PTDO Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities @DeptofDefense | Views mine
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Aug 23, 2024 • 4 tweets • 2 min read
I am arguing for making denying China hegemony the organizing principle of US strategy, not defending Taiwan.
If the US cannot defend Taiwan at tolerable cost bc the mil balance is unfavorable then we shouldn't fight a losing war over a strong but not existential interest. 1/
We cannot be "all in" on something as you suggest that is not an existential interest of Americans (e.g., our own physical security, territorial sovereignty) w/o regard to the level of cost, risk, and time.
Should we defend Taiwan if it means a pyrrhic victory that would degrade our military so badly and allow China to rearm faster (bc of their much stronger DIB) and gain hegemony in Asia anyway? 2/
Aug 22, 2024 • 4 tweets • 1 min read
Arresting the eroding military balance in the Indo-Pacific by bolstering US force posture, ensuring Taiwan Japan etc have what they need, stop divesting existing relevant force structure, etc.
Very happy to talk specifics at your convenience. A few relevant past posts follow 1/
I traveled to Taiwan earlier this month & had the opportunity to hear from various national security officials, highlight Sen. Hawley's priorities, & see Taiwan firsthand.
BLUF: Taiwan is still defensible, but time is very short & the Taiwans are not doing what's required. 1/
Taiwan quite literally faces an existential threat. If China makes good on its threats to "reunify" them, Taiwan will no longer exist. Those are the very clear stakes for the Taiwans. 2/
Given the desparate nature of the cross-Strait military balance, Taiwan needs to fundamentally reconsider their approach to countering so-called "grey zone" coercion.
What are the opportunity costs of countering these incursions, in CG operations, new investments, etc. 1/
Right now, China is *successfully* imposing costs on Taiwan through this approach. Given the fundamental asymmetries bw China/Taiwan, this is a losing strategy from Taiwan.
The National Defense Strategy Commission's diagnosis is basically correct: the US faces dangerous foreign threats and our military power has sharply atrophied relative to them.
But its prescriptions are unrealistic, inadequate, or in some cases actually counterproductive. 1/
The commission warns of sharp inadequacies in the US military vis-a-vis our adversaries, esp China. And the trends are worsening. 2/
Jun 5, 2024 • 15 tweets • 5 min read
Calls for a multi-theater defense strategy--like the one Tom Mahnken of @CSBAdc offers today in @ForeignAffairs--are strategically unnecessary, politically unrealistic, and fiscally irresponsible.
The thrust of the piece is Mahnken advocating the US adopt a 3-war military. But he lists at least 4 potential conflicts DoD must be able to fight simultaneously.
So why stop at a 3-war force? Why not 4? What about counterterrorism & homeland defense? 2/
May 21, 2024 • 6 tweets • 2 min read
Another entry in the oeuvre contending we're overly focusing on a PLA invasion of Taiwan at the expense of countering grey zone @jekavanagh @IBKardon
But grey zone strategies lack a credible theory of victory & countering them is actually *counterproductive* for DC & Taipei 1/
I agree that defending Taiwan is a vital interest. That's why we should making *absolutely sure* we are getting that defense posture right before addressing other interests.
Those who contend to prioritize China should advocate policies that *actually* prioritize it. 1/
While defending Taiwan is in the US vital interest, it's not existential, & the US is not prioritizing it. The US-China military balance has eroded sharply & we continue to prioritize Ukraine and Europe.
The Senate passed the national security supplemental over the objections of the majority of Senate Republicans.
This bill, if passed, will *gravely and materially* weaken our ability to deny Chinese aggression in the Pacific over the coming years.
The House would be prudent to block it. 1/
America faces no shortage of national security threats, not least that our own borders are wide open. This has real, direct implications for Americans' security and prosperity, but also erodes our own sovereignty. Foreign policy starts at home. 2/
Set aside (if you can) the question of a sustainable, realistic approach to NATO burden sharing.
Politically, I could think of no worse way for Europeans to support Ukraine than the moralistic lecturing of half our electorate. Just shockingly ill-advised & counterproductive. 1/
As some have pointed out, incl @ELuttwak here in @unherd, the macro indicators all point to China rigorously preparing for war: militarily, economically, politically, etc. 2/
@RANDCorporation team led by the superb David Ochmanek out with an indictment of US defense strategy and force planning.
“US defense strategy and posture have become insolvent.”
Thread 1/
rand.org/pubs/research_…
This is basically a classic Lippmann Gap, where US foreign policy commitments outpace the resources allocated to address them. The solutions: increase resources, prune commitments, or assume risk. 2/
What lessons does the Ukraine War have for US military force development? How are force development efforts aligning to US defense strategy?
Unfortunately, not well.
Thread 1/
The Ukraine War is challenging received wisdom in defense analysis circles. Some problems are well-known (anemia of the industrial base, alliance coordination problems) while others are less apparent but no less consequential to US defense strategy. 2/
What should a U.S. defense budget optimized for the strategy of denial look like?
I am pleased to share my report for The Marathon Initiative, "Resourcing the Strategy of Denial." 1/11
themarathoninitiative.org/wp-content/upl…
The study identifies the priority military forces for the strategy of denial, identifies what forces could be de-prioritized, & simulates 3 budgets under this rubric over the 5-year planning period known as the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). 2/11
A useful report by @NDIAToday re: the health of the US defense industrial base (DIB). Thread 1/
ndia.org/policy/publica…
The report lists the key indicators for assessing the health of the DIB (and they aren't good): fewer people, fewer companies, shrinking financial commitment, less predictability, and limited surge capacity. 2/
Jan 13, 2023 • 15 tweets • 6 min read
How is US military aid to Ukraine affecting critical munitions stockpiles? How does this affect US military preparedness for its priority defense planning scenario, a PRC invasion of Taiwan?
A thread based on my analysis and some important work from @CSIS 1/
Based on Mark Cancian’s sound research & @DeptofDefense disclosures, the US has provided an enormous amount of critical platforms & munitions to Ukraine, incl HIMARS, Javelins, Stingers, GMLRS, & 155mm artillery ammunition. 2/
Jan 10, 2023 • 25 tweets • 8 min read
While I’m pleased to see more US-PRC wargaming efforts in the unclassified space, analysts ought to be cautious what insights they draw from this series.
Thread based on my experience gaming & analyzing US-PRC conflict & crisis scenarios 1/
First, some insights I think this series/report gets at least partially right:
1) Casualties—Any major power war would almost certainly be incredibly bloody. The report rightly acknowledges this, and the limitations of their game here: 2/
Dec 10, 2022 • 20 tweets • 7 min read
Senior GO/FOs’ (general/flag officers) statements and testimony are important indicators for anyone assessing changing military balances. Here’s a thread of a few recent GO/FO comments on the state of the US-PRC military balance 1/
1) We have to balance that on one hand a) GO/FOs—esp service chiefs & CCDRs—have bureaucratic incentives to inflate the threat (more $, forces etc) & on the other b) their remarks are often useful proxies for classified intelligence on adversaries... 2/
