Thread: Are today's missile launches a prelude to a North Korean nuclear test? There's good reason to think so. US, ROK, and IAEA experts have been expecting a test for months, but tensions have been relatively low. Especially the previous two nuclear tests have come after a series of missile tests or in periods of crisis. 9/2016 came after MRBMs, SLBMs, the THAAD announcement, and sanctions. 2017 came after ICBM tests and during "fire and fury."

1. I'm typing a reply to a woman who wrote to me asking for assurance that we are not on the precipice of nuclear war because she was having suicidal thoughts. She's not the first. Two thoughts: 2. Nuclear anxiety, which some cold war researchers believed was a measurable psychological phenomenon that caused despair and developmental problems in children, is not gone. Nuclear reliance + brinksmanship harms people even if the weapons are not used. discovermagazine.com/mind/nuclear-a…

1. Though low, the risk of NATO-Russia conflict is still rising—but I'm less worried about nuclear threats than a Russian move to Ukraine's western or southern borders. 2. NATO weapons and supplies so far flow into Ukraine unimpeded. But if Putin wants to accelerate the attack or reduce the risk of a protracted insurgency, he could try to seal the land border or interdict vessels in the Black Sea.

https://twitter.com/DanLamothe/status/1497960779546562572

1/n. The bottom line: there is a wide range of steps that Russia could take under a "special combat service regime" for its deterrence forces. 2/n. @james_acton32 lists a number of options pertaining to strategic and nonstrategic forces here, which could involve mating warheads to delivery vehicles and increasing the readiness of those systems.

https://twitter.com/james_acton32/status/1497949996829847554

It's President Biden's signature nuclear weapons policy, but most experts are either unsure what it means or hold serious misconceptions. A short summary of my deep dive on sole purpose: 1/

https://twitter.com/FAScientists/status/1438524338249080833

2. Sole purpose is widely seen as a revolutionary shift in US nuclear declaratory policy, but so far this is all it amounts to—a few lines in a @ForeignAffairs article, that build on a 2017 speech, and repeated in the Democratic Platform:

A short, simple thread:
1. Rail mobile missiles are a relatively cheap and reliable option for countries seeking to improve the survivability of their nuclear forces. Russia did it. The US considered it (jstor.org/stable/2538738). It makes a ton of sense for North Korea.

https://twitter.com/ColinZwirko/status/1438247392902483968

2. The advantage of rail mobility is the ability to rapidly transport small numbers of missiles in ways that are difficult to predict or detect with national technical means. In other words, it further decreases the confidence of US forces in preemptive counterforce.

THREAD: 1/ As we receive new reports, it is difficult but critical to keep track of U.S. forces deploying to the Middle East amid heightened risk of war with Iran. This thread will compile and contextualize public reports of new deployments and will be updated. 2/ This thread does not attempt to convey the current status of these units. It does not track rotation of existing force structure into or out of the region, or departure of supplements. It is not intended to be a complete picture of regional posture or recent deployments.

THREAD: I have no idea whether Trump and Kim will announce steps related to Yongbyon in a few hours. But @mhanham’s exceptional thread 👇and some conversations we’ve having inspired some counterintuitive thoughts.

https://twitter.com/mhanham/status/1100408343183519745

2. After a series of concessions, the Trump administration is finally closing in on a reasonable approach to talks. That's for the best, but let's be clear that the concessions sapped their credibility and wasted the year of greatest promise—and they're still lacking a strategy.

THREAD on Trump ordering “the Pentagon to prepare options for drawing down American troops in South Korea.” Americans need to know just how extreme and irresponsible this is. nytimes.com/2018/05/03/wor… 2. In 2015-16, I directed the @CFR_org Task Force on North Korea, a group of 17 leading experts. In a 101 page report, these sentences, one part of recommendation 1, were by far the most controversial:

1. The inter-Korean joint declaration is a momentous event that represents Moon’s vision for peaceful coexistence with North Korea. The full text contains exhilarating possibilities & deep pitfalls. Follow along as I go through it in detail (1/20+). Text: m.yna.co.kr/mob2/en/conten… 2. Let’s start at the end, with denuclearization. This simple statement does not expand on previous North Korean declarations. It could have been helpful to give US negotiators a head start with in-principle definitions of “complete" denuclearization,—

Running THREAD: The administration is giving contradictory statements of its negotiating position with North Korea. Shifting standards will confuse allies and let Pyongyang pick and choose. 2. 4/22, White House Director of Legislative Affairs Marc Short. Sentences conflict. Latter could permit retention of warheads and devices rendered undeliverable, fissile material, nuclear facilities intact, missiles, CBW. nbcnews.com/meet-the-press…

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THREAD: With the news that John Bolton will become National Security Advisor on 4/9, are his views on North Korea really so bad? A close look shows he’s genuinely one of the most extreme, irresponsible, and dangerous voices in the country. 2. The first thing to note is that Bolton has plainly disparaging of Trump administration policy. Trump's pressure campaign has not brought Kim to the table, has been too weak, and has not changed anything. Days after the first DPRK missile launch, Bolton argued: