The Presidency has confirmed what many of us have been saying regarding the exercise, including that Ramaphosa's instruction, delayed by Chinese obstruction, was that Iran shouldn't actively participate.
This instruction was ignored by the SANDF, Iran, UAE, Russia, and China.

https://twitter.com/News24/status/2012459801817620559

It's impossible to overstate what a big deal this is. According to all the evidence shared publicly and reported so far, senior leaders in the SANDF conspired with Iran, Russia, the UAE, and China to disobey an order from Ramaphosa & nobody in any position did anything about it.

It’s a terrible response from Monyela.

Not only does it go against South Africa’s commitments in the NPT and Pelindaba Treaty, but it’s an emotional reaction arguing for something completely infeasible as South Africa cannot afford a viable nuclear deterrent.

https://twitter.com/deanwingrin/status/2007430962200678723

Apartheid South Africa’s nuclear capability was relatively small, done using the cheapest and simplest possible devices, and yet was so costly that both the weapons and the IRBM/ICBM delivery platforms were one of the first things cancelled in 1990-1994.

One of the more interesting chapters in the history between South Africa and Russia was the way relations warmed substantially between the apartheid government and the Gorbachev & Yeltsin administrations, even to the point of sharing a top secret defence technology project. 1/ In late 1989 with Perestroika in full swing and the war in Angola coming to a negotiated end, the two countries began talking. SA no longer feared what was still the USSR and needed aircraft engines, and the USSR in turn was looking for more funding to support its projects. 2/

There was no valid reason for the ship to turn off its AIS transponder in South African waters, which ships are not supposed to be allowed to do.
The government can’t complain that people are treating the ship’s visit with suspicion when every single step was deeply suspicious.

https://twitter.com/jsphctrl/status/1657670431518732288

I don’t know for certain whether anything was loaded onto the Lady R, but as citizens we deserve an explanation for the bizarre secrecy & unusual actions taken around it and proof that everything was above board. That should include manifests, CCTV footage, and similar evidence.

The status of all of the SANDF’s ongoing acquisition projects being managed by Armscor, from a recent presentation to Parliament. Note the delays, some caused by the increasingly dysfunctional relationship between the SANDF and Armscor, and the many unfunded requirements. Some of the associated project names on the SAAF side:
Item 1 is ASSEGAAI
4 might be BADMO/BANDMO
9 is KAMAS
10 is probably MATZO
12 is MOTHUSI
13 is MUGGIE
14 is I think ACHILLES, but AFAIK that was already delivered. This may be a follow on.

We finally get an official response, confirming what a lot of us had been hearing from our sources, but the minister still dodges the pertinent questions. Why, if this was above board, was a fake emergency declared? If ordered before the pandemic, why only make delivery now?

https://twitter.com/dailymaverick/status/1605937557333856260

Modise is trying to make this about the US, when in reality it's about the misleading of South Africa's citizens and the refusal to be transparent about actions the South African government took. Whatever diplomatic issue exists with the US on sanctioned vessels is separate.

For years the DPE and Denel have been able to avoid confronting their own failures & the effective bankruptcy of the company by short paying employees and ignoring court orders to stop doing it. Suppliers, too, went unpaid. It’s indefensible & has destroyed all trust in Denel. 1/

https://twitter.com/DPE_ZA/status/1557733706634129409

Many lives, both amongst employees & small local specialist suppliers, have been ruined through personal bankruptcies, suicides, and divorces, amongst other things. DPE & Denel seemed never to care much about it, taking an unjustifiably long time to restructure. 2/

Another excellent thread from Jon Hawkes, and of course highly relevant to the SANDF which relies almost entirely on wheeled AFVs and has had to deal with all of these questions. Especially given the huge distances SANDF AFVs self-deploy over for Ex Ndlovu & AFD each year. 1/

https://twitter.com/JonHawkes275/status/1501148609911435268

SANDF doctrine is still based on SADF-era 'fighting columns' style combat as described by Michael Morris. apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/…

It can be enormously effective for short bursts, but it can't be sustained for very long in the field before needing overhaul at rear bases. 2/

Something missed in most of the quoting of Mearsheimer regarding Russia's invasion of Ukraine is mistaking what might be rational for what is right. It's very rational for Russia to want to control Ukraine, the Nordics, and the Baltics. But it is not correct behaviour in 2022. 1/ It's rational, too, in a Realist sense for South Africa to seek to use our power to control the foreign and domestic policies of our neighbours, just as Russia is doing. You could even justify it as heading off Chinese & Western encroachment. It wouldn't be right, however. 2/

This is an interesting take, which seems quite plausible. The ANC's foreign policy approach can no longer be explained purely through the lens of historical assistance, and the ANC's own statements often reflect aligned worldviews more than just appreciation of past debts. 1/4

https://twitter.com/wheretheroad/status/1501131947417944070

I think there's a gap in the S African academic & policy space in terms of understanding the psychology, shared worldview, and information sources of our political class. We've seen mention of Luthuli House 'Kremlinology' but nobody has really performed that level of analysis.2/4

When I say that the Dept of Defence should be given back control of its facilities from DPWI & its IT from SITA it’s not because I think the DoD would automatically be less corrupt & more efficient at the task. It’s instead about increasing accountability. Let me explain why. 1/ First, the DoD is not inherently immune to procurement corruption, and has seen its fair share of tender fraud. In some areas it has better controls than the average department, especially for major acquisitions, but for more generic things the same procurement flaws exist. 2/

Earlier today I spoke to the Selby Bokaba, the City of Tshwane's spokesperson, to get more information on the city's view on its cutting off of services to various military-related buildings and Denel Lyttelton facility for non-payment. I have summarised his responses. 1/10 According to Bokaba the four SANDF-related properties at 224 Visagie Street, such as the SA Navy Headquarters, Peterson Bothongo House, and the General Piet Joubert building are owned by the Bothongo Group, which is the account holder responsible for payment. 2/10

Not enough attention has been paid to how badly National Treasury's disastrous Integrated Financial Management System (IFMS) has been for government departments, which have been banned from upgrading or renewing their obsolete core IT systems since 2006. 1/ IFMS was intended as a single ERP and financial management solution to replace all related legacy government IT systems relating to finance, logistics & asset management, human resources, and other core functins with a new single integrated system managed by National Treasury. 2/

One of the fascinating things about researching apartheid-era South African defence projects is just how much foreign involvement there was in some of them, despite the UN arms embargo, and how far everyone involved went to hide that cooperation. Some still remains secret. 1/ Of course, this wasn't true for every project of that era, nor does it mean that South African engineers weren't capable. The opposite: The country produced a set of highly skilled scientists and engineers, albeit at substantial cost, and a robust local defence industry. 2/

Some background might be useful to explain whether or not the LSWV’s demands are legitimate.

Between 1993 and 1996 the SADF, MK, APLA, and TBVC forces were integrated into a new force, the SANDF, via a carefully negotiated process agreed to by all sides. 1/

https://twitter.com/darren_olivier/status/1449350369323126784

Each force produced a Certified Personnel Register (CPR) of its members for either integration or demobilisation depending on age, skills, and willingness to integrate. MK’s list had 28 888 names, APLA’s had 6 000. A British military advisory team oversaw the process. 2/

This is an ignorant take. Generals have historically made terrible defence ministers of defence. Mattis & Austin are a rarity even in the US. It’s why most countries don’t do it. What ministers need is not long military service but excellent public policy background & experience.

https://twitter.com/RomanCabanac/status/1418106833991086082

In all of NATO, only five defence ministers have significant military experience. Only one, the US, is a former general officer. This isn’t by accident: It’s because the skills and duties of a minister of defence are very different to those of a military commander.

The Minister of Defence just told Parliament that the number of SANDF personnel deployed to restore order will be increased to 25 000 for three months. Not all will be ground troops, with some portion in support roles, but it's still the SANDF's biggest deployment since 1994. 1/ Reaching this number means reaching to the very back of the cupboard and taking everything that can move, no matter the cost or sustainability. It leaves nothing in reserve & halts all other SANDF duties & commitments. It's a reflection of just how desperate things are. 2/

Seeing as people are shocked by just 2500 troops:
1. It may be all the SAPS requested at NATJOINTS
2. Even so, the SA Army really isn’t that big. There are only 63 000 active uniformed SANDF members. About 34 000 are in the army, with only ~12 000 in dedicated infantry units. 1/

https://twitter.com/darren_olivier/status/1414663708941463554

Those 12 000 or so SANDF soldiers in infantry units are split across 14 battalions. At any given time around 5 battalions are committed to peacekeeping & border patrol, leaving 9 battalions or ~8 000 troops. That doesn’t mean they’re available for long term deployments though. 2/

It's important to understand that this deployment is taking place under S201 of the Constitution and S18 & S19 of the Defence Act, and is therefore a deployment in co-operation with the SAPS rather than one where the SANDF has independent control & emergency powers. 1/

https://twitter.com/SANDF_ZA/status/1414527639893725184

SANDF soldiers deployed in co-operation with the SAPS have some policing powers, such as detaining suspects, but can't do things like arrest people without handing them over to the SAPS. All actions need to be co-ordinated with the SAPS via the regional PROVJOC. 2/

I'm honestly disappointed. This tweet is unprofessional in its framing, sensationalist, and not the quality I expect from the M&G. The article is no better, as it adopts a breathless tabloid-style tone and doesn't back up key claims like the purported R200 million cost. 1/

https://twitter.com/mailandguardian/status/1405576206997757963

First, newspapers should ditch the 'Mabena' meme. It's misleading, patronising, and fundamentally unsuited for serious commentary on the armed forces. It would be like framing all reporting on govt departments or politics as 'mamparas', which would obviously be inappropriate. 2/

One of the most frustrating things about the defence debate in SA is the lack of knowledge about what capabilities & missions cost. e.g. To fund the existing Navy just for full utilisation would require doubling its budget to around R8-9 billion p.a. But it wouldn’t be enough. 1/ Realistically, SA would need dozens more ships & aircraft to be able to properly patrol its huge EEZ, mammoth search & rescue area, and conduct foreign operations like those off Mozambique. It’s too large an area for four frigates & a few OPVs, esp. with maintenance cycles. 2/