressed by recent U.S. progress with Japan, Philippines, and Pacific Islands.

But I think this plan has several design flaws. A short thread explaining my concerns... Let me be clear: I am a card carrying AUKUS supporter.
- In 2013, I argued that we should help Australia get nuclear-powered submarines
- In 2016, I wrote that we should deploy Virginia-class subs to Perth

So I'm fully on board with the basic logic of AUKUS...

In a new report, I argue that the nature of alignment in Asia in changing. The era of coalitions is upon us.

3 big shifts:
unipolarity ➡️ multipolarity
alliances ➡️ alignments
multilateralism ➡️ minilateralism

A thread on my @ISEAS essay, their new poll, and the implications... (2/8) Whereas a decade ago many countries looked to the United States for security and China for economic growth, neither appears to be a sure bet today.

The new @ISEAS poll shows that experts in Southeast Asia think China and the U.S. are BOTH declining in terms of leadership.

What is the logic behind America’s China strategy?

In a new article, the fantastic @EmilyYoungCarr and I analyze four different schools of thought:
1) Responsible Stakeholder
2) Communist Collapse
3) Constructive Cooperation
4) Managed Competition

A short 🧵 on our findings... We argue that these four logics vary along two dimensions:

1) Orientation: Whether US leaders seek an END STATE or STEADY STATE

2) Aspiration: Whether US leaders aim to INTEGRATE China into the international order or MITIGATE the consequences of its rise [2/7]

President Yoon wants South Korea to be a "global pivotal state" but Seoul is under-institutionalized on the global stage.

In a new article, I look at the disconnect between South Korea's new focus and the constraints on the format of its engagement. A short thread... (1/4) The U.S. and South Korea are increasingly aligned in their desire to cooperate together off the Peninsula.

But the format of that cooperation poses a challenge. South Korea is the only G20 treaty ally of the United States that is not part of the G7 or Quad. (2/4)

The White House just released the first U.S. strategy for the Pacific Islands!

This is a good move. For too long the United States has under-invested in the Pacific.

So what does the strategy get right and wrong? Here's a🧵with a few initial thoughts... 1) The strategy focuses on the region's top issues
- This includes climate, education, health, fisheries
- The main audience is the Pacific, not Washington
- The US has to listen more to Pacific Islanders
- So the focus on partnership hits the right initial note

For the fourth time in just over a year, Joe Biden has made a statement that appears to recalibrate US policy on Taiwan.

What should we make of this? My five key points...

aei.org/foreign-and-de… 1) Presidential statements create policy:
- The administration says US policy hasn't changed, since US policy is still to maintain the status quo
- The US objective may not have changed, but Biden is changing the strategy
- Biden’s advisors can't ignore this reality forever

I have two pieces today on Pelosi's possible visit to Taiwan.

In the @nytimes, @BonnieGlaser and I argue Pelosi's trip is not advisable at this time. We worry it could precipitate a crisis and put Taiwan in a difficult position. High risk, low reward. 1/8
nytimes.com/2022/07/28/opi… I've also got a short piece @AEI presenting the strategic case against the visit. In other words, even if you think crises are inevitable, is this the crisis you'd want from a strategic standpoint? I don't think so.

Let me lay out the case... 2/8

aei.org/foreign-and-de…

Great new polling data from @LowyInstitute and @natashaskassam!

The Biden team is focused on shaping regional choices, so regional polls serve as a rough report card.

In that light, there are some trends in Australia that should concern Americans. Let me highlight a couple... 1) First, some good news for Washington: Australian views of China and the United States remain markedly different than they were 5 years ago.

As worries have risen about the threat from China, Aussies have placed more importance on the United States.

Is the U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity on Taiwan dead? No. But I think it is on life support. Here's why:

The question now is whether the United States can maintain a policy that its leaders don't follow.

A quick 🧵 (1/6) President Trump was apparently quite clear in 2019:

"Taiwan is like two feet from China... We are eight thousand miles away. If they invade, there isn’t a f*cking thing we can do about it." (2/6)

vice.com/en/article/n7v…

This is a critical moment for U.S.-China relations.
In recent years there has been a debate about the degree to which the United States can shape China’s major strategic decisions.
I think that debate may be nearing its end. 🧵 1/9 For many years, U.S. policy was premised on the goal of convincing China to become a “responsible stakeholder” – to “work with us to sustain the international system that has enabled its success.”
ncuscr.org/wp-content/upl…

Much scholarly attention is focused (rightly) on what can be done to end Russia's war on Ukraine.

But the invasion and its aftermath also create many puzzles for scholars. A short thread with 10 of the puzzles I'm thinking about...🧵 This semester my graduate students @PrincetonSPIA have been thinking about puzzles related to power, coercion, signaling, perception, and alignment.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine has highlighted puzzles in each area. These will be the foundation for a great deal of research.

What should observers make of the Biden administration’s new Indo-Pacific Strategy?

In @WarOnTheRocks, I argue that the words sound good, but Asian observers are looking for actions. Washington too often says one thing and does another.

A short 🧵…

warontherocks.com/2022/02/words-… The United States has been promising to pivot (or rebalance) to Asia for the last decade.

This engagement is welcomed by most in the region, but there’s a widely shared view that the United States hasn’t delivered on its many promises.

foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/…

The United States and China got their "report cards" from Southeast Asia this week via @ISEAS's 2021 Survey.

This should be required reading for anyone focused on dynamics in Asia. How did we do? Let's take a look...

iseas.edu.sg/frontpage-feat… According to Southeast Asian experts, China remains the region's most influential political and economical power.

But observers say that China's political and economic influence both declined in the last year.

The White House just declassified its Asia strategy (or "framework"). Let's talk about the details. A thread:

1) In my view, the initial framing is wrong. The strategy aims "to maintain U.S. strategic primacy in the Indo-Pacific." But is primacy realistic? Or sensible? 2) Human rights and democracy are low priorities. The strategy explicitly seeks "primacy in the region while protecting American core values and liberties AT HOME."

Obviously, Trump did not protect our values at home. But why did they not aim to uphold key principles abroad?

What's ahead for Biden in Asia? Here's my take for @LowyInstitute.

Let's go back to the future... In 2016, Biden told an Asian audience: "The better angels in America will prevail." Now it is time to deliver.

Six points drawing on data from Asia: (1/8)
lowyinstitute.org/the-interprete… The Biden team will have to counter continuing questions about US commitment and credibility.

Many in Asia believe that American engagement and influence is declining. In particular, they worry that Washington is looking inward and increasingly adopting America First logic.

My new piece @WarOnTheRocks analyzes the White House's China strategy.

I've heard five critiques:
1) Too confrontation for admin critics
2) Too restrained for CCP critics
3) Too transactional for allies
4) Too values-based for Trump
5) Too late to matter

warontherocks.com/2020/06/five-c… I want to begin by acknowledging that this is a carefully crafted strategy. It deserves serious debate.

Unfortunately, the administration remains "badly fractured intellectually" on China policy. The authors were saddled with several basic contradictions.
whitehouse.gov/wp-content/upl…

There’s some must read polling data for Asia watchers just out from @ISEAS (h/t @lindseywford). Here are 8 points that caught my eye… (1/9)

iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/The… First, some good news: More Southeast Asian experts think the Indo-Pacific is a viable concept for regional order this year than last (28% in 2020 vs 17% in 2019). In this regard, the administration has made progress in the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, and Indonesia. (2/9)