The updated count on RU towed artillery in storage has been published by @HighMarsed (HM) and @CovertCabal (CC):


(Attached image taken from the video)

Let's see what might have happened.

https://x.com/HighMarsed/status/1836804093114786203

As HM explains, the method has changed. The systems are grouped according to size: large, medium, small, mortars. An "unknown" category has been added.

This unknown category is something we will pay special attention to, as many of the "unknown" are irregular systems.

I decided to take a quick look at the official 🇷🇺 MoD reports of daily 🇺🇦 losses.

@NedSnow2019 has taken upon himself/herself to handle the unenviable task of collecting these reports. Much has been said about the aviation loss claims, so I won't focus on these. Same with HIMARS launchers, of which 93 have been destroyed, out of 39 delivered to Ukraine.

The category where the greatest discrepancy exists between reports and the possible reality is artillery.

What might be happening in the rear areas in Kursk: a short thread on the RU logistics and support units that might be involved.

This is based on official information released by the RU MoD and other open sources. It is harder to get visual confirmation of rear and logistics units involved in a specific sector.

However, we could extrapolate based on our general knowledge of the structure of the logistics units + confirmations from the RU MoD.

In a total war, when a commander is asked how much of something he needs, the answer is a straightforward "Yes". That's pretty much the origin story of the Soviet WW2-era ZiS-3 gun.

Let's see what that story's implications might be from today's perspective. In the first months after the opening of the Eastern Front (or the start of The Great Patriotic War, depending on the POV), the Soviet army sustained heavy artillery losses.

This prompted them to look for a cheap and easy to mass produce gun. The ZiS-3 design was selected.

The biggest artillery storage base you've never heard of, and what might have been stored there.

Ikovka (55.595955, 64.962645)

(Warning: a very nerdy thread ahead) The biggest 🇷🇺 towed artillery storage facility is the base near Planovyi (also referred to as Shchuchye, officially military unit 58661-58).

According to @HighMarsed the base stored 4,757 towed artillery pieces in 2021.

Since I published my analysis on remaining 🇷🇺 artillery stocks, the most common question has been "why is it so difficult for 🇷🇺 to produce more artillery units and barrels?"

Probably the most concise answer is this:

https://twitter.com/theleva7/status/1772517463126630894

Recently @skarsgr2 pointed me in the direction of this article from last year, which offers a more detailed explanation:

The author refers to this earlier article published in late 2022, which cites 🇷🇺 military sources: dailykos.com/stories/2023/7…
novayagazeta.eu/articles/2022/…

A few weeks ago @CovertCabal and @HighMarsed published the most detailed publicly available count of RU artillery units in storage. The count offers a very compelling low-end estimate of what's left in storage. Let's try and make some adjustments.

A long thread. The problem with arty is it's further away from the frontline, offering lower visibility on average. It is relatively easier to recover once hit, so a damaged/destroyed unit will stay at a visible spot for a shorter time. This makes it harder for losses to be visually confirmed.

This is a quick and by no means exhaustive review of what Russia might be producing in terms of new artillery systems.

Focus so far has mostly been on shells, which I believe might be the wrong thing to look at if you're attempting to find potential artillery-related shortages. There are 4 factories that produce (or have recently produced) new artillery units and related artillery-specific components:
- Uraltransmash: 2S19 Msta-S, 2S35 Koalitsiya, 2S40 Floks, 2S3 Akatsiya (modernization)
- Motovilikha Plants: 2S34 Khosta, 2S31 Vena
(continues...)

One problem @HighMarsed and @CovertCabal faced during their 🇷🇺 storage satellite image count was distinguishing between D-20, D-1, and M-30 howitzers.

This is important, because this set of systems represents over 50% of all visible stored towed arty.

https://twitter.com/HighMarsed/status/1753578892344877301

The D-1 and M-30 systems have important qualitative differences that make them unlikely candidates for reactivation.

https://twitter.com/waffentraeger/status/1753866509724635504

I've previously discussed some calculations and adjustments to data on visually confirmed 🇷🇺 losses in the 🇷🇺🇺🇦 war. As a follow-up, I'd like to look at more precise calculations on total losses + remaining stocks.

Let's first look at MBTs. We work with imperfect data. Thus, a number of adjustments are required.

In general, the greater the required adjustment, the lower the confidence in the estimate. Many of the data points we have require significant adjustments, so the estimates below are low confidence.

A key question related to the 🇷🇺🇺🇦 war is when 🇷🇺 will exhaust its reserves of key military equipment - tanks (MBTs), armoured vehicles, artillery, various transportation vehicles. Two ingredients needed to answer that: rate of loss, remaining stock. Some thoughts on losses data. Many journalists and even military analysts use available data in ways I find suboptimal. As the time passes and numbers accumulate, such analyses based on wrong interpretations may lead to very misleading conclusions. So discussing the underlying data is important.

Why everyone should help 🇺🇦 clear landmines as fast as possible – the most important thread I've written.

The response to the 🇷🇺 invasion of 🇺🇦 has been muted in some parts of the world. Exploring the reasons is a story for another time, but everyone should be concerned.

1/23 UA is often referred to as the breadbasket of Europe. Its lands contain a quarter of one of the most fertile soils on earth – the black soil.

At the same time, the country is not densely populated, with 72 people per sq km (compared to 234 in Germany, and 428 in India).

2/23