databaazi Profile picture
5 Jul 19
Want to know exactly *how big* a disaster Aadhaar is? And how incompetent the UIDAI is?

Check the timestamp on that tweet.

Then check the validity of that Aadhaar.


And we're not even done with the ANI examples yet.

Again, check timestamp then verify Aadhaar status.

Incompetence elevated to an art form. #AbolishUIDAI
Read 3 tweets
27 Apr 19
The IL&FS Aadhaar enrolment scandal - Part 1

Why the Aadhaar database is fatally compromised, why the UIDAI has known about it for years, and how they covered it up. (thread)
2. This is a story about a scandal so big it should have marked the cancellation of the entire Aadhaar project (and, if fully reported, still will).
3. It begins in Hyderabad, in 2012. The Govt of undivided Andhra Pradesh was one of the earliest and most enthusiastic adopters of Aadhaar. So much so that, by 2012, Hyderabad district *already had more Aadhaar numbers than people*.
Read 40 tweets
6 Jan 19
Journalists: here is the complete breakdown of Arun Jaitley's Rs. 90,000 crore "Aadhaar savings" lie.

Please test *any* element of it against reality.
Here is the original takedown of the World Bank's "Aadhaar savings" lie (as used by the govt in the Supreme Court).

Here is the detailed explanation of the World Bank's efforts to cover up their initial error once they were publicly challenged.

Read 5 tweets
9 Dec 18
@mihirssharma Shamika Ravi is Director of Research at Brookings India.

@mihirssharma "Support for the Brookings India Health Monitor was generously provided by HCL Foundation."…
Read 6 tweets
11 Aug 18
Since the #Ujjwala LPG connection scheme was (paid) trending last week, it may be useful to discuss its relationship to the ongoing Aadhaar data catastrophe, and specifically to the furore surrounding R.S. Sharma's latest contribution on the issue. (1/7)
Here is R.S. Sharma's response to the controversy. (2/7)
Others have already unpacked the various lies and misrepresentations in it, but there's one statement of specific relevance to Ujjwala:

"People are also providing a copy of their Aadhaar cards to various service providers, though this is neither required nor desirable."

Read 8 tweets
8 May 18
"Aadhaar is the biggest fraud in the country."

- Ananth Kumar, BJP MP for Bangalore South
"I have always been saying Aadhaar is niraadhaar."

- Ananth Kumar, BJP MP for Bangalore South
"We will scrap it [Aadhaar]. Lock, stock and barrel, it will be thrown into the dustbin."

- Ananth Kumar, BJP MP for Bangalore South
Read 6 tweets
7 May 18
Of Aadhaar and "vested interests": A short thread
19feb16: "Microsoft is working with the Indian government to link Skype with the Aadhaar database".…
31may16: "Microsoft’s plan to link...Skype with the Aadhaar database for making authenticated calls with government institutions and others is expected to move further with Minister...Ravi Shankar Prasad indicating his consent to the plan".…
Read 6 tweets
7 Apr 18
Note to journalists:

Want to blow the lid off a scandal far larger than Cambridge Analytica?

Just ask this one simple question - how?
If that's too difficult, here's how you break it down:

1) How many of these 30 crore+ voters *personally and specifically linked* their voter ID to an Aadhaar number (including auditable evidence of prior informed consent)?

2) How many of these 30 crore+ voters *are even aware* their voter ID has been linked to an Aadhaar number?

3) So where did all these Aadhaar numbers bulk-linked to voter IDs come from?

Read 9 tweets
15 Feb 18
This is another story the UIDAI *really* hopes people have forgotten about.…
Read 21 tweets
23 Jan 18
"It [consent] is not required".

- UIDAI CEO A.B. Pandey

Here is the full text of the (transparently illegal) section of the Aadhaar Bill that the govt inserted in an attempt to give itself a retrospective amnesty.
Read 2 tweets
4 Jan 18
@nixxin "For online grievances, no mechanism is available at PG [Public Grievance] portal through which the requisite information may be sorted or quantified. No such record is being maintained for offline grievances.”
@nixxin "Any disclosure of the UIDAI grievance database, which essentially forms a part of the UIDAI CIDR operations, therefore, would have an impact on national security".

- the UIDAI…
@nixxin If you contact the UIDAI call centre, who do you *think* you talk to? A UIDAI employee?
Read 5 tweets
21 Nov 17
For Servam, it's these guys:
They even attend departmental meetings.
Read 4 tweets
7 Nov 17
Latest data on the Aadhaar enrolment crisis: (1/10)
Largely unreported, the Aadhaar enrolment infrastructure has finally collapsed under the weight of its own dysfunction. The table below shows that the number of operators reported blacklisted (49,000) is now equivalent to *122.5%* of total active operators (40,000). (2/10)
To understand the scale of the crisis, if these operators were responsible for processing *just the average number of enrolments per certified operator*, this would translate to *140 million Aadhaar numbers* having been issued through operators now banned for malpractice. (3/10)
Read 10 tweets
2 Nov 17
The Aadhaar 'savings' lie: a deconstruction

Total 'saving' claimed: Rs. 57,029 crore
Actual saving *before costs*: Rs. 174 crore

Full breakdown and list of sources below. (1/7)
Source for detailed breakdown of the Rs. 36,144 crore claim: Lok Sabha Unstarred Question 1692 (25.11.16). Link: (2/7)
Source for detailed breakdown of the Rs. 49,560 crore claim: Rajya Sabha Starred Question 384 (07.04.17). Link: (3/7)
Read 7 tweets
30 Oct 17
Remember the UIDAI’s announcement in November 2015 that it had appointed international audit and consultancy firm PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) to audit and review Aadhaar security? (1/6)…
PwC has been deeply embedded in the Aadhaar program since its inception, and the firm is also responsible for operating the Servam database-linking program (Project architect: Ravi Goyal; Lead directors: Ashwani Mahaldar and Vikram Sharma), (2/6)
for running Aadhaar mirror databases at the state level (for example in Karnataka), (3/6)
Read 6 tweets
24 Oct 17
Latest data on duplicate Aadhaar numbers: (1/5)
Largely unnoticed, the govt just *almost doubled* the disclosed figure for total Aadhaar numbers cancelled (not just ‘deactivated’). In answer to Lok Sabha SQ255 (02.08.17), the govt stated that ‘during the last 3 years, about 5 lakh Aadhaar have been cancelled’. (2/5)
The previous total for *disclosed* Aadhaar cancellations was 554,821, of which 418,254 had been cancelled as of 28.02.13 (link:…). So the new *minimum* figure for total Aadhaar numbers cancelled (not just deactivated) is ‘about’ 918,254. (3/5)
Read 5 tweets
23 Oct 16
1. Notable provisions of the recently notified Aadhaar regulations on Aadhaar deactivation and cancellation:
2. Aadhaar numbers can be deactivated by the UIDAI *at any time* and *on any basis* ‘as deemed appropriate by the Authority’.
3. Aadhaar numbers can be cancelled ('omitted') by UIDAI *at any time* and *on any basis* if it deems the enrolment to ‘appear fraudulent’.
Read 6 tweets