Ok, the book is finally available (after numerous logistical delays since August). So here’s a thread about its main thesis. The central puzzle is tries to solve is why late imperial Chinese taxation (specifically, Qing taxation) was so unbelievably low. 1 amazon.com/Ideological-Fo… The put this in perspective, here are some rough numbers: most early modern European states taxed some 7 to 10 percent of their GDP, Asiatic empires (including previous chinese dynasties) usually 5 percent or so, England and Japan around 20. The Qing fell below 1-2 percent in the… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…

Some China-related predictions for 2023: 1. (Moderate confidence) The economy will grow more than 5 percent year on year, but none of the underlying structural problems (demographics, housing bubble, local government debt, relatively low consumption) will significantly improve. 2. (Moderate confidence) The central government will have to engage in considerable monetary loosening, which means that the RMB won’t make notable gains against the dollar even though Chinese GDP growth will significantly outpace the US’s.

And in case you were wondering, yes the Chinese government has better internal data. It basically says the entire population will be exposed within a few weeks, which almost everyone in China knows already. ft.com/content/1fb604… So… is there really an argument to be made that lack of government information disclosure in this instance is leading people to significantly underestimate how widespread the virus is?

To everyone who mocks the Chinese government’s (yes, blatant) undercounting of Covid cases and deaths, I’d like to ask the following question: assuming that they have more accurate internal data for administrative purposes, what social good would be served by making it public? 1 Would social panic be enhanced or dampened by the disclosure of this data? If your argument is instead that this damages the credibility of official statistics, well, why do you assume those had credibility to begin with, after all the recent fiascos with economic data? 2

If you think that at least half the Chinese population was always going to have concerns/fears about exiting Zero Covid, then you really have to take seriously that the protests were, paradoxically, a positive political development for the government in at least one sense… 1 … which is that they will likely lessen social blame on the government once the virus begins to rapidly spread (which it already has). E.g., most pro-zero Covid people on my social media feeds seem angrier at the protestors than at the government for giving in. Of course… 2

All things considered, this is a positive development—certainly better than the indecisive muddling through that many of us feared after the protests last week. Clear signals being sent from the top now that reviving the economy is the top priority. 1 wsj.com/articles/china… As everyone knows, the exit from Zero Covid will be painful in the short run—based on what happened elsewhere in East Asia, likely for the next six months. Can the government weather that? I’d say the protests helped a bit in that regard: in terms of political optics, it may… 2

Personally, I think the central question that should occupy China scholars over the next couple of months, possibly the next few years, is “how will/should the Chinese government operate in a lower (compared to, say, even last year) political trust environment?” The … 1 … pretty significant damage that zero Covid mismanagement has done to the public’s faith in government competence and credibility can’t be wished away even if you’re an ardent nationalist, so what now? Part of the reason why China could transition, over the past decade, into… 2

Here’s one lesson we can all learn from early modern and modern history: stable regimes always need to capture at least one powerful segment of society and keep it on their side. It can be aristocrats, it can be gentry, it can be capitalists or the intelligentsia, or it… 1 … can even be the masses if the ruler is very skilled at populist politics (e.g., Mao). Keeping everyone on your side is impossible given inherent divides in interest, but you need at least one. Moreover, you need to keep that segment on your side through carrots, not sticks… 2

But seriously, during Jiang Zemin’s years in power, you never could have guessed that people would genuinely miss him, and for good reason. Those were, at the time, difficult years: mass unemployment during the SOE reforms, floods, political crackdowns from time to time… 1 But yeah, they were also years of enormous economic growth and, for the most part, societal hope. They also may have represented the high point in China’s brief infatuation with liberalism. Growing up during that time, my generation basically took for granted that China would… 2

Somewhat bizarrely, recent developments in China seem to validate one crucial piece of traditional Law and Economics wisdom: almost any kind of policy or legal clarity is better than ambiguity and indecisiveness. If I were forced to identify the main proximate cause for the… 1 … recent protests, I’d probably say it was because the government gave off a bundle of signals 2 weeks ago that it was moving towards reopening, and then seemed to backtrack once cases rose. Central policy directives are now full of “do this, but not too much of it”-type… 2

I don’t anticipate many large-scale protests in the next couple of days—the government has enough coercive capacity to prevent them—but judging from Chinese social media, the loss of political trust among the general population is fairly widespread and likely long-term. … 1 … This again demonstrates just how brittle a political foundation built upon nationalist sentiments (which seemed to be something the government was increasingly reliant upon over the previous two years) can be. Economic growth provided something more reliable for a while … 2

There’s a lesson in these protests about the dangers of centralization:the main reason why Chinese protests post-1989 and pre-2019 were local in nature (and therefore less threatening to the government) was that policymaking was also largely decentralized. There was no… 1 … national-level focal point that could mobilize protests across the major population centers. Covid control was arguably the first truly national-level policy that really had a salient impact on everyday life. While it worked, it provided perhaps the biggest boost to… 2

This is the segment of Xi’s Party Congress speech that addresses an issue I care deeply about (“traditional culture”). It’s an intelligent segment, but a few things stand out: first and foremost, he prefers the term “traditional culture,” and has deemphasized “Confucianism.” 1 … In fact, this has been a common characteristic of his past speeches on this issue. Here, too, he emphasizes that Confucianism is but one component of a multi-faceted “traditional culture.” Yes the most prominent component, but still just a component. This suggests that … 2

There’s a simple reason why all the “emperor” labels and analogies being thrown around Twitter are unreasonable: most Chinese emperors neither held unchecked power, nor lacked a succession plan. Prior to the Qing, bureaucrats imposed considerable checks on the emperor’s power, … … so much so, in fact, that it bogged down the state more often than not. During the Qing, Manchu emperors gained more control over the state, but the state’s control over society at large shrunk dramatically, and local self-governance was the norm. …

Because I’m in some dire need of psychological silver linings after the events of the past week, here are some potentially more positive takeaways from the 20th Party Congress (admittedly, this is my way of giving myself therapy, so take these with a grain of salt, if at all): 1 First, “security”—the big keyword—of the main speech, is mainly pitched in a defensive, as opposed to offensive stance. I’m reading it as a reactionary policy against perceived external hostility and turmoil. No change in official language on Taiwan in any way. 2

Alriiight… two weeks from the end of the 20th Party Congress, so it’s time for some predictions. Willing to take bets on any of these if you PM me. First, Xi will stay on for a third term. If you still think that’s in doubt by this point… I really don’t know what to tell you. 1 Second, no clear successor (someone in their early 50s) will be identified. I.e., no such person will be part of the Politburo Standing Committee. A fourth term is more than likely at this point, and no one in Xi’s position would want to appoint an heir so early. Too dangerous. 2

Here’s the basic conundrum faced by economic policymakers: they can’t revive domestic demand if real estate values (and therefore household wealth) keep declining; there’s probably no way to stabilize real estate without more government spending; however… bloomberg.com/news/articles/… … local governments are close to broke due precisely to the decline in real estate values, while the central government’s war chest has also shrunk considerably. The normal way out would simply be to increase the money supply and devalue the RMB, but that risks further damage…

Over the past month, I’ve been surprised (pleasantly?) at how brittle social media Chinese nationalism is in the face of still moderate socioeconomic upheaval. If my Weibo feed (which includes most of the major nationalist public intellectuals) is any indication, it’s been… … forced into a defensive posture far more swiftly than it’s near-total domination over the last two years could have reasonably suggested, and the backlash has been far fiercer. A number of developments have colluded to make this possible: the Shanghai fiasco, economic pain…

Thanks to an unexpected change in Beijing’s quarantine policy that allows international travelers to enter after 14 days instead of 21, I’m finally back at home and in the thick of things now. Daily covid testing now more or less expected, but it’s very convenient, … 1 … no more than a few minutes’ walk in most residential areas. Freedom of movement is still available to most people, and I’ve been taking long walks every morning, but most commercial entities are shut down, and most academic institutions are under pretty strict lockdown… 2

So… a week into quarantine, 2-3 more to go. Room is fine, wifi is decent, food is horrible but won’t kill you. What’s made the strongest impression on me is the sheer scale of government operations devoted to this system: the number of people it employs, the amount of… 1 … resources it controls. Sure, the lockdowns are economically devastating, but getting rid of the entire quarantine and data-tracing apparatus won’t be economically costless either: you build that large an apparatus, and it begins to create its own reasons for existing. 2

So… I’m scheduled to fly back to China tomorrow to deal with a family emergency, and of course Beijing now looks like it’s going into some kind of lockdown or pseudo-lockdown within the next 5 days. This is going to be an… interesting trip. Some basic observations: Beijing obviously has a unique political status within the Chinese system, so there’s massive pressure to avoid a Shanghai-style fiasco. What does that mean? Unfortunately it doesn’t mean that Beijing won’t lockdown. Rather, it’ll probably…