Why the Aadhaar database is fatally compromised, why the UIDAI has known about it for years, and how they covered it up. (thread)
2. This is a story about a scandal so big it should have marked the cancellation of the entire Aadhaar project (and, if fully reported, still will).
3. It begins in Hyderabad, in 2012. The Govt of undivided Andhra Pradesh was one of the earliest and most enthusiastic adopters of Aadhaar. So much so that, by 2012, Hyderabad district *already had more Aadhaar numbers than people*.
Since the #Ujjwala LPG connection scheme was (paid) trending last week, it may be useful to discuss its relationship to the ongoing Aadhaar data catastrophe, and specifically to the furore surrounding R.S. Sharma's latest contribution on the issue. (1/7)
Here is R.S. Sharma's response to the controversy. (2/7)
Others have already unpacked the various lies and misrepresentations in it, but there's one statement of specific relevance to Ujjwala:
"People are also providing a copy of their Aadhaar cards to various service providers, though this is neither required nor desirable."
31may16: "Microsoft’s plan to link...Skype with the Aadhaar database for making authenticated calls with government institutions and others is expected to move further with Minister...Ravi Shankar Prasad indicating his consent to the plan".
@nixxin "For online grievances, no mechanism is available at PG [Public Grievance] portal through which the requisite information may be sorted or quantified. No such record is being maintained for offline grievances.”
@nixxin "Any disclosure of the UIDAI grievance database, which essentially forms a part of the UIDAI CIDR operations, therefore, would have an impact on national security".
Latest data on the Aadhaar enrolment crisis: (1/10)
Largely unreported, the Aadhaar enrolment infrastructure has finally collapsed under the weight of its own dysfunction. The table below shows that the number of operators reported blacklisted (49,000) is now equivalent to *122.5%* of total active operators (40,000). (2/10)
To understand the scale of the crisis, if these operators were responsible for processing *just the average number of enrolments per certified operator*, this would translate to *140 million Aadhaar numbers* having been issued through operators now banned for malpractice. (3/10)
Remember the UIDAI’s announcement in November 2015 that it had appointed international audit and consultancy firm PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) to audit and review Aadhaar security? (1/6) economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/p…
PwC has been deeply embedded in the Aadhaar program since its inception, and the firm is also responsible for operating the Servam database-linking program (Project architect: Ravi Goyal; Lead directors: Ashwani Mahaldar and Vikram Sharma), (2/6)
Largely unnoticed, the govt just *almost doubled* the disclosed figure for total Aadhaar numbers cancelled (not just ‘deactivated’). In answer to Lok Sabha SQ255 (02.08.17), the govt stated that ‘during the last 3 years, about 5 lakh Aadhaar have been cancelled’. (2/5)
The previous total for *disclosed* Aadhaar cancellations was 554,821, of which 418,254 had been cancelled as of 28.02.13 (link: planningcommission.nic.in/sectors/dbt/fa…). So the new *minimum* figure for total Aadhaar numbers cancelled (not just deactivated) is ‘about’ 918,254. (3/5)